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About the Project 
 
RESPOND is a three-year project (2017-2020) that is funded by the European Commission 
under Horizon2020 Programme with the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy 
coherence of the European Union (EU), its member states, and neighbours. RESPOND is a 
comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 Refugee Crisis which 
is one of the biggest challenges that the Union has faced since its establishment. The crisis 
foregrounded the vulnerability of European borders, the tenuous jurisdiction of the Schengen 
system and broad problems with multi-level governance of migration and integration. One of 
the most visible impacts of the refugee crisis has been the polarization of politics in EU Member 
States and intra-Member State policy (in)coherence in responding to the crisis. 
 
Bringing together 14 partners from 7 disciplines, RESPOND aims to:  
• provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at 
macro, meso and micro levels through cross-country comparative research; 
• critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing the migration 
governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and third 
countries. 
 
RESPOND is a comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 Refugee 
Crisis. The project probes policy-making processes and policy (in)coherence through 
comparative research in source, transit, and destination countries. 
 
RESPOND addresses how policy (in)coherence between the EU, MSs as well as between 
states differentially positioned as transit, hosting and source countries affect migration 
governance. Specifically, by delineating interactions and outcomes between national refugee 
systems and the EU, we will analyse the reasons behind the apparent policy incoherence. 
 
RESPOND studies migration governance through a narrative which is constructed along five 
thematic fields: (1) Border management and security, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) 
Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. Each thematic 
field is reflecting a juncture in the migration journey of refugees and designed to provide a 
holistic view of policies, their impacts and responses given by affected actors within. 
 
The work plan is organized around 11 work packages (WPs) – of which 8 have research tasks. 
The project also includes two WPs to organize impact-related activities targeting different 
audiences, including the scientific community, policy actors and the public in general. 
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Executive Summary 
 
This report examines the border management and migration control regime in Turkey, 
analysing its main legal and policy framework as well as the organisations and actors involved 
in policy implementation. Drawing from the empirical material, the report focuses on pre-entry 
measures, “at the border” controls, controls within the national territory, and return policy fields. 
The report aims to understand to what extent, and how, Turkey’s border management and 
migration control measures have changed from 2011 to 2017, how the changes have 
influenced policy implementations, and what the main gaps are between the legal frameworks 
and actual practices. The report also focuses on how relevant (state, non-state and national, 
local international and supranational) actors interact in implementing measures and what the 
patterns of cooperation and tensions are among them. 
 
The analysis shows that, in the given period, the dominant perspective in Turkey about border 
management has revolved first around the notion of humanitarianism, which is exemplified by 
the open-door policy towards forced migrants from Syria, and later on securitization within the 
context of combating illegal immigration and protecting national security. The relationship with 
external actors, such as that of the EU, has played a role in prioritising and strengthening 
border management in Turkey. Evidence on the main institutions and actors who implement 
the border management and migration control measures display the key issues at stake. These 
are primarily related to the presence of more than 20 different legal regulations that are 
overlapping and contradictory to some extent, the lack of a uniform civilian border management 
unit and adequate capacity to effectively monitor entries and exits. Moreover, the protracted 
refugee situation of more than three million Syrians in Turkey, and the highly centralist state 
policies appear to be important aspects of migration control policy. In reference to the specific 
fields, the findings are the following: For pre-entry, Turkey’s liberal visa policy and the EU-
Turkey Readmission Agreement (RA, 2013) and the EU-Turkey Statement (Statement, 2016) 
have a significant impact on irregular border crossings (both entries to and exits from Turkey) 
of migrants. Unilateral cross-border operations and interventions from Turkey in northern Syria 
have reduced the mass arrivals of Syrians since 2016. Concerning the “At-the-border” 
dimension, here the policy change from an open-door policy towards stricter border controls 
are observable. The strict stance was also supported by other measures including the 
construction of a wall on the Turkey- Syria border, more border surveillance and sea rescue. 
Main internal controls measures include obligations about registration, reporting, updating and 
taking travel permits for movement within and out of Turkey. 
 
In formulating policy recommendations, the report concludes that Turkey should develop a 
more civilian border management structure and eliminate vagueness and contradictions in its 
legal framework. Regarding the situation at the border, blocking the migratory flows in 
neighbourhoods by constructing a border wall or conducting unilateral military operations may 
not be effective border management policy in the long run. In terms of “internal controls”, the 
implementation of travel permit (to be able to travel within Turkey) measures should be re-
formulated, as it significantly limits the exercise of freedom of movement of people who are 
under international or temporary protection in Turkey. In what concerns the “return” dimension, 
voluntary returns should be closely monitored and the non-refoulment principle should always 
be respected. In addition, the procedures and consequences of readmission agreements 
should be carefully analysed. Moreover, to comply with human right standards, Turkey should 
act with more transparency and cooperation with non-state actors in apprehension, 
deportation, and voluntary return of asylum seekers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The country report focuses on the border management and migration control regime and its 
implementation in Turkey with reference to the developments that took place during 2011 and 
2017. In general, the term border management refers to the EU’s ensemble of legislation, 
policies, implementations, institutions, and actors (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018, p.9). 
Within the report, border management refers to all the measures regarding admission and 
entry of third country nationals as defined by the 2016 European Border and Coast Guard 
Directive.1 In addition, in the case of Turkey, as a candidate but still as non-EU country, the 
term migration control also captures the different modes of control that might fall outside the 
EU’s scope as respecting the country-based differences. 
 
Although the RESPOND’s WP2 covers macro, meso and micro level analysis, this report only 
focuses on the macro and meso levels. The macro level analysis focuses on the border 
management related legal and institutional framework. At the meso level, the report aims to 
map the non-state institutions and actors involved in the implementation of border 
management and control policies as well as to explore patterns of cooperation and tensions 
among them. It also aims to explore border governance among different agencies involved in 
implementing migration controls and to understand how state and non-state actors involved in, 
and affected by, understand and respond to border management in Turkey. This includes both 
cooperation in implementing control policies and patterns of resistance. As following the legal 
and institutional framework, the report is organized on the basis of the four spaces and phases 
of controls operated at the macro and meso levels. These include “pre-entry controls”, “at the 
border”, “internal control regime” and “return”.2 
  
                                                             
1 See Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 
on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC. 
2 1. Pre-entry controls: Readmission agreements, measures relating to preventing unauthorised 
migration from the third countries; smuggling/trafficking initiatives; visa requirements; 2. ‘At the Border’: 
Visa & Schengen regimes, Integrated Border management, surveillance at sea and land borders; smart 
borders, information databases (EURODAC, SIS, VIS etc.); facilitators package (smuggling- e.g. 
criminalising transport of unauthorised migrants into the EU by citizens of MS); 3. Internal control regime: 
Regulations on stay and residence; detention; apprehension measures relating to surveying, locating, 
detaining and deporting (note: administrative deportation under national law may be different from the 
EU return regime) unauthorised/undocumented migrants; measures around facilitation/ policies 
regarding access of migrants to welfare, education, healthcare etc.; 4. Return: Return and readmission 
of unauthorised migrants, including detention for the purpose of return. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Sampling and Data Gathering 
 
The first part of the report focuses on the legal and institutional framework of border 
management and migration control. It relies on analysis of the post-2011 legal framework 
which is extremely fragmented. Moreover, the report explores how various other actors have 
addressed migration control; how their views have interacted with responses that changed 
over time and affected policy outcomes and implementations. Along with official documents 
and statements, considering both macro and meso levels, the reports published by 
international organisations and non-governmental organisations provide data on current 
implementations. An online search was also conducted to collect media coverage of migration 
controls. Academic articles and books are widely used in different stages of data analysis and 
writing results. 
 
The second part of the report on implementation relies on meso level analysis. The report is 
based on a multi-sited fieldwork, including semi-structured interviews, participant observation, 
and focus group studies (roundtable) that have been conducted in five cities, namely: Izmir, 
Sanliurfa, Istanbul, Ankara and Canakkale.3 The meso level analysis is based on 15 border-
related meso level interviews in Izmir, 4 in Ankara, 2 in Canakkale, 13 Sanliurfa and 12 in 
Istanbul. In total 46 semi-structured interviews4 have been conducted in those cities between 
July and November 2018. The interviews were conducted with border-related, high level, state 
officers including the representatives from ministries, and directorates [Directorate General of 
Migration Management (DGMM) and Provincial Directorate of Migration Management 
(PDMM)], local government bodies (municipalities, city councils), law enforcement agencies 
(Izmir Gendarmerie Department of Anti-smuggling and Organised Crime Unit, Izmir Provincial 
Directorate of Security Department of Combating Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking), 
provincial civil servants, experts from inter-governmental organisations (such as IOM, 
UNHCR), representatives of international, national, local non-governmental organisations and 
lawyers dealing with cases about migrants. Moreover, the authors have observed several 
policy-oriented workshops in Turkey and have had a dozen informal conversations during 
those workshops with the policy-makers and practitioners on the one hand, and the 
representatives of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), international non-governmental 
organisation (INGOs) and national non-governmental organisation (NGOs) as well as scholars 
on the other. 
 
To deepen understanding of complex border management processes and bordering practices, 
empirical accounts are needed. Considering this, the researchers did fieldwork in Ankara, 
Istanbul and Canakkale, but particularly focused on two border provinces – Izmir and Sanliurfa 
- to collect comprehensive data about border management. Ankara does not have a high 
migrant and/or refugee5 population and it is not one of the border provinces. Nevertheless, as 
a capital city it is important as it hosts international, European and national policy making and 
implementing institutions and their main headquarters or centres such as the EU Delegation 
to Turkey as well as the high-level of national institutions such as the related ministries, but 
also the Directorate General of Migration Management. In addition, Ankara hosts not only IGOs 
but also important international as well as national NGOs. Like Ankara, Istanbul is not a border 
province, but nearly 600,000 Syrians live in Istanbul, which is the highest urban population in 
                                                             
3 The fieldwork and the meso level, border-related semi-structured interviews in Izmir, Ankara and 
Canakkale were conducted and analysed by Dr. N. Ela Gokalp Aras (SRII). In Sanliurfa, they were 
conducted by Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (SRII) and in Istanbul by Prof. Dr. Ayhan Kaya (Istanbul Bilgi 
University) and Dr. Susan Rottmann (Ozyegin University). 
4 The list of interviews is provided in the Appendix 2. 
5 Ankara has 88,373 refugees as of 27 December 2018 (Gocgov, 2018a).  
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Turkey (DGMM, 2019a). It has always been an important “transit hub” and a destination city 
for internal migration.  
 
Izmir is a large metropolis in the western extremity of Anatolia and the third most populous city 
in Turkey. It has been an important “transit” or “gateway” city, which is a significant location for 
the irregular transit migration from Turkey to Europe. It is the main sea-border crossing point 
(exit) both geographically and socially. Since the 1990s, Izmir has been impacted by the 
increasing number of international migrants who move to and through the city, and who have 
come with the intention of settling and/or working, seeking asylum or transiting to a third 
country (Biehl 2014, p.56). As the main transit hub of the Aegean Sea, Izmir has witnessed an 
intense migratory movement in the summer 2015. The city hosts large numbers of Syrians as 
the eighth largest city for Syrian population in the ranking in Turkey. As of March 2019, there 
are 143,666 registered Syrian refugees, who are under temporary protection (gecici koruma) 
in Izmir (DGMM, 2019a). Although the city is not a border one, the majority of the irregular 
migration networks are located there. Izmir has important ties, not only because of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Sea route, but also its link with Istanbul’s networks. The control seems 
extremely difficult, which provides a space for those migrants with intense transnational 
networks (Ibid., p.56).  
 
Until 2010, the sea route to Greece was the major channel for migrants. Due to the increased 
surveillance at the sea border since 2016 by Greek and Turkish coast guards in collaboration 
with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the crossings shifted to the land 
border. As will be shown in this report, central measures of regaining control over the sea 
border such as the RA (2013) and the Statement of March 2016 have been implemented 
mainly through Izmir. In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defence 
Ministers took the decision on 11 February 2016 to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to support 
Greece and Turkey, as well as the EU’s border agency Frontex, in their efforts to tackle the 
refugee and migrant crisis (NATO, 2016). Thus, since Izmir also hosts the NATO base, it is an 
increasingly important province in terms of border management and migration control. The 
following three figures show the spatial importance of Izmir in terms of irregular migration 
cross-border migratory movements. Figure 1 displays the importance of the “Eastern 
Mediterranean Route”, which has the higher numbers for sea-border crossings rather than the 
land border. Figure 2 displays the importance of Izmir in the region, particularly in reference to 
border crossings to the Greek islands. Figure 3 shows the importance of the region and Izmir 
in terms of irregular migration. 
 
Due to the intense number of border-crossings to Lesvos, a Greek island, from 2014 onwards, 
Canakkale was also included in the research, particularly Kucukkuyu, a town in the Ayvacik 
district. The researcher also visited the important crossing-points, where International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has temporary outreach teams and where the Coast Guard 
has special headquarters following from the sharp increase of irregular border-crossings in 
2015 from Turkey to Greece. In this regard, along with Cesme, Dikili6, where the readmissions 
have been conducted until 22nd July 2019), was also visited.  
                                                             
6 According to the meso level interview with state and non-state actors in Izmir and Ankara, as a part of 
the EU-Turkey Statement (based on the Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol legally), 
Gumusluk/Bodrum, Dikili and Cesme/Izmir had been used at the beginning. However, during the report 
period, only Dikili was mentioned for the continuing readmissions by the above-mentioned meso level 
actors.  
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Figure 1: Western, Central and Eastern Mediterranean Migratory Routes 
 
Source: FRONTEX, “Migratory Map”, Available at: <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-map/> [Accessed 14 February 2018].
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Figure 2: Important Border-Crossing Points at the Aegean Sea 
 
Source: Association for Solidarity with Migrants (ASAM), “Aegean Border”, Presentation at RESPOND Turkey 1st 
Routable Meeting, 17 December 2018, Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul. 
 
 
Figure 3: Irregular Migrants Apprehended in 2017 by Provinces 
 
Source: Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) (2018). “Irregular Migration Statistics”, Available 
at: <http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/irregular-migration_915_1024_4746_icerik> [Accessed 16 January 2019]. 
 
 
The fieldwork in Sanliurfa took place in the three most populated districts of the city, namely 
Eyyubiye, Haliliye, (both of which are in the city centre) as well as Siverek, which is 81 
kilometres away from the province centre (Nufusu, 2018). Traditionally, Sanliurfa has not been 
a city receiving internal or international immigrants. As of March 2019, it hosts the second 
largest Syrian population in Turkey, with 451,434 Syrians. 24 % of the total population 
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(1,985,753) are Syrian, meaning that every one person out of four in the city is Syrian (DGMM, 
2019a). 
 
Figure 4: Map of Turkey-Syria Border  
 
Source: Turkiye Gazetesi, 2019. “Sinir Namustur”. Available at: 
<https://www.turkiyegazetesi.com.tr/gundem/330765.aspx> [Accessed 18 February 2019] 
 
Participant observations in some provincial state offices that directly engage with border 
enforcement, internal controls, and deportations also provided significant insights to 
researchers about the implementation of policies at the local level and in the bureaucratic 
culture. Moreover, Ceylanpinar town (100 km away from the province centre) which lies on the 
Syrian border and having both an official border gate and a crowded refugee camp (hosting 
around 22,000 refugees) was visited. The researchers also took a drive along the border where 
the Syrian town of Ras al’Ayn (Resul-Ayn in Turkish) is just less than one kilometre away. This 
visit enabled to see the land border, its geographical dimension, the locations of the 
settlements in the border region, the recently established border wall as well as to learn about 
previous interactions of these towns.  
 
Sanliurfa is one of the four provinces in Turkey to have a border with Syria. The length of 
border is 250 km out of total 911 km of Turkey-Syria border. The population density of the first 
0–100 km of land from the borderline (both in Turkey and Syria) is high, as there are several 
towns on the border. The centre of Sanliurfa is only 55 km away from the border. The province 
has three official border gates, namely Akcakale, Mursitpinar, and Ceylanpinar located in the 
respective border towns. Just across these towns, there are three towns on Syrian territory 
(Tel-Abyat, Aynel-Arab, and Resul-Ayn respectively). This appears like a border line dividing 
a large town into two towns that remain in the territory of different countries. Sanliurfa has 
become an important location for the settlement of Syrian refugees in Turkey since 2011. 
Although it is a relatively less visible and less studied province in the context of refugee 
research in Turkey (compared to Gaziantep), it hosts more Syrian refugees than Gaziantep. 
Sanliurfa has also three refugee camps (officially called temporary shelter/accommodation 
centres) which host 67,682 Syrians, the highest number among the other nine provinces which 
have similar camps (GocGov-Distribution, 2018).  
 
Until 2011, Sanliurfa could be characterized as a province of internal emigration, but the Syrian 
civil war has substantially changed the character and demography of the city. The province 
has become a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual city with Turkish, Arab, and Kurdish communities. 
This has made the city an attractive place for Syrians to arrive and settle down. Moreover, 
there are kinship ties between local border communities in Sanliurfa and communities living in 
the northern border areas within Syria. The region has been separated with the construction 
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of the national territories of Turkey and Syria in the early 20th century.7 Since then, cross-
border social and economic relations (the flow of people and goods) have continued in different 
forms from marriages to trade (smuggling) and daily visits between each side within the limits 
of central states’ allowances or illegally. The liberal visa policies and rapprochement between 
Syrian and Turkish governments from 2002 to 2011 eased such interactions. Thus, border 
permeability, concerning the intensity of the interactions between borderline towns and 
villages, was very high before the Syrian crisis and remained so until 2015-2016 when the 
Turkish government adopted restrictive controlling measures.  
 
2.2. Data Gathering and Analysis  
 
We, as the Turkey RESPOND research team (Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Istanbul 
Bilgi University and Ozyegin University), conducted many of the interviews in Turkish, however 
some were conducted in Arabic with the assistance of translator and some in English.  
 
We used the common-coding scheme of WP2 that was used by the other consortium members 
of the REPSOND Project, making some country specific revisions and additions. In addition, 
the four dimensions of analyses are taken into consideration for categorisation of the codes, 
namely, “pre-entry controls”, “at the border”, "internal control regime” and “return”. Interview 
data is analysed by using qualitative content analysis and Nvivo11 Plus Programme that 
allowed us to systematically categorize, describe and interpret the collected material. We used 
both a deductive and inductive approach in creating our coding frame for meso level analysis. 
We started with the developed categories indicated in the WP2 guideline and then focused on 
Turkey specific aspects which are critical to understand border management. The original data 
itself required us to add new main categories, such as context related developments, and sub-
codes under the original code. 
 
2.3. Limitations 
 
Due to sensitivities about national security issues in Turkey and the security of researchers, 
we faced difficulties in accessing formal interviewees from security forces like those from 
border check points (Hudut Karakolu), Gendarmerie, and Police Force in Sanliurfa. Thus, 
interviews with these actors could not be conducted in this city. For Izmir, the researcher 
managed to conduct interviews with both Izmir Gendarmerie Department of Anti-smuggling 
and Organised Crime Unit and Izmir Provincial Directorate of Security Department of 
Combating Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking; but despite numerous efforts, the Coast 
Guard Aegean Sea Region Command did not accept our interview request.  
Another important limitation is accessing reliable data about deportations, particularly when it 
came to checking and reporting results, as it raises issues related to ethics and researcher 
safety. Although the Bar Associations, as well as the lawyers who have been working in this 
field in Izmir, Sanliurfa and Istanbul provided important insights, it should be noted that 
researchers could not get permission to access the removal centres, consequently, they could 
not conduct any interviews with the officers at those centres. However, the report provides 
reflections from the meso level actors despite this limitation. 
 
Finally, due to the high numbers and visibility of the Syrian refugees, the interviewees and 
legal framework mainly focuses on Syrians. We tried to overcome this with additional 
information regarding non-Syrians. 
                                                             
7 Current borders of Turkey were drawn by Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 after the Turkish War of 
Independence. During the Ottoman Empire, the border lines were more permeable, there were strong 
kinship, tribal, religious and ethnic ties. Due to the Turkey’s national security related concerns and 
territorial disputes with neighbouring countries (with Syria over Hatay), the southeast borderlines have 
remained important and subject of securitization until the 2000s. 
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3. Key Developments since 2011 
 
Since 2011, challenges pertaining border management have arisen, marked by mass arrivals 
of Syrians to Turkey and the continued use of entrances from Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian and African 
irregular migrants. Following the Syrian Civil War, adopting an unconditional “open door 
policy”, Turkey welcomed all the Syrian refugees fleeing from the conflict. This policy was 
mainly driven by both domestic and foreign, geopolitical policy concerns such as to present 
itself as a powerful country in the region, to play a regional mediator role and to contribute to 
the solution of humanitarian problems through diplomacy (Gokalp Aras and Sahin Mencutek, 
2015, p.202 and 2016). Changes in refugee policies, including restrictive border controls and 
non-arrival policies8 can be explained with reference to “the critical juncture that was reached 
(in terms of the sheer magnitude of the refugee situation and the protracted nature of the crisis) 
as well as a redefinition of the strategic interests (including growing security problems and 
constraints faced in the previous foreign policy objectives)” (Ibid., p.101). However, based on 
our fieldwork findings, the “open-door policy” has been dynamically changing and recently it is 
not implemented in practice. 
 
Syrians mainly preferred Turkey as the destination country, due to geographical closeness, 
accessibility and the ease of transportation. Syrians were able to enter the country via official 
border crossings or unofficial ones with or without passports. Turkey had an agreement, made 
in 2009, that allows visa-free entry to citizens of Syria - the details of which will be outlined in 
the “pre-entry” part of the report. Until 2016, Turkey did not cancel the visa-exemption regime 
for the citizens of Syria. Thus, Syrians holding passports were able to flee to Turkey from other 
host countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and other countries along with the land borders 
due to the open-door policy. Starting from October 2011, Turkey granted Syrians temporary 
protection status based on the Regulation on Temporary Protection in 2014 (Official Gazette, 
2015)9. 
 
The Turkish government approached Syrians’ arrival as an incident of emergency as it was 
such a massive population movement. During the first phase, the Syrian refugees were settled 
in the camps along the border cities. However, the Turkish government did not allow 
international agencies to have access to the camps. Even the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR)10 was only able to access camps after February 2012 
(Ibid., pp.102-103). The capacity of the camps was limited and during this period the newly 
arriving Syrians, who had their own financial resources, settled in border cities or moved to the 
cities where they had kinship and ethnic networks and believed it was more likely to have job 
opportunities.  
 
Turkey’s open-door policy towards Syrians represent a shift from Turkey’s past responses to 
similar mass movements, such as from Iraq in the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, when the 
country avoided opening its borders and did not grant status to migrants. As Turkish 
policymakers were overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of post-1991 Iraqi arrivals, the issue 
                                                             
8 These measures can be different from the other restrictive practices used in recent years. In general, 
those policies can be understood as the measure that aim directly to impede access to asylum such as 
visa regimes, carrier sanctions, and immigration pre-inspection (Gibney, 2005, p.9). 
9 The Regulation has been translated into English, which is available at 
http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/temptemp.pdf (Accessed 19 December 2019).  
10 During the field research in Izmir, the informants stated that the World Food Programme 
representative have also access to the camps to monitor and evaluate the “food-card” implementation. 
It is stated that the representatives of Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) and United Nations Children’s 
Emergency Fund (UNICEF) have been visiting the camps. UNICEF specifically was mentioned as 
having no problem for its access since it has been funding the temporary education centres as well as 
child-friendly spaces. The respondents addressed UNICEF as the funding institution and Kizilay as the 
implementing one. 
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was internationalized and securitized from the outset (Kaynak, 1992; Latif, 2012; Ihlamur-Oner, 
2014; Gokalp Aras and Sahin Mencutek, 2018). Responses to the mass arrival of Syrians were 
different as the Turkish government “has avoided viewing Syrian mass arrivals as a security 
threat and asking for international burden sharing in the early years, as a demonstration of its 
more flexible and liberal humanitarian response as compared to the pre-2011 period” (Gokalp 
Aras and Sahin Mencutek, 2018, p.80). Gradually revisiting the unconditional open-door policy 
to slowdown, the arrivals of refugees, Turkey lined towards finding solutions within Syria such 
as delivering aid shipments to a border crossing - known as “zero-point delivery”11-, 
establishment of cross-border camps, and working on safe zone alternatives (Ahmadoun, 
2014, p.14). Turkey urged the United Nations Security Council to create a “safe haven” and 
“no-fly zone”, a similar solution to the Iraqi refugee crisis in 1991. However, as of 2019, this 
zone could not be created due to the conflict of interests within the Council itself.  
 
The “open-door” policy started to be replaced by a “closed door” policy in practice, which has 
become more consistent since 2012. This change became more visible in 2015 partly because 
it was reported by the human-rights NGOs (Human Rights Watch/HRW, 2012; AI, 2014). Most 
recently, only three out of ten land border official gates are open for limited periods of time for 
commerce and humanitarian aid (HRW, 2014; Kanat and Ustun cited in Koca, 2015, p.217). 
Amnesty International (AI) claims that there are limited open border gates, and Syrians without 
passports are not allowed to cross the border unless they can prove urgent humanitarian needs 
(AI, 2014, p.10). Also, AI argues that access for some Palestinians were denied due to absence 
of proper visas (Ibid. p.12). As detailed below, the empirical research for this report conducted 
in different cities confirms that the open-door policy has turned into a closed-door policy, or at 
least a highly controlled one. Despite the empirical evidence, on 13 March 2016, President 
Erdogan stated that “Ankara’s open-door policy for Syrian refugees will continue due to the 
responsibility coming from Islamic civilization, contrary to Western hypocrisy” (Dailysabah, 
2016). Furthermore, the official declaration of 3 April 2016 repeats this official statement:  
 
There is not any change in this attitude. Turkey is bound by its obligations under 
international law and is determined to continue providing protection to the Syrians 
who have fled from violence and instability in their country (MfA, 2016). 
 
According to official records, it is possible to see the active or inactive border gates. For 
example, with Syria, out of 14 gates only 6 of them are active (Border Gates, 2019). Regarding 
numbers as of 21 March 2019, the registered Syrian refugees are 3,651,635 (DGMM, 2018a). 
In addition, figure 5 provides detailed information about the recent situation at the borders. The 
inconsistency between official declarations regarding the “open-door” policy and the situation 
in practice is quite controversial. As detailed below in the report, the fieldwork and the semi-
structured interviews at meso level display that the “open-door” policy is not valid in practice 
anymore. There are only exceptional permissions for border-crossings due to emergency 
cases and severe health issues.  
 
                                                             
11 Turkey has invented the term “zero-point operation”, which refers to a special form of aid delivery. 
According to international law, there needs to be either the receiving government’s approval or a U.N. 
Security Council resolution to be able to deliver aid to a country. Since both of these requirements are 
unachievable in Syria, Ankara has created its own way: Trucks carry aid just to the border, from which 
Syrian people in need take it over the frontier with trucks. In this way, the border violation is avoided 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). 
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Figure 5: Turkey-Syria Border Crossings Status 
 
Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/turkey-syria-border-crossings-status-1-
may-2019-enartr> [Accessed 8 May 2019]. 
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Finally, it needs to be mentioned that Turkey has recently opened a new gate at the Turkey- 
Syrian border, which became operational in late 2018 for speeding up the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Afrin and meeting the infrastructural needs of the region. As of 15 March, 
the TRC used that door for sending trucks to Syria (Hurriyet Daily News, 2019). 
 
Regarding the Turkey-Syria border, the Turkish government has developed a border security 
strategy to prevent infiltration by “militias and terrorist groups”. This strategy is stemmed from 
Turkey’s concern that the power vacuum and increasing influences of Kurdish military groups 
in northern Syria threaten border security. Turkey has framed and implemented its unilateral 
cross-border operations as the only option for security as it serves as a border from “threats” 
and is part of their right to self-defence. On 22 February 2015, Turkey launched its first cross-
border military operations in Syria, called Sah Firat Operation. In 2016, Turkey launched a 
broader scale military operation called, Operation Euphrates Shield (Firat Kalkani Harekati, 24 
August 2016- 29 March 2017) and in January 2018 Operation Olive Branch (Zeytin Dali 
Harekati) conducted in the Kurdish-controlled Afrin region in Northern Syria. There is a direct 
link to the Syrian refugees. President Erdogan explicitly linked the operations to the repatriation 
of the over three million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, back to Syria (TRT, 2018). In a 
separate statement, the president’s wife publicly noted that the operation was to ensure safety 
in the region, noting “when security and stability is ensured in the region with Operation Olive 
Branch, new flows will be stopped and those who are already here are expected to be able to 
return to their country” (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). She also referred to Operation Euphrates 
Shield after which more than 140,000 Syrians returned to Jarablus (ibid.). Thus, these 
operations also address a shift in Turkey’s approach to Syrian refugees and the increasing 
emphasis on “return policy” (Gokalp Aras, 2019, p.7). Although Turkey’s military incursions 
into Northern Syria raise concerns about violation of Syria’s sovereignty and Turkey’s quest 
for power in the Middle East, it has not yet been challenged or criticized by the international 
community. 
 
Another key development is the “security wall” at the Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iran borders 
which was constructed in 2016. The details about this wall, as well as the one between Turkey 
and Iran, are given under the “at the border” sub-section. 
 
The “exit” dimension at the Western borders of Turkey carries utmost importance in relation to 
migration towards Europe. Although details will be given later on in this report, the most 
significant developments since 2011 at those borders are linked with the EU. By 2015, a 
number of factors resulted in the intensification of the collaboration between the EU and 
Turkey. These factors include: Turkey’s failure of its assertive policy in the region and the 
internationalization through the United Nations strategy, the size and length of stay of Syrian 
refugees, the increasing incidents12, the increasing PYD control of territories close to Turkey 
and the impact of the so called “Refugee Crisis in Europe”13. As we have argued above, the 
sheer volume of post-2011 movements from Syria made the country’s response to the matter 
also an issue of national security independent from the EU. So, in 2015 at the peak of mass 
arrivals from the Turkish shores to Greece, Turkish policy and the EU objectives in controlling 
irregular migration once again intersected (Heck and Hess, 2016 and 2017; Gokalp Aras 
2019). 
 
                                                             
12 December 2011 incidents: : Syrian–Turkish border clash; F4 jet incident: June 2012 interception of 
Turkish aircraft; October 2012 cross-border clashes; January 2013 incident; February 2013 bombing; 
April 2013 border air raid; May 2013 Akcakale incident; 2013 Reyhanli bombing; 2013 helicopter 
incident; January 2014 incident on Syrian Kurdistan border; January 2014 Turkish airstrike; March 2014 
Turkish shoot down of a Syrian aircraft 
13 For further details: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/node/4115_fr and 
https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/refugee-crisis-in-europe/ 
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In December 2013, Turkey and the EU signed a controversial and long-awaited Readmission 
Agreement (RA, 2103). In response, the EU introduced the Roadmap towards a Visa-Free 
Regime with Turkey, which raised Turkey’s expectations regarding direct visa exemption 
(Roadmap, 2013). Those two documents are mainly related with the long-standing 
externalization policy of the EU; however, as it was mentioned above, the developments in 
2015 when millions crossed the Balkan Route had a significant impact on the EU-Turkey 
relations in regards to border management. In this framework, the first important development 
was the Joint Action Plan (JAP) agreed upon by Turkey and the EU on November 29, 2015 
sought to stem the mass migration movements (European Commission, 2015a).  
 
One of the important developments since 2011 is the inclusion of NATO as a third party in 
border management. NATO Defence Ministers took swift decisions on 11 February 2016 to 
deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to support Greece and Turkey, as well as the EU’s border 
agency Frontex, in their efforts to regain control over the movements of migrants and refugees 
(NATO, 2016). Following the JAP, the EU-Turkey Statement (EU-Turkey Statement, 2016), 
mostly referred to as the EU-Turkey deal, was accepted by both sides and accelerated the 
implementation of the RA. In brief, the EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed 
“to end irregular migration flows from Turkey to the EU, ensure improved reception conditions 
for refugees in Turkey and open up organised, safe and legal channels to Europe for Syrian 
refugees” (European Commission, 2018a, p. 1). In the course of time, Turkey started to 
challenge “NATO’s presence role in the Aegean Sea” and was increasingly unwilling to allow 
“even NATO forces to patrol part of its maritime border”, thus it formally requested its 
termination in 2017 (Dimitriadi et al., 2018, p.15). The details about those developments 
regarding border management at the Western borders will be discussed later in this report. 
 
In the summer of 2016, the political context of Turkey, in particular after the coup attempt on 
15 July, changed dramatically and a “state of emergency” was declared which lasted until 18 
July 2018. After the attempt, due to national security concerns, in particular to prevent irregular 
escapes from the country, Turkey tightened its border controls. Turkey even suspended the 
Turkey–Greece Readmission Protocol in response to a decision by a Greek court to release 
eight former Turkish soldiers who fled the country a day after the 15 July coup attempt 
(TRTWorld, 2018). The impact of the attempted coup was significantly visible, particularly 
during the fieldwork in Izmir as will be discussed later in this report. 
 
 
4. Legal Framework 
 
4.1. Pre-Entry Controls 
 
4.1.1. Visas 
 
This section firstly addresses the following questions: what are the legal arrangements for 
issuing visas? Which nationals need visas to enter? What have been the major developments 
since 2011? Secondly, the EU-Turkey collaboration regarding the visa policy will be analysed 
in respect to Turkey’s candidate status.  
 
Turkey has been implementing liberal and flexible visa policy, in particular for the countries in 
Caucasus, the Middle East and Africa. Visa exemptions apply for the countries which are in 
the negative list of the EU such as Libya (2009), Jordan (2009), Tajikistan (2009), Azerbaijan 
(2009) and Lebanon (2010). Although visa requirement for some of those countries have been 
re-issued, that is not the case for all of them, for example, Iran and Iraq still have visa 
exemption (MfA, 2019a). Kaiser and Kaya (2015) noted that “the regime governing entry and 
residence in Turkey is more liberal and flexible in comparison with the EU acquis”, and “Turkey 
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faces a problem of balancing its interest for accession to the European Union which asks 
Turkey to tighten its entry regime with the demands of its growing tourism industry for a liberal 
visa policy” (p.12). Thus, since the first Accession Partnership document (APD) in 2001, the 
Council emphasized the need for Turkey to start the alignment of visa legislation and practice 
with those of the EU (Council Decision, 2001).  
 
Turkey’s transposition of the Schengen Visa code in the wake of its accession talks for full 
membership to the EU, started in October 2005. In the framework of the Schengen Visa code, 
the demands of the EU can be summarized as investigating fake documents to combat 
irregular migration, abolishing the practice of issuing visas at borders, harmonization regarding 
visa stickers and types, respecting negative and positive list of countries regarding visa 
requirements and providing standardised visa policy for all the EU members. However, in 
practice, according to the LFIP (2013), the Council of Ministers can decide on visa exemption 
for certain countries and the issuing of visas at borders are still the case although the EU has 
been demanding the abolishment of this practice, instead suggesting a longer and more 
detailed procedure. Besides the technical problems such as visa types and stickers, the most 
controversial issue is still Turkey’s liberal visa policy; Turkey still provides mutual visa 
exemption for the countries that are on the EU’s negative list (Gokalp Aras, 2013, p.315). Since 
1998, all the progress reports of the Commission mentioned this discrepancy between the 
EU’s negative visa list and Turkey’s mutual visa exemption countries list. In addition to the 
EU’s negative visa list, there is also a positive list, whereby Turkey needs to align its own 
procedures taking into account the EU’s list. In terms of the positive list, it ought to be 
mentioned that there is no uniformed and standardised visa procedure for all the EU members. 
For example, some of the member states’ citizens can enter with their national identity cards, 
which is not possible for some of the others. According to the most recent progress report for 
Turkey (European Commission, 2019a, p.49), Turkey continues to apply a discriminatory visa 
regime towards 11 Member States. Parallel to the EU’s demands, it should be noted that there 
are also some important developments as a part of visa policy; for example, the biometric 
security features that were brought into use on 1 June 2010. In addition, Turkey has revised 
its policy in regard to duration of stays allowing for 90 days within 180 days in parallel to the 
EU acquis. 
 
Article 18 of the LFIP states that the Council of Ministers is authorised to “enter into agreements 
determining the passport and visa procedures; and under circumstances when considered 
necessary, unilaterally waive the visa requirement for citizens of certain states; facilitate visa 
procedures, including exemption from visa fee; and, determine the duration of visas”. This 
article means that rather than following the negative and positive list from the EU, the Turkish 
government decides by itself which countries’ nationals require a visa to enter Turkey. For a 
stay up to 90 days, a residence permit is not required and foreigners can stay for a maximum 
of 90 days with their valid visa. For work visas, there is a coordination between the MfA and 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. All the important documents and all the countries 
and the applied visa regime for them can be found at the MfA’s official web site (MfA, 2018a). 
The electronic visa application system (e-Visa) allows foreigners to make their visa application 
online with tourism and commerce purposes. Beginning from 5 January 2016, all applications 
for Turkish visas will have to be made through the Pre-Application System of Turkish Sticker 
Visa (MfA, 2018b). 
 
The most recent Progress Report in 2019 by the EC states that although Turkey has set up 
seven working groups to carry out technical work for the visa liberalisation dialogue, no 
progress has been made in the harmonisation of the Turkish visa policy with the EU common 
visa policy (European Commission, 2019a, p.7). The same report states that amending the 
anti-terror law and practices in line with EU standards is central and it remains as one of the 
benchmarks in the visa-liberalisation dialogue (ibid., p.44). The report mentions the significant 
progress regarding biometric passports, which are also seen as the compatible with EU 
standards. However, the need for taking further steps to ensure full alignment with the EU visa 
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policy is emphasized (ibid., p. 49). To summarise briefly, Turkey needs to harmonise further 
its visa policy, in particular to the Visa Regulation and the Visa Code including “aligning Turkish 
visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-required countries, fully phasing-out 
of the issuing of visas at borders and of e-visas and ensuring that the issuing of visas at 
consulates is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in the Visa Code” 
(European Commission, 2018b, p.48).  
 
Following the signature of the RA, the EU prepared a “Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime 
with Turkey” that contains 72 benchmarks or requirements that need to be met by Turkey, 
while Turkey had been expecting a direct visa exemption. Turkey responded to those demands 
with its own Annotated Roadmap towards a Visa-Free Regime (Roadmap, 2018). For the 
implementation of the RA, visa liberalisation was one of the pre-conditions for Turkey and since 
it could not be reached, Turkey has introduced some administrative measures for some of the 
articles of the RA. 
 
Considering the high number of refugees as a consequence of the mass migration from Syria, 
visa policy regarding this country is important and ought to be mentioned here. As of 2009, 
Turkey started to imply liberal visa policy to Syria, which was introduced by the former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, when he said “I would like to address the Syrian people 
here; Turkey and the Turkish people is your second home and we pave the way for visa-free 
travel  and to welcome you” (CNNTurk, 2009). However, Turkey has started to implement visa 
restrictions for Syrians entering the country by air or by sea as of 8 January 2016 (Haberturk, 
2015). The visa restrictions have not been applied to the Syrian refugees who cross the 
Turkey-Syria border by land to flee the conflict in Syria. According to the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the restriction is still valid (MfA, 2019a). 
 
4.1.2. Carrier Sanction Legislation 
 
According to EU law regarding carrier sanctions, carriers are responsible “to take all the 
necessary measures to ensure that an alien carried by air or sea is in possession of the travel 
documents required for entry into the territories of the Contracting Parties’ and to return third 
country nationals refused entry at external borders” (Council Directive, 2001, Schengen 
Acquis, 1985). The LFIP covers similar provisions for carriers’ sanctions in Turkey. Article 12 
(a), where visa exemption is mentioned in relation with carrier sanctions, states that “visa 
requirement for entry into Turkey may not be sought from those foreigners who: disembark at 
a port city from a carrier, which has been obliged to use Turkish air and sea ports due to force 
majeure”.  
The main article of the LFIP is Article 98 (1) regarding the “Responsibility of Carriers” that 
states that “carriers shall be responsible with: a) returning the foreigners that they have 
transported to the border gates for entry into or transit from Turkey, in cases where foreigners 
are refused entry into or transit to Turkey for any reason whatsoever, to the country they came 
from or to a country where they shall definitely be admitted”.  
 
The LFIP Article 98 (2) states that if it is necessary, DGMM may request carriers to “bring 
passengers to the border gates to provide their passenger details prior to their departure for 
Turkey”. For being able to implement the above-given regulation, DGMM also mentions the 
Ministry and the Ministry of Transport, Maritime and Communications, as the partner institution 
[Article 98 (3)]. After the introduction of the “travel permit regulation, visibility of this legislation 
and its consequences became more visible in Turkey and controls have started to be made by 
the carriers due to the possible fines. However, in terms of the amount, there is no standardized 
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fine but each governorship has a different implementation concerning their basis on the related 
legislation.14 
 
4.1.3. Advance Passenger Information/ Passenger Name Record Information 
 
In Turkey, like the visa, PNR can be seen as one of the “pre-entry measures” regarding border 
controls and in some regard, they can be evaluated as a part of the carrier responsibilities that 
are mentioned previously. It is mainly limited to airline transportation. Briefly, for international 
and national flights, all passengers are obliged to provide travel documents and a visa (if it is 
required). For example, Turkish Airlines (a private airline company) asks passengers on 
domestic flights for a national ID card, valid passport, driver license or marriage certificate to 
be provided (Turkish Airlines, 2019).15 In the case of international flights, a passport, a visa (if 
it is required for the destination country) and other documents should be provided (Ibid.). In 
Turkey, the PNR system appears as the common one, while API is required by some countries, 
which must be collected by the airline company before the passengers’ boarding. Different to 
PNR, API requires the following information: passport expiration date, passport country of 
issue, country of residence and address of your accommodation on the first night etc. 
 
As of 7 November 2015, Turkey adopted The Regulation on the Procedures and Principles for 
the Obligations of Airway Carriers in order to combat irregular migration under the name of 
Turkiye Yolcu Bilgi Sistemi (TYBS) (Regulation #29525, 2015). The legal basis of the 
regulation is the LFIP (Article 3, 5, 6, 7, 9,15, 54, 98, 99 and 104), Turkish Civil Aviation Law 
(#2920) and the Law on the Organization and Duties of the General Directorate of Civil Aviation 
(#, 5431, 10 November 2005). (Regulation #29525, 2015)  
 
Article 5 (1) of the regulation states that “carriers are obliged to take the necessary measures 
by checking the tickets and other passenger documents in order to prevent the unaccepted 
passengers from being transported, including the sale of tickets, before the flight. The same 
article also addresses the Ministry of Interior as the authorized institution that informs the 
carriers regarding the prohibition of entry to the country in line with the Article 99 of the LFIP 
in cases where it is inconvenient to share.  
 
The Regulation also mentions the securing and accommodating of an unaccepted passenger 
(Article 6), accompanied unaccepted passenger (Article 7), and administrative fine (Article 10). 
Regarding PNR and API, it is possible to request passenger and flight information from carriers 
according to the Article 9- (1) of the Regulation as “the General Directorate shall bear carriers 
who bring passengers to border gates, take passengers from border gates and fly in domestic 
lines; may require the sharing of API and PNR information of the passengers via the 
communication module that provides instant data transfer at the time of flight, flight and after 
flight.” In order to fulfil this purpose, the General Directorate is given the role to prepare the 
required infrastructure for communication as well as sharing data with the carriers.  
 
According to the newly established system, DGMM has a special department, called the 
working Group of Turkey Passenger Information System (TPIS, Turkiye Yolcu Bilgi Sistemi 
Calisma Grubu) that was established with the Regulation on TPIS Working Group Department 
(TPIS, 2018). This system is also related to the Personal Data Protection Act (Kisisel Verilerin 
Korunmasi Kanunu) that was renewed in 2016 according to the EU demands in this field (Law 
                                                             
14 Law #6458 (Articles 65-71, 91 and 98); Madde-3: Law #29656 (Article 91); Law #6883 (Articles 3, 21, 
22, 35 and Temporary Article 1); Law #4925 (Articles 3, 6 and 26); Law #27255 (Article 38); Law #5442 
(Arhttp://www.bursa.gov.tr/yol-izin-belgesi-hakkinda-karar-duyurusuticles 11/C and 66); Law # (Article 
32), Regulation # 2016/8 (Article 5). As one of the samples for the fine: http://www.bursa.gov.tr/yol-izin-
belgesi-hakkinda-karar-duyurusu. 
15 This information is obtained from the different sections of Turkish Airlines official web site: 
https://www.turkishairlines.com/ 
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#6698, 2016). Within this framework, Turkey can also ask for detailed passenger information 
from all countries that are suspected, including the EU. It is foreseen that the incoming data 
will be analysed in the newly established centralized system under the coordination of DGMM 
and after the necessary operations, suspected passengers will be banned from entering the 
country and they will be deported.16 
 
4.1.4. Immigration Liaison Officers 
 
The main aim behind the creation of an immigration liaison officers’ network can be 
summarized as gathering and sharing relevant information and aiming to prevent irregular 
migration, countering related criminal activities, facilitating return and managing legal migration 
(European Commission, 2004). The EU has almost 500 immigration liaison officers (ILOs) 
currently deployed by MSs to third countries (European Commission, 2018c). In this 
framework, in Turkey there is one European Migration Liaison Officer (EMLO) and also one 
European Border and Coast Guards Agency Officer (EBCGA) liaison Officer.17  
 
The starting point of the deployment of EMLOs in Turkey was the Council Conclusions of April 
2015, where one of the special aims is stated as to “step up cooperation with Turkey in view 
of the situation in Syria and Iraq” as well as the EC’s Communication on the European Agenda 
on Migration in the same year (Council Meeting, 2015; European Commission, 2015b). The 
tasks were given to the EU Delegations in the target countries, therefore the EU Delegation to 
Turkey undertook this role. The responsibilities of EMLO in Turkey are to “establish and 
maintain direct contacts with competent national and regional authorities for cooperation with 
EU on migration. Provide analysis and recommendations. Coordinate and support ILOs 
Network Support implementation of EU return policy” (European Commission, 2004). In terms 
of the scope, the same document states that, generally, EMLO represents the EU migration 
interests. 
 
Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Frontex and Turkey was 
signed on 28 May 2012. This MoU aimed at enhancing operational capabilities on the Turkish 
borders following an official request from Turkey. It also included risk analysis and exchange 
of data (Dimitriadi et al., 2018). Within the framework of the implementation of the 
aforementioned Memorandum, a Working Plan was signed in February 2014 in Warsaw (MfA, 
2019b). After Regulation 2016/1624 came into force, the EBCG Agency also commenced 
deployment of liaison officers (EBCGA LO) to third countries including Turkey (MfA, 2019b). 
The main aim for this deployment is to play an operational role and also establishing better 
communication between the EBCGA and the authorities of the host countries. The main 
responsibility of the EBCGA LO is defined as “to develop and maintain operational bilateral 
cooperation with host country, draft and elaborate field assessments, support implementation 
of EBCGA projects and support ILOs Network” (European Commission, 2004). One of the 
priorities of the EBCGA liaison officer is to focus on risk analysis and return, in this regard, 
Turkey-Frontex Risk Analysis Network (TU-RAN) was established (Frontex, 2018). 
 
Parallel to the above-given collaboration structure, the 7th ILOs meeting in Turkey was held on 
8 October 2018 with the participation of the EU MSs representation, the consulates of the MSs 
and the EU Delegation Turkey and the meeting hosted by DGMM (DGMM, 2018b). 
 
                                                             
16 Goc Idaresi Turkiye Yolcu Bilgi Merkezi Calisma Grubu Baskanligi Kurulus, Gorev ve Calisma 
Esaslarına Iliskin Yonerge, Available at: 
<https://kms.kaysis.gov.tr/Home/Goster/140406?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1> [Accessed 9 May 
2019]. 
17 EMLOs are currently deployed in Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tunisia and Turkey 14 EBCGA LO are currently deployed in Turkey, Serbia 
and Niger (European Commission, 2017).  
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4.2.  “At the Border” Controls  
 
4.2.1. The Legal Framework: Defining Conditions for Entry and Exit: The 
Conduct of Border Checks 
 
Until the LFIP (#6458) came into force in 2013, the Passport Law (#5682) and The Law related 
to Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (#5683) had been the legal framework for the 
entrance and exit of foreigners since 1950. The LFIP (Article 124) completely abrogated the 
Law Related to Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey. Although the Passport Law is 
still in force, the LFIP (Article 124) abrogated many provisions of this Law (including Articles; 
4, 6-11, 24-26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38, additional Article 5, first and second paragraphs of 
Article 5, second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 34).  
 
Regarding entry and exit, the Passport Law states “foreign subject persons may enter and go 
out of places determined only by the Council of Ministers” (Article 1). Article 2 states that the 
“foreign subject persons are obliged to present valid passports or a passport substitute 
document to enter Turkey and to go out of Turkey”. The same article also gives the authority 
to the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs to decide on the documents to be accepted 
instead of passports for foreign persons. With the legal change in 2013, apart from the 
provisions of the Passport Law which are still in force, the conditions for entry into Turkey by a 
foreigner are mainly and comprehensively set out in the LFIP (#6458). Pursuant to LFIP, for 
the legal entry into Turkey, it is required to use a valid passport or a substitute of a passport at 
the predetermined border gates (LFIP, Article 3(1) or the passenger entry and exit gates 
(Passport Law, Article 1). If there is no visa exemption, for both the entry and stay of up to 90 
days, there is a need for visa. 
 
To elaborate entry conditions, Article 5 states that “(1) Entry into and exit from Turkey shall be 
through the border gates with a valid passport or travel document.” As different from the 
previous Passport Law, the LFIP mentioned the detailed check regarding Article 7, which 
defines the persons who are refused to enter Turkey. Article 6 (4) states that “at the time of 
entry into Turkey, checks shall be carried out to determine whether or not the foreigner falls 
within the scope of Article 7.” During this check, the foreigner can be held for a maximum of 
four hours [Article (6)]. As one of the important dimensions, Article 7 provides detailed 
information regarding the persons who can be denied entry as follows: 
 
Article 7: a) who do not hold a passport, a travel document, a visa or, a residence 
or a work permit or, such documents or permits has been obtained deceptively or, 
such documents or permits are false; b) whose passport or travel document expires 
sixty days prior to the expiry date of the visa, visa exemption or the residence 
permit; c) without prejudice to paragraph two of Article 15, foreigners listed in 
paragraph one of Article 15 even if they are exempted from a visa. 
 
In case of a need for international protection, the LFIP states, “the conditions stipulated in 
Articles 5, 6 and 7 shall not be construed and implemented to prevent the international 
protection claim.” Different to the Passport Law’s definitions (Article 8)18, rather than health, 
security, morals or welfare aspects, the LFIP’s Article 7 has determined more objective criteria: 
                                                             
18 Art. 8, Persons who are forbidden to enter Turkey. 1. Tramps and beggars. 2. The persons who are 
insane and who suffer from contagious diseases. 3. Of these persons exceptions may be applied to the 
ones who come for the purpose of treatment or change of air by their means of transport or under the 
financial protection of their legal guardian and their health is not hazardous for the public health and 
peace. 4. The persons who are accused or condemned of one of the crimes accepted as base for return 
according to the agreement or agreements concerning returning the criminals which are included in the 
Republic of Turkey. 5. The persons who have been driven out of Turkey and still are not allowed entry. 
 27 
   
  
(1) Foreigners who shall be refused to enter into Turkey are those: a) who do not 
hold a passport, a travel document, a visa or, a residence or a work permit or, such 
documents or permits has been obtained deceptively or, such documents or 
permits are false; 
b) whose passport or travel document expires sixty days prior to the expiry date of 
the visa, visa exemption or the residence permit; 
c) without prejudice to paragraph two of Article 15, foreigners listed in paragraph 
one of Article 15 even if they are exempted from a visa. 
(2) Actions in connection with this Article shall be notified to foreigners who are 
refused entry. This notification shall also include information on how foreigners 
would effectively exercise their right of appeal against the decision as well as other 
legal rights and obligations applicable in the process (LFIP, Article 7). 
 
According to the Article 9(1), the DGMM or governorates are given the authority to impose an 
entry ban against foreigners whose entry into Turkey is objectionable for public order, public 
security or public health reasons. The ban cannot exceed five years and under some specific 
conditions can be extended additional ten years [Article 9(3)]. This article provides further 
details about the reasons for entry bans. 
 
4.2.2. The Legal Provisions Regarding Facilitating Entry/Criminalisation of 
Entry and Exit within the Context of Migrant Smuggling 
 
It should be stated that although trafficking in persons is a serious crime and a grave violation 
of human rights, this is not in the scope of this report. Only “smuggling” will be focused upon 
in this section. 
 
Smuggling is addressed in the Turkish Penal Code (#5237) that came into force on 26 
September 2004 as replacing the previous one.19 According to the Article 79(1), smuggling is 
defined as “(1) Any person who, by illegal means and with the purpose of obtaining, directly or 
indirectly, a material gain: a) enables a non-citizen to enter, or remain in, the country, or b) 
enables a Turkish citizen or a non-citizen to go abroad”. The same article also states that the 
smugglers “shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of three to eight years 
and a judicial fine of up to ten thousand days.” In the context of the increasing number of deaths 
among migrants, as of 22 July 2010, the penalties have been increased. Smuggling attempts 
are charged as a criminal offence. For example, if the person carrying migrants through land 
or on the highway is caught before reaching the border while exiting the country, smuggling 
will be punished as a criminal offense by lawful regulation even if it has not been fully 
committed. 
 
According to the Turkish Penal Code, one of the most important elements in determining the 
crime of migrant smuggling is the existence of the special intent such as material and financial 
benefit. If the offender has no purpose of obtaining material benefits, the crime of migrant 
                                                             
6. The persons who are perceived as coming for the purpose of destroying the security and public order 
of the Republic of Turkey or helping or participating in with the persons who want to destroy the security 
and public order of the Republic of Turkey. 7. Prostitutes and the persons who incite women to 
prostitution and the persons who undertake white women trading and any types of smugglers. 8. The 
persons who cannot prove that they have not enough money to live in and depart from Turkey in the 
period they stated but they have someone to support them or the persons who cannot prove that they 
will not engage in one of the works prohibited to the foreign subjects. 
19 The original and official text of the Law is available at 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5237.pdf (Accessed 13 January 2019). However, the 
translation of the Law is done by the European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice 
commission) Strasbourg, 15 February 2016 Opinion No. 831 / 2015, CDL-REF(2016)011. 
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smuggling does not exist. For example, for humanitarian reasons, if someone provides help to 
an immigrant, that person cannot be found guilty of smuggling. However, it is not always 
necessary to obtain the material interest for the completion of the crime. For example, if a 
person is caught who is carrying a group of immigrants on a boat, they will be still punished 
even if they have not received the payment yet. The Law also states that if forged documents 
are used for the provision of a foreigner’s entry in Turkey, then the perpetrator must also be 
punished by fraud in private documents or in official documents (Article 212). In addition, if a 
foreigner has legally entered Turkey, however does not fulfil the requirements to stay and if 
someone provides them with the facilities to stay to obtain material benefits, it also constitutes 
crime (Dogan, 2018).20 The other related acts regarding providing facilities to remain in Turkey 
can be defined as providing food, providing housing or other places. However, as mentioned 
above, in case of humanitarian reasons, to provide food or drinks cannot be evaluated as a 
crime. It should also be mentioned here that in case of asylum or mass migration, those groups 
are excluded from punishment when violating entry rules, as long as they apply to the Turkish 
government “within a reasonable period of time” (LFIP, Article 64). 
 
In terms of exit from Turkey, both Turkish citizens or foreigners should have valid passports 
and the exit can be done through the pre-determined gates according the LFIP. Therefore, 
regardless the reason for exit, the attempted exit from the country in a way contrary to the 
legislation constitutes the offense of smuggling (Turkish Penal Code, Article 79/ 1-b). 
 
Regarding the related international cooperation and agreements, Turkey has been a part of 
Budapest Process21 and it hosted its presidency in 2006. Turkey is one of the founders of the 
Silk Road Region Working Group, which aims to gather transit, source and destination 
countries on the migratory routes together. In addition, regarding the border crossings, also as 
a part of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Turkey has been providing 
support for the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue. Most importantly, Turkey signed the 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention/Protocols) on 13 
December 2000 (Palermo Convention, 2000). 
 
4.2.3. The Legal Provisions Regarding Fingerprinting of Asylum Seekers and 
Irregular Migrants at the Border 
 
Although the LFIP does not have any articles or specific regulations that clearly address 
fingerprinting, the Implementation Regulation of the LFIP (#29656, 2016) has related 
provisions. Article 124 of the Regulation of the LFIP states that “personal data of foreigners 
within the scope of the Law including fingerprint, palm print, retina, voice scanning and 
photograph shall be collected, protected, maintained, used and shared by the Directorate 
General or provincial directorate within the framework of procedures and principles”. The same 
Article also elaborates on the storage of the data as “collected personal data shall be stored 
by recording them in a system exclusive to this purpose, indicating identification information of 
the foreigner along with when and by whom the data were collected.” (Article 124). 
 
Additionally, for those who are subjected to registration for temporary protection, TPR Article 
21 stipulates that photographs, fingerprints or other biometric data suitable for determination 
of identification should be collected and recorded in the central registration database and 
matched with available biometric data. 
                                                             
20 For information is available at https://barandogan.av.tr/blog/ceza-hukuku/gocmen-kacakciligi-sucu-
cezasi-nedir-tck.html (Accessed 10 May 2019). 
21 This is an interregional forum on migration that established in 1993 and covers Europe and Asia. One 
of the aims of this forum is to prevent and counteract irregular migration facilitating return and 
readmission of irregular migrants and prevent and combat human trafficking, for more information see 
https://www.iom.int/budapest-process (Accessed 13 December 2018).  
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Furthermore, according to Police Powers and Duties Law (#2559), fingerprints of asylum 
seekers, or if it is necessary, fingerprints of other foreigners who entered into country, are 
taken by the police and are registered to the official system. In practice, fingerprints collected 
by the Police are stored under the Automated Fingerprint Identification System which is used 
by various other countries (EGM, 1998). However as indicated in the Regulation, DGMM has 
its own finger print collection and storage module structured under a network system called 
Genet. Infrastructural developments of GocNet are mainly completed and the system is 
currently active with 46 physical and 210 virtual servers available in close circuit in all PDMMs. 
As stated in the DGMM’s 2017 Activity Report, GocNet has already been integrated with other 
relevant public institutions and the enhancement activities on this matter were in progress as 
of April 2018 (DGMM, 2017). 
 
Fingerprint data is also mentioned as part of “visa policy”. The EU launched the Visa 
Liberalisation Dialogue with Turkey on 16 December 2013, which is based on a roadmap that 
sets out the requirements that Turkey needs to meet. The Roadmap has five thematic groups 
and one of them is the “document security”. As part of this section, Turkey needs to issue 
“biometric passports in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and 
EU standards” which is supported with fingerprints and photos again according to the ICAO 
standards and biometric passports with chips, fully in line with EU standards (European 
Commission, 2016). As a result, in 2017, Turkey started to issue the new generation passports, 
which has the personal information section made of polycarbonate material, similar to the new 
generation of Turkish identity cards. The new generation of passports are also known as “e-
passports” and they give a passport number, name, surname, nationality, date of birth, 
identification number, issuing authority, arrangement and validity date, etc. as well as the 
personal identification information and biometric data such as photos, fingerprints, signatures. 
Thus, “fingerprints” are part of the new passport and documentation process in Turkey.  
 
4.2.4. Border Surveillance and Sea Rescue 
 
As stated before, Turkey has a quite fragmented border management and migration control in 
terms of both legal and institutional framework. Focused only on mainly migration and human 
mobility dimensions, the following list provides the main border-related national legislation: the 
Law on the Protection and Security of Land Borders (Law #3497, 1988), the Law on Military 
Property Regions and Security Zones (Law #2565, 1982), the Coast Guard Command Law 
(Law #2692, 1982), the Law on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of Interior (Law 
#3152, 1984), the Turkish Civil Aviation Law (Law #2929, 1983), the Law on Gendarmerie 
Organization, Duties and Powers (Law #2803, 1983) and the Law on Foreigners and 
International Protection (Law #6458, 2014). In terms of international regulations, Turkey has 
the memorandum of understanding with Frontex since 2012. The other related international 
conventions and regulations are given later under this heading.  
 
The above-given legal framework is applied for both land, sea and air borders of Turkey. 
Turkey has a land configuration with 65 per cent of its border being land borders (2949 km). 
However, borders in the east and south east lie in mountains and these long steep land borders 
in the east and south east create challenges for border management (Gokalp Aras, 2013, 
p.284). Turkey also has a long coastline, which constitutes sea borders in its South, North and 
West of 6530 km (Ibid.). The country is surrounded by eight countries and the border lengths 
are provided by the following table and figure.  
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Figure 6: Turkey and Its External Land-Air-Sea Borders 
 
Source: Gokalp Aras, N. E., 2013. A Multi-level and Multi-Sited Analysis of the European Union’s Immigration 
and Asylum Policy Concerning Irregular Transit Migration and Its Implications for Turkey. PhD. Middle East 
Technical University, Social Sciences Institute Ankara, p.286. 
 
In terms of the sea-border, particularly focusing the Aegean Sea, it ought to be stated that 
there are many actors including Frontex and NATO. Also, it is difficult to evaluate the existing 
procedures which are quite fragmented as well as not transparent and inaccessible. Regarding 
the Aegean Sea and the disputes, there have been interrelated issues between Turkey and 
Greece since the 1970s about the delamination of territorial waters, national airspace, the use 
of exclusive economic zones, the use of the continental shelf and the Flight Information 
Regions (FRI) as well as the demilitarization of some of the Greek islands based on the official 
claims (MfA, 2018e). They are related with the territorial jurisdictions, and they have an impact 
on border surveillance. For the national waters, the maritime border between Turkey and 
Greece has not yet been determined in an agreement. Currently, Turkey and Greece both hold 
6 nautical miles of breadth in territorial waters in the Aegean Sea and there is a need for a 
bilateral agreement. Another interrelated problem is the continental shelf. Since there are no 
determined maritime jurisdiction areas between both sides, the limits of the continental shelf 
are not be determined yet, but there is only a jurisprudence that neither of them holds the 
delimited maritime jurisdiction beyond the 6 nautical miles of territorial waters. In addition, 
regarding the airspace area in relation with the border issue, Turkey argues that Greece’s claim 
for the 10 nautical miles national airspace is a violation of international law and exploits the 
responsibility of FIR (MfA, 2018e). Due to the lack of agreements and also bilateral claims of 
two sides, there has been tension between the two countries.  
 
The most important problem regarding the Aegean Sea is the Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Activities that are regulated by the 1979 International Convention on Search and Rescue at 
Sea (known as also Hamburg Convention) (IMO, 2018). There is an overlap between the 
Turkish and Greek Search and Rescue (SAR) zones. Thus, the coordination between these 
two countries carries utmost importance as it is foreseen by the Hamburg Convention. Turkey 
claims through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “disputes between Greece and Turkey on 
search and rescue regions are mainly due to Greece's approach as the subject matter of 
sovereignty. The search and rescue zones, which are determined to save human life, are not 
service areas” (MfA, 2018e). If at the sea border-line or in the Turkish territorial waters one 
boat is detected, the Greek coast guard can ask their Turkish counterpart to stop it, which is 
called as “early detection” and it prevents those cases from reaching Greek waters. According 
to the SAR rules, the responsible side has also seek-rescue duty. In addition to the early 
detection, both sides can use other ways to prevent the unauthorized access of boats to their 
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waters, such as convincing them to change their route by approaching the boat or using all 
possible communication agents (FIDH, 2014, p.27). These actions are seen also as push-
backs and they will be given with the other SAR problems as based on the empirical data that 
was collected as part of fieldwork later in this report. 
 
Differently from the sea-border on the West that is the main exit point, the Eastern and 
Southern land borders appear to be the main entrance for the majority of asylum seekers and 
refugees, often through irregular ways. While on the sea-borders physical closeness as well 
as political disputes create problems, in the east and south, controlling the borders are difficult 
due to their physical characteristics. The Eastern and South-eastern border with Iran and Iraq 
is marked by mountainous geography and harsh climate conditions in winter. Concerning the 
border with Syria, historical, economic cross-border kinship relations make border 
management difficult as well as the recent Civil War in the country.  
 
Regarding the border surveillance on the land borders, in particular with Syria, Turkey 
commenced construction of a “security wall” along its border with Syria in 2016 by replacing 
the fences to prevent terror attacks from Syria, border smuggling and illegal crossings, and to 
control refugee movements. The security wall is 899-km long, with an expected total cost of 
$400 million. The wall is made of mobile 3-meter-high, 2-meter wide and 30-centimeter-thick 
concrete blocks (Milliyet, 2017). More than a mere “wall”, it incorporates a technologically 
advanced “Integrated Border Security System”, which is backed up by fibre optic sensors, 
cameras, observation balloons and unmanned aerial vehicles (Ibid.).  
 
According to the technical information available in Turkish media, the wall is equipped with 
newly constructed mobile watch towers that are equipped with advanced technological 
surveillance. They are constructed with durable material to protect against mortar and rocket 
attacks, as well as being composed of five floors where the needs of soldiers are met. It should 
be noted that when there is no need for security or when security needs arise in the other 
regions, they can be moved and re-established for the desired purpose (CNNTurk, 2018; 
Haberler, 2018; TRTHaber, 2018).  
 
Figure 7: Security Wall at Turkey-Syria Border22 
 
Source: Islam Media Analysis, “Turkey official says border wall with Syria near completion”, 18 January 2017, 
Available at: <http://www.islamedianalysis.info/turkey-official-says-border-wall-with-syria-near-completion/> 
[Accessed 19 February 2019]. 
 
This new model of border control is supported with the high-tech systems that go beyond land 
borders to include Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems (SGRS) to monitor sea borders. It was 
written that the wall, called as “Turk Seddi”, will be the third longest wall in the world after the 
Great Wall of China and the US-Mexico border (Ensonhaber, 2018).  
                                                             
22 Source: Islam Media Analysis, “Turkey official says border wall with Syria near completion”, 18 
January 2017, Available at: <http://www.islamedianalysis.info/turkey-official-says-border-wall-with-
syria-near-completion/> [Accessed 19 February 2019]. 
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Parallel to the long-standing EU demands regarding border management, in particular as 
following JAP, the wall can be seen as one of the most concrete efforts by Turkey regarding 
border control (Gokalp Aras, 2019, p.7). However, since the border management changes in 
Turkey cannot be solely explained by the EU’s impact, it is also possible to see the wall itself 
as “a new marker and symbol of territorial sovereignty due to various terror attacks and 
infiltrations” (Aras, 2017, p.1). The wall is supported by a security road where Turkish soldiers 
conduct patrolling.  
 
Moreover, Turkey has started erecting a wall on Iranian border as well. There is news that 
Turkey will erect walls on the Iraqi and Armenian border (DW, 2017). The Minister of Interior, 
Suleyman Soylu has stated the modular concrete walls at the Turkey–Syria and Turkey–Iran 
borders and in total 76% of the existing projects regarding border security roads have been 
completed (Soylu, 2018).  
 
Figure 8: Watch Towers at Turkey’s South and East Land Borders 
 
Source: The picture on the left is taken from https://www.trthaber.com/haber/turkiye/suriye-sinirinda-564-
kilometrelik-guvenlik-duvari-tamamlandi-369310.html and the drawing on the right is taken from 
https://www.haberturk.com/tv/gundem/haber/1661721-suriye-sinirina-orulen-duvar-bitti-kulekollar-yapiliyor/2 and 
merged for better visualization by the authors [Accessed 17 February 2019]. 
 
 
4.3. Internal Controls  
 
This section focuses on the regulations on stay and residence; detention; apprehension 
measures detaining and removal (instead of the term “deporting/deportation”, in Turkish 
legislation the term “removal” is used) and irregular migration (national legislation uses the 
term “irregular migrant” rather than unauthorised/undocumented migrants).  
 
4.3.1. The Key Provisions for Regulating the Stay of Refugees, Asylum Seekers 
and Irregular Migrants 
 
Regulations on stay, residency and secondary movements (from Turkey and within Turkey)23, 
which are associated with the status granted to the migrants, determine ways in which internal 
                                                             
23 “Secondary movements occur when refugees or asylum-seekers move from the country in which they 
first arrived to seek protection or for permanent resettlement elsewhere”, European Parliament (2017). 
“Secondary movements of asylum- seekers in the EU asylum system”, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608728/EPRS_BRI(2017)608728_EN.pdf 
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controls operate within the borders of receiving country. In this framework, Article 19 of the 
LFIP states that “foreigners who would stay in Turkey beyond the duration of a visa or a visa 
exemption or, longer than ninety days should obtain a residence permit.” The LFIP also 
requires that “all foreigners arriving Turkey with a residence [or] a work permit issued by the 
consulates should register with the address-based registration system no later than twenty 
working days as of the date of arrival” [LFIP, Article 26 (2)]. This address-based registration 
provides a main tool of internal controls of foreigners.  
 
Article 30 of the LFIP identifies six types of residence permits, including short term, student, 
family, long term and humanitarian residence permits as well as residency permit for victims 
of human trafficking (Cetin et. al., 2018, pp.631-7). However, the LFIP does not envision the 
granting of residence permits to either international protection status holders or beneficiaries 
of temporary protection. These categories are exempt of the residence permit requirement but 
they are given rights to stay on the basis of international protection status respectively (AIDA, 
2019a).  
 
Humanitarian residence permits and human trafficking residency permits are also crucial for 
controlling the stay of irregular migrants in the country and are related to readmission and 
deportations. The humanitarian residence permit is issued for one year if the applicant meets 
some of the pre-determined criteria with the LFIP Article 46 and 47. In case of delays regarding 
removal, humanitarian residence is provided due to the limited capacity of removal centres. 
After individuals are issued humanitarian residence permits, they are required to register in the 
address-based registration system within twenty working days [LFIP, Article 46 (1)]. This 
enables the state’s control of their secondary movements within Turkey. 
 
Another type of residence permit, for victims of human trafficking, is granted for 30 days by the 
governorates, and may be renewed for six months periods (total duration cannot exceed three 
years). This residency is granted “to break from the impact of their [negative] experience and 
reflect on whether to cooperate with the competent authorities” (LFIP, Article 48-49). Such 
residence permits shall be terminated in the cases where “victims of human trafficking have 
re-connected with the perpetrators of the crime through their own volition” [LFIP, Article 49 (2)].  
 
The status for stateless persons is granted by the DGMM and a Stateless Person Identification 
Document, issued by Governorates, which enables their legal residence in Turkey, is subject 
to renewal in every two years [LFIP, Article 50 (1) (2)]. Applications of the stateless persons 
for status in another country and the acquisition of the nationality of another country make the 
status and the Identification document invalid [LFIP, Article 50 (1) (4)]. Stateless persons “shall 
not be deported unless they pose a serious public order or public security threat” [LFIP, Article 
51 (1-b)].  
 
Concerning the stay and residence of asylum seekers, there has been a dual system that 
differentiates between European and non-European asylum seekers as based on Turkey’s 
geographical limitation (Cetin et. al., 2018, pp.631-7). The first group can obtain “refugee’ 
status”; while the second group can only obtain “conditional refugee status”24. There is another 
duality between Syrian and non-Syrian refugees. Due to the Syrian mass migration, Syrian 
                                                             
(Accessed 19 February 2019). However, in Turkey secondary movements also refers to asylum seekers’ 
and refugees’ forced movements from the city they enter to the satellite cities that they need to reside.  
24 LFIP (Article 62): A person who as a result of events occurring outside European countries and owing 
to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it, shall be granted. 
conditional refugee status upon completion of the refugee status determination process. Conditional 
refugees shall be allowed to reside in Turkey temporarily until they are resettled to a third country.  
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refugees are granted another international protection status, which is called “temporary 
protection”.25 The LFIP and the Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR)26 make a legal basis 
for the status of asylum seekers from Syria and those from other countries to be the subject of 
two different protection regimes in Turkey, with distinct sets of procedural rules, reception 
provisions and detention considerations (Ibid., p.9). The differences in terms of residency, 
travel, and deportation will be further elaborated in the following section. 
  
Institutionally, the DGMM is the main body responsible for the registration of all individuals who 
apply for international and temporary protection. DGMM has provincial offices. While the 
registration and conditions of stay for those having international protection is regulated by the 
LFIP, it is elaborated further for the temporary protection status holders with the TPR and 
relevant circulars (Circular, 2016). 
 
The LFIP asserts that “International protection applications shall be registered by the 
governorates”, with true identification documents. In the case of a lack of identification 
documents, a person’s statement is accepted [LFIP, Art.69 (1-3)]. At the time of registration, 
the applicant is issued with “a registration document valid for thirty days indicating the 
international protection application and containing identity information” and is informed about 
the date and place of interview [(LFIP, Art.69 (5,7)]. Before 10 September 2018, the procedure 
was mainly conducted by the UNHCR and its national implementing partner ASAM. After the 
completion of the first registration and interview with the UNHCR/ASAM in Ankara, the 
applicant and her/his family are issued an International Protection Applicant Identity Document 
along with a foreigner’s identification number (FIN). “Holding a FIN is essential for all foreign 
nationals in procedures and proceedings regarding access to basic rights and services” (AIDA, 
2018a, p.59). If the application for international protection could not be finalised, the registration 
document shall be extended for a validity period of six months [(LFIP, Art.76 (1)] without getting 
FIN. Those whose procedures were finalized have to travel to their assigned “satellite city” to 
inform relevant PDMM. However, as of 10 September 2018, the entire procedure of refugee 
status determination (RSD) moved under the authority of the DGMM. According to the new 
procedure, the UNHCR will not be taking any pre-registrations and the RSD procedure will be 
conducted solely by the DGMM as the national authority assigned under the LFIP. The 
UNHCR’s official web-site states that  
 
UNHCR has provided support to DGMM during its formation process, including 
registration of international protection applicants and referral processes. As of 10 
September 2018, UNHCR stopped registering and making referrals of foreigners 
wishing to apply for international protection in Turkey. As of 10 September 2018, 
UNHCR stopped carrying out mandate Refugee Status Determination procedures 
(UNHCR, 2018c). 
 
According to the LFIP, foreigners should apply for international protection to PDMM offices in 
any of the 81 provinces upon their entry to Turkey. As it was stated above, PDMM is the agency 
responsible for registering and further processing of all applications for international protection 
lodged by individuals. However, the UNHCR’s actions are limited with protection activities such 
as the delivery of counselling services to refugees and asylum-seekers in Turkey. It is also 
emphasized that “the UNHCR will continue to have access to international protection 
                                                             
25 According to Article 91 of the LFIP, ‘temporary protection may be provided for foreigners who have 
been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and who have arrived 
at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary 
protection’. The detailed information is also provided by the Turkey- country Report: Legal and Policy 
Framework of Migration Governance. Available at: <https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-
blog/2018/8/1/comparative-report-legal-and-policy-framework-of-migration-governance-pclyw-ydmzj-
bzdbn-sc548-ncfcp> [Accessed 19 February 2019]. 
26 This Regulation is prepared on the basis of Article 91 of the LFIP.  
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applicants and, subject to the consent of the applicant, to the information concerning the 
international protection application lodged by the individual with PDMM (UNHCR, 2018c). 
There are no official figures regarding the number and the nature of decisions on asylum 
applications. In addition, no figures are available regarding the overall number of non-Syrian 
refugees who have been resettled in third countries; however, 15,329 Syrians were resettled 
in third-countries between 2014-2019 (DGMM, 2019). With the new change, only the parallel 
procedure between Turkey and the UNHCR is changed but the resettlement will continue to 
be done by the UNHCR.  
 
For those granted conditional refugee or subsidiary protection status, the ID is valid for one 
year [LFIP, Art.83 (1-2)]. These IDs substitute a residence permit without subject to fees. The 
content, format, and validity of all these IDs granted to beneficiaries of international protection, 
conditional refugees, subsidiary protection, and statelessness are regulated with a Formal 
Information Note in September 2014 (Information note, 2014). 
 
Referral centres are under the authority of DGMM, which conducts the identification and 
registration procedures for foreigners who arrive in Turkey to seek temporary protection [TPR, 
Article 19 (1)]. “Governorates shall issue temporary protection identification document to those 
whose registration proceedings are completed” free of charge for a certain validity period or 
indefinitely and beneficiaries are given foreigner identification number [TPR 22 (1, 2,3)]. The 
second paragraph of the same article states that “foreigners under this Regulation, who are 
considered to potentially pose a threat to public health, shall undergo health checks in 
accordance with procedures and principles to be determined by the Ministry of Health and 
necessary measures shall be taken when considered necessary”. 
  
The registration of temporary protection differs from applicants of international protection. 
Temporary protection status is granted to those “who arrived at or crossed the borders of 
Turkey in a mass influx seeking immediate and temporary protection” (implying refugees 
arriving from Syria within the context of TPR 2014). As Refugee Rights Centre (2017) writes  
 
Since March 2016 (Circular, 2016), the registration process is divided into two main 
stages. The first is preregistration, which is carried out by either the Foreigners’ 
Police branches or Sub-Provincial Directorates of Security. The second stage is 
registration, for which PDMM offices are the responsible authority (RRC, 2017).  
 
After Syrians completed pre-registration, they are given a Pre-Registration Document with a 
validity of 30 days (which may be extended for another 30 days). The document contains a 
Foreigner’s ID Number starting with “98”. This pre-registration document enables them to 
access primary health care services (Circular, 2016). After being granted eligibility (which 
requires risk evaluation of relevant security and intelligence departments and final decision of 
DGMM, and PDMM), a person’s information is uploaded to GocNet’s temporary protection 
module by PDMM’s officers. These beneficiaries are obliged to approach PDMM for 
completing registration and to obtain a Temporary Protection Identity Card that will replace 
Pre- Registration Document. This document is free of charge. It contains a photo, basic identity 
information, and a Foreigners’ ID Number starting with ‘99’. This ID is not the equivalent of a 
residence permit (Refugee Rights Centre, 2017, p.4). It means that they cannot be transited 
to a long-term residence permit and their duration cannot be used for applying for Turkish 
citizenship [TPR 25 (1)]. The Temporary Protection Identity Card regularizes the stay of 
persons in Turkey. It allows them to stay in the province where they complete their registration 
processes. The Foreigners’ ID Number is critical to access fundamental rights and services 
such as health care and education (RRC, 2017).  
 
The most important internal control mechanism for asylum seekers is residence and the 
obligation to report to the authorities. Authorities oblige those under international protection 
(non-Syrians) to “reside in the designated reception and accommodation centres, a specific 
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location.” In practice, they are obliged to stay in one of 51 pre-determined cities, determined 
by MoI and known as satellite cities (Cetin et al., 2018, pp.667-668). Also, they are required to 
register with the address-based registration system and report domicile address to the 
governorate of these cities, and stay there until the finalization of their asylum proceedings 
(LFIP, Article 71). According to the fieldwork and information gathered from both state and 
non-state actors, if there is a city that an international protection applicant particularly prefers 
or where their close relatives live, they can express their preference to PDMM. The below 
given map displays those satellite cities.  
 
Figure 9: Satellite Cities to Stay for International Protection Applicants 
 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2019. “Registration and RSD with UNHCR”, Available at: 
https://help.unhcr.org/turkey/information-for-non-syrians/registration-rsd-with-unhcr/ [Accessed 19 February 
2019]. 
 
Temporary protection has different residency regulations from international protection and 
based on their registration. Although residing in satellite cities is not obligatory, a person who 
is under temporary protection (Syrians) has to reside in a province in general where they make 
their first registration, temporary accommodation centre27 or a certain place determined by the 
Directorate General [TPR, 2014, Article 24 (2-a) and Article 33]. Article 33 of the LFIP states 
that  
 
a) Reside in a province, temporary accommodation centre or a certain place 
determined by the Directorate General [DGMM]; 
b) Comply with their reporting duty in form and intervals determined by the 
governorate; 
c) Notify updated information on their employment status in thirty days; 
ç) Notify their income, movable and immovable properties in thirty days; 
d) Notify the changes in their identity information such as address, marital status 
and birth and death in the family in twenty business days; 
e) Present other personal data to the competent authorities;  
f) Reimburse the costs, if it is determined that they have been benefiting from 
service, assistance and other resources wrongfully; 
g) Comply with other obligations requested from them by the Directorate General 
or the governorate. 
                                                             
27 Only the Syrians lacking personal sources preferred camps (to temporary accommodation centres) 
instead of starting a life in city centres due to the high rent costs. DGMM decides on admission to camps 
in coordination with governorates due to the capacity issues and takes refugees family situation and 
special conditions into account (RRC, 2017, p.9). Those staying camps have a right to leave it with 
informing camp management and provide their new residence address within 20 days (RRC, 2017, p.9). 
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The above-given article authorises the DGMM to limit freedom of movement of Syrians to a 
particular location (AIDA, 2019b). However, until the 2015, those limitations were not applied 
strictly but 29 August 2015, “an unpublished DGMM Circular28 ordered the institution of a range 
of measures by provincial authorities to control and prevent the movement of Syrians inside 
Turkey” due to the growing irregular sea crossings of Syrian nationals and the impact of the 
EU-Turkey Statement (ibid.)    
 
In addition to the residency rules as a part of the internal controls, “travel permits (yol izin 
belgesi)” is another internal control tool for recipients of international protection. Travel permits 
are not only for international protection, but also for Syrians with a temporary protection status. 
Those permits are important in the internal control mechanism that has been strictly 
implemented which obliges conditional refugees to hold a “travel permit” document. With the 
2016 Circular29, it is further clarified that migrants with a temporary protection status are 
permitted to stay in the province where they are issued temporary protection IDs (Circular, 
2016, A-2D, p.4).30 This circular was introduced by the DGMM’s International Protection Unit 
(Uluslararasi Koruma Daire Baskanligi) dated 15 March 2016. It states that “Syrian foreigners 
residing in Turkey should not leave the province where they are registered because of their 
access to rights and services as well as to provide public safety and security” (Circular, 2016). 
It was written that “this issue should be sensitively followed up to avoid any trouble” (AIDA, 
2018b). This circular is delivered to 81 provinces and governorates and available to relevant 
state authorities (District Governorates, Provincial Gendarmerie Command, Provincial Security 
Directorate, Provincial Directorate of Disaster and Emergency, Provincial Directorate of Family 
and Social Policies, Provincial Directorate of National Education, Provincial Directorate of 
Health) (AIDA, 2018b).  
 
With this Circular (2016), Syrians are required to obtain travel authorisation document from 
provincial governorates when they travel to another city other than the one in which they are 
registered. The permits are valid for 15 days. During the process of buying tickets and during 
travel, they are required to present both travel permit documentation and their temporary 
protection IDs (gecici koruma kimlik belgesi) (Travel Permits, 2018). Carriers have an 
obligation to get one copy of each document and present them to the authorities if required. 
Also, after their return to the city where they are registered, they are required to report their 
presence to the PDMM. If the travel period will take longer than 15 days, they may apply for 
an extension (maximum another 15 days) before the travel permission document expires 
(RRC, 2017, p.10). Since all access to rights and services (education and health) depends on 
where they register, the documents are critically important (RRC, 2017, p.10).  
 
All these obligations serve the control of residency and secondary movements of temporary 
protection beneficiaries within the country. These registrations, verifications of records and 
address updates have been strictly implemented since 2016 (after 2016 March Circular) and 
Syrians have been informed about these obligations.31 In addition, the Circular of DGMM 
(2017/10) was introduced on 29 November 2017 that specifies PDMM may introduce reporting 
                                                             
28 DGMM Circular No 55327416-000-22771 of 29 August 2015 on “The Population Movements of 
Syrians within the Scope of Temporary Protection”. 
29For the original text in Turkish: 
http://kizilcahamam.meb.gov.tr/meb_iys_dosyalar/2016_03/22094122_gkkusulveesaslargenelge.pdf 
[Accessed 26 August 2019]. 
30 They have to stay in the province where they registered [TPR Art. 24 (1)] and they have to inform 
PDMM of changes of address. Foreigners under temporary protection are obliged to register in the 
Address Registration System and notify the changes in their address in twenty business days [TPR, 
33(2-d)]. They are only able to practice these rights and use the services in the province where they 
completed their temporary protection registration and where they obtained a Foreigners’ ID number 
(RRC, 2017, p.5). 
31 For further information see <http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik3/adres-degisikligi-islemleri_558_560_8969>, 
[Accessed 19 February 2019]. 
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obligations on temporary protection beneficiaries by means of signature duty as similar to the 
beneficiaries of international protection. Failure to comply with reporting obligations may 
consequence the cancellation of temporary protection status. 
 
Also, although for Syrians, there is no obligation to stay in designated centres or satellite cities, 
they are obliged to follow specific rules that have been constantly getting stricter. It is also the 
fact that there are some cities where it is not possible to make temporary protection 
applications, which are Istanbul and also the other nine border cities (HRW, 2018a). This is 
due to the fact that governorates have had a power of discretion for not accepting registration 
of more Syrians as observed in Istanbul and Hatay since the early months of 2018 (Cetin et 
al., 2018, p.644). Furthermore, as of July 2019, the controls were increased and in particular 
for Istanbul, Syrians were given time by the MoI until 20 August 2019 to turn to the cities that 
they have been registered according to the statement by the Governorship of Istanbul:  
 
Although they are under temporary protection, the Syrian nationals who are not 
registered (registered in other provinces) in Istanbul, are given until 20 August 2019 
to return to the provinces where they are registered. Those who do not return at 
the end of the specified period, according to the instructions of the Ministry of 
Interior will be taken to the provinces where they are registered” (T24, 2019) 
 
The TPR further elaborates the cases in which temporary protection beneficiaries intend to 
depart to any other country for either the purpose of resettlement or a temporary visit. These 
people are required to get permission from the DGMM, known as an exit permit (TPR Article 
44, TPR). Syrians who plan a family reunification departure from Turkey must first register with 
DGMM as a “temporary protection beneficiary”, then they are able to request and obtain an 
exit permit to legally leave Turkey to another country. 
 
In general, complexities and vagueness about travel documents (for those under international 
protection) raise questions about the implementation of 1951 Convention travel document 
right.  
 
4.3.2. Apprehensions and Administrative Detention 
 
As it was summarized in the RESPOND Project WP1 Report (Cetin et. al., 2018), irregular 
migrants who are caught and apprehended by law enforcement units, should immediately be 
reported to the governorate for a decision to be made concerning their removal (deportation) 
status [LFIP, Article 57(1)] (Cetin et al., 2018, pp. 670-4). Illegal entry or illegal stay in Turkey 
does not hinder the right to apply to international protection [LFIP, Article 65(4)]. If they lodge 
an international protection application to law enforcement units, the application should 
immediately be reported to the governorates [LFIP, Article 65(2)]. According to LFIP Article 57 
(1), the duration between the apprehension of an irregular migrant and a decision to be 
rendered whether they would be removed or not should not exceed 48 hours. If the decision is 
“removal”, then the governorate may issue administrative detention for those, who bear high 
risk of disappearing or are seen as a threat to public order [LFIP, Article 57 (2)]. Table 1 
provides a list of removal centres, where administrative detention is realised. 
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Table 1: List of Removal Centres  
 
Source: DGMM, 2019b. Removal centres under the DGMM Management, Available at: 
https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/removal-centers_915_1024_10105_icerik [Accessed 9 July 2019]. 
 
The LFIP provides new terms regarding immigrant detention under the “Administrative 
detention and duration of detention for removal purposes”. Article 57 (2) states the following  
 
Those for whom a removal decision have been issued, the governorate shall 
issue an administrative detention decision for those who; bear the risk of 
absconding or disappearing; breached the rules of entry into and exit from 
Turkey; have used false or fabricated documents; have not left Turkey after the 
expiry of the period granted to them to leave, without an acceptable excuse; or, 
pose a threat to public order, public security or public health. 
 
In addition, it is foreseen that the detention of persons seeking protection should be an 
exceptional measure (Article 68). Previously, Article 4 of the Passport Law and Article 23 of 
the Law on the Sojourn and Movement of Aliens were mentioned administrative detention; 
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however, those articles were unclear about the detention. Instead, they explain a type of 
accommodation carried out by the authorities; however as clearly causing deprivation of liberty.  
 
Article 57 of the LFIP references Article 54 which lists, all the grounds for a decision of removal, 
in other words deportation. Therefore, the very same article provides the criminalisation of the 
actions as ranging from being a member of terrorist activities to overstaying visa or the visa 
exemption. Article 54 (1) also mentions working without a work permit or having rejected 
international protection. Article 57 (2) also states that “foreigners subject to administrative 
detention shall be taken to removal centres within forty-eight hours of the decision by the 
[same] law enforcement unit that apprehended them”. 
 
The duration of administrative detention in removal centres shall not exceed six months [Article 
57 (3)]. However, in the case of uncompleted procedures due the lack cooperation with the 
foreigner, this period can be extended for a maximum of six additional months. This means 
that administrative detention is possible for up to one year. However, for the extension of the 
detention period, Article 54 (4) requires monthly reviews by the authorities regarding the 
necessity of the detention. It should be noted that the legal representation or lawyer (if the 
foreigner does not have the means to pay the attorney’s fee, legal counsel will be provided) of 
the foreigner who is subject to administrative detention may appeal this decision through the 
Judge of the Criminal Court of Peace and the decision by the Court should be taken within five 
days [Article 54(6)]. However, empirical data collected as a part of the RESPOND' fieldwork 
and many reports32 shows that there are a significant number of cases where the above-given 
legal framework is not respected. 
 
The LFIP clearly states that “applicants of international protection cannot be the subject of 
administrative detention for lodging an international protection claim” [LFIP Art.68 (1)]. 
Nevertheless, Article 68 (2) of LFIP specifies “four grounds” on which the administrative 
detention of international protection applicants can be justified: 
  
a) for the purpose of determining the identity or nationality [of the person] in case 
there is serious doubt as to the accuracy of the information provided;  
b) for the purpose of being withheld from entering into Turkey in breach of terms 
[and conditions] of entry at the border gates; 
c) when it would not be possible to identify the elements of the grounds for their 
application unless subjected to administrative detention;  
ç) when [the person] poses a serious public order or public security threat [LFIP 
Art.68 (2)]  
 
According to Article 58 and 59 of LFIP, foreigners subject to administrative detention are held 
in removal centres. The working principles of removal centres and basic rights of detainees 
are regulated under article 59 of the LFIP. Accordingly, detainees may have access to 
emergency and primary healthcare services, may be given opportunity to meet with their 
relatives, the notary public, their representatives and lawyers, and may have access to 
telephone services. They may also have contact with consular officials of their country of 
citizenship and officials of the UNHCR. Representatives of the relevant NGOs with expertise 
in the field of migration may visit the removal centres upon obtaining permission from the 
DGMM. Families and unaccompanied minors should be accommodated in separate areas in 
order to enable children to have access to education and the responsibility lies with the Ministry 
of National Education to take the necessary measures. The person also has the right to 
challenge the removal decision. After giving a written notification of a person who is subject of 
                                                             
32 Deportation Monitoring Aegean, 2019. “Surrendered to Harmandali Removal Prison”, 4 June 2019, 
available at: https://dm-aegean.bordermonitoring.eu/2019/06/04/surrendered-to-harmandali-removal-
prison-how-eu-policies-lead-to-expulsion-and-maltreatment-of-migrants-deported-to-turkey/ [Accessed 
10 July 2019].  
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detention, the period of administrative detention for applicants shall not exceed thirty days 
[LFIP Art.68 (5)]. Appeal against the detention decision is possible, and it should address the 
Judge of the Criminal Court of Peace. However, such an application does not suspend the 
administrative detention, but the Judge has to finalise the assessment within five days as a final 
decision. 
 
The persons concerned, their legal representative or lawyer may appeal against the removal 
decision to the administrative court within 15 days from the date of the notification of the 
removal decision [LFIP, Article 53(3)]. The appeals should be decided within 15 days and the 
decision of the court on the appeal is final (Ibid). The appeal has a suspensive effect; therefore, 
the person should not be removed during the judicial appeal period (Ibid). However, there is 
an exception for the suspensive effect for the appeal of those who are given a removal decision 
due to being leaders, members or supporters of a terrorist organisation or a benefit oriented 
criminal organisation; posing a threat to public order or public security or public health and 
being associated with terrorist organisations which have been defined by international 
institutions and organisation (Ibid). Once the detention period has ended, an individual may be 
removed to his/her country of origin, a transit country or a third country [LFIP, Article 52(1)]. 
However, before each removal action, an assessment for compatibility with non-refoulement 
needs to be made [LFIP, Article 4; Implementing Regulation of LFIP, Article 4]. Therefore, the 
removal may take place as long as the destination country is safe in terms of the non-
refoulement principle. According to LFIP, Article 74, a third safe country is defined as “a safe 
third country in which he/she has lodged an [international protection] application or in which it 
would have been possible to lodge an international protection claim that could have resulted 
in the granting of appropriate protection in compliance with the Convention”. Persons under 
detention who are subject to implementation of the removal decision are taken to border gates 
by law enforcement unit [LFIP, Article 60(1)]. If an irregular migrant is unable to cover his/her 
travel costs, the full or remaining cost of travel should be covered from the budget of the DGMM 
[LFIP, Article 60(3)].  
 
Finally, based on the fieldwork and conducted interviews, on the 24th May 2018, a new internal 
regulation was issued by DGMM. Before, in the case of irregular border-crossings, Syrians 
used to be released without taken into the removal centres. The interviewees (both state and 
non-state actors) stated that before this regulation, the number of Syrians was quite high and 
that there were many attempts to cross the border. However, after the introduction of this 
regulation, Syrians are escorted by law enforcement actors and accompanied to the existing 
temporary accommodation centres (as they are officially referred to, however are commonly 
referred to as “camps” in informal language) in the south-eastern border cities. These are not 
removal centres, they are government-financed centres where vulnerable Syrians have been 
sheltered since 2011. As these are not removal centres, after registration with the camp 
authorities, Syrians are free to leave the camps. Despite the research for this report, we were 
unable to obtain official documents regarding the 24th May regulation. However, the meso level 
interviews which mention this new internal regulation and the related implementations are 
given later in this report.  
 
4.3.3. Deportation 
 
The concepts of forced return and deportation are not used in in the LFIP’s official English 
translation, rather the term of “removal” is used, which refers the process of the forced return 
of an individual to the origin, transit or a third country based upon an administrative or a judicial 
decision (IOM, 2009, p.63). However, although the official documents use the term “removal”, 
the action refers to “deportation” in practice. It should be noted that removal can be seen as 
violating both the following constitutional rights: “everyone has the right to personal liberty and 
security” (Article 19) and “Everyone has the freedom of residence and movement” (Article 23) 
of the Constitutional Law. However, Article 16 provides the legal basis for some restrictions as 
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it follows “the fundamental rights and freedoms in respect to aliens may be restricted by law 
compatible with international law.” 
 
Regarding return, first of all it should be noted that the LFIP states that 
 
No one within the scope of this Law shall be returned to a place where he or she 
may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, 
where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion 
(Article 4).  
 
In the above-given framework, Article 52 (1) of the LFIP defines removal as: “foreigners may 
be removed to their country of origin or a transit country or a third country by virtue of a removal 
decision.” The DGMM or state authorities hold jurisdiction to issue a removal decision [LFIP, 
Art.53 (1)] There are fifteen criteria set out at the Article 54 of the LFIP, including being involved 
(as supporters, leaders, members) in terrorist or criminal organisations; submitting false 
documents during legal procedures about entry, visa, and residence actions; posing a public 
order, public security or public health threat; violating rules about residency status, violating 
terms and conditions for legal entry into or exit from Turkey; having been issued a negative 
decision about international protection application [LFIP, 54 (1)]. Exemptions of removal are 
assessed and decided on a case by case basis [LFIP, 55 (2)] 
 
After the finalization of the decision, the foreigner is granted “no less than fifteen days and up 
to thirty days to leave Turkey” [LFIP, Art.56 (1)]. However, the same article states that this 
period should not be granted to the foreigner under many circumstances, particularly cases in 
which the foreigner pose a public order, public security, public health threat [LFIP, Art.56 (1)].  
 
Asylum seekers whose case has been rejected will be safe from being subjected to a 
deportation decision for 15 days following the communication of the rejection to them by the 
PDMM. If they choose to file an appeal with the relevant court within this time frame, they will 
be protected from a deportation decision until the finalisation of this appeal application. The 
Bar Associations provides legal counselling and assigns lawyers. However, there are no 
statistics about the number of the appeals.  
 
Moreover, the right of appeal of foreigners was almost eliminated with the amendment of Article 
53, 54 at the Legislative Decree No. 676 (Kanun Hukmunde Kararname) which was issued on 
29 October 2016 under the Emergency Law Period (KHK #676, 2016). The amendment 
clarifies that foreigners who are leaders, members or supporters of a terrorist organisation or 
a benefit oriented criminal organisation; who pose a public order, public security or public 
health threat; and who are affiliated with terror organisations that are recognized by 
international institutions shall be removed at any stage of their international protection 
procedure.33 
 
Attempting to leave Turkey in an irregular manner is one of the grounds for deportation and a 
person may also be detained for this reason. Applicable legislation as well as international 
agreements to which Turkey is a party requires Turkish authorities not to deport persons who 
are in need of international protection (RRC, 2017, p.13).  
 
As of July 2019, deportation was intensively discussed. As following the statement made by 
the Governorate of Istanbul, which gave time until August 20 to return where they have been 
registered (Euronews, 2019), the Ministry of Interior, Suleyman Soylu gave another statement 
on the following day regarding the operations against irregular migrants, where he stated that 
                                                             
33 Also see amended version of the LFIP, Available at: 
<http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.6458.pdf> [Accessed 20 February 2019]. 
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“last year, we have deported a total of 56 thousand illegal immigrants. This year, the average 
is 80 thousand, which means that almost 40-50 percent higher than the last year. We have to 
do this” (tv100, 2019). However, at another platform, Soylu mentioned the number of irregular 
migrants who arrested as 268 thousand and at the end of 2019, it is expected to more than 
300 thousand (Sabah, 2019). The statements from different officials regarding irregular 
migration and Syrians in particular in Istanbul have created reactions from the civil society and 
academia, thus both the Minister of Interior and the DGMM General Director shared 
statements, which mentions that it is not possible and planned to deport any Syrians who are 
under temporary protection (CNNTurk, 2019; FP, 2019; Gazeteduvar, 2019a; TRTHaber, 
2019). However, since July, the deportation cases have been increasingly reported not from 
Istanbul but also the other cities, which need to be monitored closely.  
 
4.3.4. Voluntary Return  
 
In contrast to “removal”, “return” will be referring to “voluntary return” in this report. The LFIP 
regulates voluntary return under “support for voluntary return” with Article 87 (1) and 
beneficiaries of temporary protection have a right to voluntarily return to Syria: “Material and 
financial support may be provided to those applicants and international protection beneficiaries 
who would wish to voluntarily return”. According to the same article paragraph 2, the DGMM 
is the responsible authority to carry out voluntary repatriation activities in coordination with 
international organisations, public institutions and civil society organisations. 
 
Those who would like to voluntarily return have to apply to the PDMM office in their city of 
registration. They must complete a Voluntary Return Form and take a copy of it along with a 
travel permission document. With these forms, they are able to freely travel to the appropriate 
border crossing point and leave Turkey. Voluntary return means accepting the termination of 
temporary protection status; thus, authorities take away their Temporary Protection ID Card at 
the border. Article 85 (1) of the LFIP clearly states that “The international protection status shall 
terminate in cases where the beneficiary if/when: … voluntarily returned to the country from 
which they have fled or stayed outside of due to fear of persecution”. Re-application of the 
temporary protection status is under the discrepancy of DGMM. It should be noted that Syrians 
under temporary protection are granted the right to temporarily visit Syria during festive times. 
Therefore, this return is not a part of voluntary return and since it has special permission, the 
beneficiaries do not lose their temporary protection status. The DGMM announces periods for 
application for short visits and give travel documents which are often valid for 3-4 months 
(before and after festive times). However, as it is outlined in the implementation section of the 
report, many interviewees mentioned rather than voluntary returns but forced returns or 
unlawful practices regarding the voluntary return process. 
 
4.3.5. Readmission Agreements and the EU-Turkey Statement 
 
Turkey has readmission agreements with the following countries: Syria, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, 
Romania, Ukraine, Pakistan, Russia, Nigeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yemen, Moldova, 
Belarus and Montenegro and the ratification process of the signed readmission agreements 
with Nigeria, Yemen and Pakistan have not yet been completed (MfA, 2018d). The 
Readmission Protocol with Greece (Protocol, 2002) has played a critical role regarding the 
implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. The most recent readmission agreement was 
signed with the EU in 2013 (RA). Although it was neither a readmission agreement nor an 
international agreement but a bilateral political statement, it should be noted that the EU-
Turkey Statement is closely related to the RA. Thus, the Statement will also be mentioned 
under this heading. 
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The Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol (2002) 
The Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey was signed in 2002. Since then, its 
ineffective implementation has been criticised by the EU (European Commission, 2012). 
However, this Protocol became critically important after 2015 due to the increased irregular 
border-crossings from Turkey to the EU. At that time, although the EU-Turkey Readmission 
Agreement had been already signed, according to the Article 24 of the RA, readmission for the 
TCNs could not be applicable until 1 October 2017. Therefore, when the EU-Turkey Statement 
was agreed in 2016, the Protocol was the legal basis of the readmission of TCNs. However, 
this Protocol “was suspended by Turkey unilaterally in response to a decision by a Greek court 
to release eight former Turkish soldiers who fled the country a day after the 15 July 2016 coup 
attempt (Gokalp Aras, 2019, p.8). The Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that “we have 
a migrant deal with the EU. It is being implemented. We have a bilateral readmission deal with 
Greece. We have now suspended this agreement. The process is not fully over but our 
dialogue with Greece will continue” (TRT, 2018). It also means that all those who cross the 
Turkey-Greece land border (Evros) are not any more covered due to the suspension of the 
Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol, as the Statement only covers the readmissions from 
the Greek islands.  
 
The EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement (2013) 
On 16 December 2013, Turkey and the EU signed the agreement “on the Readmission of 
Persons Residing without Authorization” (RA, 2013) although it has been on the EU-Turkey 
relations’ agenda since 2000s. The RA specifies provisions related to the readmission of the 
nationals of the EU Member States (MSs) and Turkey. In addition, it deals with the readmission 
of the third-country nationals (TCNs) and stateless persons who have entered into, or stayed 
on, the territory of either side directly arriving from the territory of the other side. Since its 
ratification, it has been applicable only to Turkish citizens according to the Article 24 of the RA, 
readmissions should be applicable for TCNs after 1 October 2017. However, with the EU-
Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, the TCNs’ readmission was foreseen by June 2016 
(European Commission, 2015a; EU-Turkey Statement, 2016). As a result, as of 4 April 2016, 
Turkey accepted the first readmitted group from the Greek islands and the readmission of 
TCNs started on this date as a part of the Statement, which was legally based on the 
Readmission Protocol between Greece and Turkey (European Commission, 2016). However, 
it should be added that the RA could not be used for TCNs but only for the Turkish citizens 
until July 2019 due to the administrative measure by Turkey as based on the delays regarding 
visa exemption process. Regarding this measure, it was not possible to obtain any official 
declaration from Turkey (Ozturk and Soykan, 2019); however, the European Commission 
stated that the suspension of the readmission of TCNs by Turkey was due to the uncompleted 
visa liberalisation process (European Commission, 2018b p. 46). Similarly, the meso level 
interviewees from Ankara and Izmir have shared the same information regarding the 
implementation of the RA.  
 
On 22 July 2019, the Turkish government officially announced the suspension of the RA. This 
was explained as a response to the EU sanctioning Turkey’s gas drilling operations in Cypriot 
waters. Prime Minister Cavusoglu said that “this was not only due to the EU’s recent sanctions. 
The decision was also taken because the EU still had not introduced the agreed-on visa-free 
regime for Turkish citizens” (Euroactiv, 2019). It should be noted that in many sources, there 
is a certain confusion regarding whether the government suspended the RA or the Statement 
or the both. Some sources only mention the RA but the content addresses the Statement, 
while some of them mention the Statement at their headings but again their content addresses 
the RA (DMA, 2019a; Euroactiv, 2019; Europost, 2019). The suspension of the RA was also 
evaluated as the suspension of the Statement (Gazeteduvar, 2019b). For example, Euroactiv 
(2019) stated that “The Turkish government has announced its suspension of the readmission 
agreement concluded with the EU in 2016, the so-called ‘EU-Turkey deal’. This was a response 
to the EU sanctioning Turkey’s gas drilling operations in Cypriot waters”. In general, as it was 
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one of the observations at the field, the RA and the Statement are used interchangeably. 
However, since the direct quotation from the Prime Minister, Cavusoglu is “We will not wait at 
the EU's door. The readmission agreement and visa-free deal will be put into effect at the same 
time” as addressing only the RA” (Daily Sabah, 2019), it seems the Turkish Government 
continues to use the mass migration as a foreign policy tool against the EU (Greenhill, 2010 
and 2016; Gokalp Aras, 2019) and declares the de-facto situation regarding the RA once again. 
According to the field research findings provided at the meso level, the RA was not applicable 
in practice; however, the Statement has been implemented despite the small numbers of 
readmissions. However, we do not come across a further explanation neither from Turkey side 
nor from the EU regarding the status of the RA and the Statement at the time this report was 
finalized.   
 
The EU-Turkey Statement (2016) 
Following the sharp increase of crossings from Turkey to Greece, new policy tools and 
agreements were introduced: such as the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP, 2015) and the 
EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016. With the Statement, the European Council and 
Turkey agreed on “three main objectives: preventing loss of lives in the Aegean Sea; breaking 
the migrant smuggling networks; and replacing illegal migration with legal migration” (Sert and 
Turkmen, 2017, p.34). According to Article 1 of the statement, Turkey agreed to accept the 
return of all migrants not in need of international protection who crossed Greece after the 20th 
March 2016 and to take back all irregular migrants who had been intercepted in Turkish waters. 
In Article 2, the statement formulates the regulations concerning Syrians as distinct from other 
irregular transit migrants. Known as the “one-to-one” formula, this article states that for every 
Syrian returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian should be resettled in the 
EU, up to a maximum of 72,000 people (Article 2). Finally, the Statement mentions upgrading 
the customs union and “re-energizing the accession process” for Turkey to obtain full 
membership. The existing incentives within the externalization framework, such as capacity-
building support and financial aid, are also included but on more generous terms. 
 
The Statement paved the way for the immediate return of Syrian refugees arriving on Greek 
islands to Turkey, on the grounds that it is defined as a “safe third country”. However, Turkey’s 
safe country status appears controversial, especially because of Turkey’s geographical 
limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, which limits refugee status solely to those who meet 
the criteria for the refugee status due to events happening in European countries, as well as 
some reported violations of non-refoulment principle (Peers, 2017; Ulusoy and Battjes, 2017). 
In addition, according to analysis by law experts (Ulusoy and Battjes, 2017; Lehner, 2019; 
Ozturk and Soydan, 2019; Vrieze, 2018), it is not clear which legal basis is applicable for the 
Statement34. The legal nature of the Statement has been quite controversial since its 
publication. Some of the scholars argue that it is an international agreement (Heijer and 
Spijkerboer, 2016; Arribas, 2017) while others argue that is only a political statement (Peers, 
2016; Ulusoy and Battjes, 2017; Koenig and Franke, 2017), which was also stated by the 
interviewees in Izmir and Ankara. 
As it will be explored as a part of the meso level implementation part of the report, the 
readmissions of TCNs through the Statement continued although with small numbers until its 
suspension. As a part of “one-to-one formula”, Turkey claims that the total number of 
readmitted TCNs are 1,866, while 347 of them are Syrians as it can be seen below.  
 
 
                                                             
34 The legal nature of the Statement has been quite controversial and widely discussed since its 
publication. Some of the scholars argue that it is an international agreement and binding upon its parties; 
while some of them argue that is only a political statement and non-binding.  
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Table 2: Irregular Migrants Returned to Turkey within the Scope of the EU-Turkey 
Statement 
 
Source: DGMM, 2019c. “Return Statistics”, Available at: <https://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/return-
statistics_915_1024_10104_icerik> [Accessed 15 July 2019] 
 
The EU’s figures claim that the resettlement of Syrian refugees from Turkey after 4 April 2016 
is 20,292; while the returns from Greece to Turkey since 21 March 2016 are 2,224 (European 
Commission, 2019b). Since the UNHCR has been using the official figures from Turkey, it 
provides the same figures as Turkey (UNHCR, 2019). However, as it was stated earlier, the 
number of irregular migrants among them to have made an asylum application for international 
or temporary protection is not provided by Turkey.  
 
Regarding the changing numbers of the border-crossings, the figure given below reflects the 
impact of the Statement: 
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Figure 10: Arrivals- Sea Border
 
Source: European Commission, 2019c. “EU-Turkey Statement Three Years On”. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20190318_eu-turkey-three-years-on_en.pdf [Accessed 9 July 2019]. 
 
As it can be seen above, as following the EU-Turkey Statement, there is an important decrease 
regarding irregular border-crossings; but it should be noted that there are many other related 
factors for this decrease such as increasing securitisation, establishment the “security wall” at 
the south-east borders of Turkey, increasing internal controls etc. Concluding this part, the 
Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol (2002), the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement (2013), 
and the EU-Turkey Statement (2016) are significantly connected to each other, but Turkey as 
of 22nd July 2019 has suspended all of them. 
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5. Implementation  
 
5.1. Key Actors  
 
Instead of a uniformed, institutional border management structure, there are over 20 actors 
which have responsibilities pertaining to the protection and control of the Turkish border. Their 
responsibilities and tasks are regulated with over 25 different legal regulations. The principal 
coordination role belongs to Turkish General Staff (Turkish Armed Forces, mainly the Land 
Forces Command), Ministry of the Interior (Turkish Gendarmerie General Command, Turkish 
Coast Guard Command, the Directorate General of Security, Department of Border 
Management under the Directorate General of Provincial Administration, the Directorate 
General of Migration), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
State Actors (Law Enforcement) 
Law enforcement in Turkey is carried out by several departments and agencies, all acting 
under the command of the President of Turkey, or the Minister of Internal Affairs. In terms of 
border control, land borders have been controlled by the Land Forces Command of the Turkish 
Armed Forces (Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri) according to the Law on the Protection and Security of 
Land Borders (Kara Sinirlarinin Korunmasi ve Güvenligi Hakkindaki Kanun) dated back to 10 
November, 1988 (Law 3497, 1988). According to the above-mentioned law, and also the 
Regulation on Military Property Regions and Security Zones (Askeri Yasak Bölgeler ve 
Güvenlik Bölgeleri Yonetmeligi), the Land Forces Command is responsible for the areas 
established at a distance of 30 to 600 meters along the land border line, and on the coasts if it 
is needed. This area is stated as “the First-Degree Military Area,” which is restricted with the 
600-meter boundary strip, and counted as a “Forbidden Zone” (Regulation #1553, 1983). Up 
to 2013, except the border gates at the land border, the Gendarmerie had the primary role for 
border control for the 127 kilometres of the Turkey-Iran Border, as well as 384 kilometres of 
the Turkey-Iraq border. However, as of 20 August 2013, this role has been transferred to the 
Land Forces Command. Since then, the Gendarmerie has only been carrying out judicial law 
enforcement services. 
 
The Gendarmerie’s (Jandarma) area of jurisdiction is outside city centres, and they also have 
the responsibility for border management. Additionally, the Gendarmerie General Command 
has a close relationship with the police force in Turkey since the area of responsibility within 
the provincial and district municipal boundaries belong to police forces; whereas the region 
outside of these boundaries constitutes the area of the Gendarmerie (Regulation, 2009).  
 
Turkish Coast Guard Command (TUCG) serves as the law enforcement authority, and it is the 
coast guard service branch of the Turkish Armed Forces during emergency and wartime. 
Additionally, TUCG has this role under the Ministry of Interior during peace time as well. 
According to the Coast Guard Command Law Article 4, some of the major border related roles 
of the Coast Guard Command are to: protect coasts and territorial waters, to ensure security, 
and to prevent all kinds of sea related criminal acts (Law #2692, 1982). Briefly, the Coast 
Guard Command is assigned to monitor sea boundaries, and is responsible for the protection 
and security of all coasts, territorial waters, ports, gulfs and inland waters according to the 
above-mentioned law.  
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Figure 11: Turkey Border Management Schema  
 
Source: This table is translated into English by the authors from Turkish, see Yesiltas, 2015, p.15.  
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The General Directorate of Security, affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, provides the control 
of human entry and exits at border gates. In contrast to the Gendarmerie, the police force is 
responsible for law enforcement in cities, and some other locations such as airports.35 They 
are responsible for transferring migrants to removal centres, and in the cases of deportation 
that have been established by PDMMs, to complete the deportation process. As of 5 February 
2016, the Department of Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking36 under the General 
Directorate of Security were established. The same change was made for the Gendarmerie in 
2016, wherein the Command of Smuggling and Organized Crimes was changed to the 
Command of Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking. In addition to the above-mentioned 
special department, the Directorate General of Security is responsible for Passport procedures 
of Foreigners in Turkey; while the visa procedures are the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs according to the Passport Law (#5682, Article 24). Finally, the National 
Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) has the authority to conduct cross-border 
operations and to gather intelligence in terms of border control.  
 
As it can be seen from the above-given schema, the border management and actor-based 
structure is significantly complex. As suggested by the fieldwork findings, this complex 
institutional structure coupled with the highly fragmented legal structure brought additional 
complexities to Turkey’s response to the Syrian mass migration.  
 
State Actors (Civilian) 
Since the beginning of 2000s, with the impact of EU accession process, Turkey has adopted 
a strategy to establish a “civilian border management agency” (Icduygu and Ustubici, 2014). 
This process has become more remarkable. Following the adoption of the Law on Foreigners 
and International Protection in 2013, as the responsible institution for the implementation of 
the law, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) was established as the 
civilian migration management institution under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). DGMM has 
provincial branches in 81 provinces, 148 districts in Turkey. DGMM carries the activities with 
the aim of practising policies and strategies regarding the migration area, facilitating the 
coordination between the agencies and institutes on these issues, carrying out the operations 
and processes regarding foreigners’ entry into and stay in Turkey, their exit and being deported 
from Turkey, international protection, temporary protection and the protection of the victims of 
human trafficking. (DGMM, 2019d).  
 
Aside from the above-mentioned security-based actors, currently the Presidential Decree No. 
4 (PD No. 4) provides important articles regarding border management, and also defines the 
role of the DGMM. For example, Article 159 of the PD No. 4 states that the DGMM is 
responsible for “[ensuring] combating irregular migration through coordination among law 
enforcement and relevant public institutions and agencies, [as well as] develop measures and 
follow up on the implementation of these measures”. Among one of the permanent boards and 
committees of the DGMM, there is also “the Coordination Board on Combating Irregular 
Migration” (Article 113); however as following the Presidential Decree the structure of the 
Board has been changed37 Additionally, there is a Department of Protection of Victims of 
                                                             
35 For further information: https://polis.osce.org/country-profiles/turkey [Accessed 23 August 2019] 
36 For further information: http://www.gim.pol.tr/Sayfalar/anasayfa.aspx [Accessed 14 December 2018]. 
37 The provision related to this Board was abolished by the Decree Law No. 703, but the problem is that 
the provision regarding the permanent committees and commissions, which was formerly part of the 
LFIP, including the board, was not included in the above-mentioned Presidential Decree. In the 
provisional Article 8 of Decree Law No. 703 abolishes the entities with their duties and powers related 
to the policy determination of such boards, and they have been transferred to the Presidency policy 
boards. For example, another permanent commission (the International Protection Evaluation 
Commission), is included in the Presidential Decree) but not the Board related with irregular migration. 
As a result, I believe that the powers for policy-making regarding this board have been transferred to 
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Human Trafficking that is “assigned for carrying out activities and actions related to combating 
human trafficking and protecting victims of trafficking” [PD No. 4, Article 161(2) Article 108 c 
(1)].  
 
In addition, the Board of Migration Policy was established by the LFIP (Article 105) in order to 
determine migration strategy regarding its follow up and implementation. With the transition to 
the Presidency System, the board was annulled with the Decree #703 on 13 September 2018, 
and with the Presidential Decree No. 1 the Presidency Organization was re-named and 
became a part of the Presidency (Decree # 30474, 2018). It should also be noted here that the 
“Security and Foreign Policy Board” also added to the existing institutional structure of the 
Presidential Council by Presidential Decree No. 1. The Article 26 (1) (d) and (e) of the Decree 
defines the duties of the Board, mentioning the “illegal activities [occurring] at the borders of 
Turkey” as well as “migration policies and strategies”.  
 
In addition to DGMM, the Task Force for Asylum, Migration and External Borders Protection 
was established in 2002 as the first civil entity that directly pertained to border management. 
In 2004, it was re-named as the Integrated Border Management Project Implementation 
Directorate, as a part of the Ministry of Interior, which was abolished and replaced with the 
Bureau on Development of Border Management Legislation and Administrative Capacity after 
MoI was established in 2008. The Bureau on the Development of Border Management 
Legislation and Administrative Capacity was renamed as the “Border Management Bureau” in 
2012. On 20 March 2015, the role and the authority of the Bureau was transferred to the 
Directorate General of Provincial Administration and it was renamed as the “Department of 
Border Management” under this DG. This department is responsible for: the formation of the 
legal and institutional structure in the field of border management, the supervision and 
compliance of the works carried out in the pre-accession process with the EU, to ensure that 
necessary steps are taken in order to carry out and follow-up on the projects, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the projects, and finally to provide information to the Ministry of Interior. Most 
importantly, its main purpose is to establish a “National Border Security Agency/Organization” 
as a part of the MoI; however, the Syrian Civil War and the unstable situation at the borders 
since 2011 has been causing delays and this responsibility still belongs to the Turkish Armed 
Forces (Turkish General Staff). 
 
The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Disaster and Emergency Management Authority 
(AFAD) has been playing a significant role in border cities regarding the temporary 
accommodation centres (camps). These temporary accommodation centres were originally 
established for the purpose of having a more effective response to natural disasters, for the 
rapid completion of improvement activities, as well as to carry out the works related to planning 
and providing coordination. However, following the Syrian refugee-migration in 2011, AFAD 
undertook the role of the above-mentioned centres (camps). In cooperation with the relevant 
ministries, public institutions, organisations, and the TRC, the AFAD provided or contributed 
to housing, shelter, health, security, social activities, education, worship, interpreting, 
communication, banking and similar services in tent and container cities. As of March 16, 2018, 
by the Implementing Regulation Amending the Temporary Protection Regulation, the duties of 
coordinating the rights and services provided to Syrians within the scope of the operation of 
temporary accommodation centres and temporary protection and the provision of expenses 
related to health services were taken over by the DGMM from AFAD. 
 
The Ministry of Justice’s role in migration governance in Turkey lies with various, but specific, 
cases. For example, the Ministry of Justice deals with a range of cases including: death cases 
or in cases of criminal activities, such as migrant smuggling and human trafficking. 
 
                                                             
the Presidency's policy boards. However, in the organisational chart of the DGMM that updated in 
September 2018, still has this board.  
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There are also semi-state associations, such as the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC, Kizilay), 
which has a “Migration and Refugee Services Department”. In response to the Syrian Civil War 
and mass migration movement, TRC launched the “Syrian Crisis Humanitarian Relief 
Operation” on 29 April 2011 in order to contribute to the logistics of the cross-border operations 
of all humanitarian actors responding from Turkey to Syria. Furthermore, TRC has an 
observatory role concerning the voluntary returns of Syrian citizens and refugees who want to 
voluntarily return to their country (GocGov. 2018b). 
 
Local Actors 
Local authorities also have a responsibility for border management. According to Article 11 of 
the Provincial Administration Law, the governors are in command of all the public and private 
law enforcement actors within provincial borders (Law #5442, 1949). All the officers are obliged 
to fulfil the orders that are issued by the Governor immediately. According to the same law, 
Governors have the authority to ensure the security in civil airfields, ports and border gate to 
make regular and effective execution of duties and services related to entry and exit, to ensure 
the cooperation and coordination between the responsible organisations, and to take the 
necessary measures and implement them (Amendment: 29 August 1996- 4178 / Article 2). 
Municipalities on the border regions mainly provide first level of emergency and humanitarian 
aids as mainly depending on their location and closeness to border-crossing points. 
 
Inter-Governmental Actors 
In relation to intergovernmental organisations and supranational actors, since 2011, IOM 
appears to be one of the more important UN agencies, in particular regarding border 
management in Turkey. The main role of IOM regarding border management in Turkey is to 
support the Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy that developed by the European 
Commission. IBM “requires that competent authorities work together effectively and efficiently 
and it seeks to address three levels of cooperation and coordination: intra-service cooperation, 
inter-agency cooperation and international cooperation” (IOM, 2019). In collaboration with 
IOM, UNHCR also takes an active role in border management. Ensuring the principle of non-
refoulment, UNHCR aims to promote “protection-sensitive border management and access to 
asylum procedures for refugees and asylum-seekers, including those in removal centres, inter 
alia by working to improve access to information and legal assistance” (UNHCR, 2018a). 
However, as it will be given later on the role of UNHCR is quite limited in comparison with IOM 
regarding border management. At the border cities, some national NGOs such as ASAM are 
funded or supported by UNHCR rather than its direct appearance. 
 
Non-State Actors 
Regarding non-governmental organisations/actors in Turkey, some NGOs such as the 
Association of Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), Association for Solidarity 
with Refugees (Multeci-Der), the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief (IHH), Bar Associations (in particular regarding detention and deportations 
or the criminal activity related other cases) are the most active civil society organisations that 
have been also active at borders.38  
 
As a part of this report, semi-structured interviews were conducted in five cities namely: Izmir, 
Sanliurfa, Istanbul, Ankara and Canakkale. In these cities, the above-mentioned important 
border-related organisations were visited, and their results will be elaborated on in the following 
section.  
 
                                                             
38 For further details, see ASAM (http://en.sgdd.info/); Multeci-Der (http://www.multeci.org.tr/en/); IHH 
(https://www.ihh.org.tr/en), The Union of Bar Associations (https://www.barobirlik.org.tr/en) [Accessed 9 
August 2019].  
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5.2. Key Issues Implementing Border and Migration Controls  
 
5.2.1. Important Developments after 2011 
 
The reflections of major developments and the milestones take different turning-points for each 
city. Not only were there increases in the populations in both Izmir and Sanliurfa, but border 
control related developments have also impacted meso actors operating in each city examined 
in this study. In Sanliurfa, 2013-2014 was widely recalled for mass arrivals in a short time 
period, while 2016 was referred to as the year that restrictive border controls for entries were 
implemented. On the other hand, the meso level interviewees in Izmir mentioned 2015 and 
2016 as the periods of dramatic change. Between 2015 to 2016, new actors started to take an 
active role in Izmir and the Aegean routes, especially in relation to the dramatic increases of 
border-crossings, migrants’ deaths, and the so-called European Refugee Crisis.  
 
The majority of the interviewees in Izmir highlighted elevated numbers of entries and high 
levels of irregular border mobility in the city. Interviews also revealed that although mass 
migration from Syria started in 2011, the change in 2014, 2015, and March 2016 (until the EU-
Turkey Statement) was dramatic. Border related stakeholders, such as law enforcement 
actors, local authorities, or even NGOs working in this field, were not ready and many of them 
were not previously present in Izmir as institutions. High number of the irregular border-
crossings at the Aegean border is reported regarding Canakkale. In particular Kucukkuyu was 
mentioned regarding this period in the following quotation of a local journalist: 
 
I could see 21 boats at the same time at the sea through my camera lens. In 2015-
2016, the border-crossing started here (Kucukkuyu) intensively. Actually, it started 
in 1997 as first around here and since then… Then 2015… It was shocking. The 
coast guard was struggling because the sea was full of boats and people. What 
can they do? On the land, migrants set up a camp. Can you believe that in five 
acres of land? Thus, with the outbreak of the Syrian war, migration issue became 
a real issue here. 80-90 percent of the migrants who were apprehended here were 
Syrians. The rest were from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and African 
countries such as, Nigeria, Niger, Central African Republic. I even remember that 
immigrants who were caught here were from Colombia (Interview SRII- Canakkale-
06)39.  
 
The following two quotations also display the situation at the city centre in Izmir, in particular 
the Basmane district in 2015, as also referring to both the lack of capacity and also the change 
in numbers in 2017. 
 
Especially, the summer of 2015 and 2016. I hope that I will not see anything like 
that again in my life. In Izmir, it was 50 degrees, but hundreds of refugees were on 
the roads, in parks… every day in Basmane. We have never witnessed such a 
thing… All the shops in Basmane had life jackets, whistles, waterproof phone 
covers etc. And they are still so (Interview SRII-Meso-Izmir-02). 
 
                                                             
39 This is the code of the interview. All the details about interviews can be found at “Appendix 2: List of 
Interviews”. Since the interviews have been done by three institutions and four different researchers, to 
be able to show the differences but also address the related institution and the researcher, these codes 
are given to all the interviews. For example, “Interview SRII-Izmir-01” refers that this interview has been 
done by SRII (as the institution) in Izmir. However, the Appendix 2 provides the following details 
“Interview SRII-Izmir-01. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the high-level officer of the law 
enforcement/ state security agency, 10 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey.”  
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When we started here (Izmir), we had a population of 47,000 Syrians. If I am not 
mistaken, there were about 300 non-Syrians at that time. Then, there was an 
explosion in the summer of 2015 regarding the border-crossings. At the end of the 
summer, there were 97,000 registered Syrians here (Izmir). When we started, 
there were 1,000 people in queues at our door. There was no information regarding 
the access to services. The PDMM-Izmir was not here yet, and their role was taken 
by the police’s foreign branch. Migration related inquiries were transferred to the 
PDMM-Izmir by the summer of 2015. In that year, everybody supported each other 
without saying that this is a state actor or a civil society organisation (Interview 
SRII-Meso-Izmir-02). 
 
5.2.2. Pre-Entry Controls 
 
5.2.2.1. Visas 
 
At the meso level regarding visa policy, we could not obtain substantial data. Only the following 
two quotations from Izmir mention visa dimensions as a part of border management: 
 
Of course, if you look at the figures (irregular border-crossings) from 2015 and 
2016 it is not the impact of the wall. Maybe the wall has affected only the Syrians 
who come to Turkey directly; but the visa requirement for the Syrians coming from 
the third countries and also for Iraqis is different… The ones who came to Turkey 
during 2015 and 2016 were mainly from the third countries such as Lebanon, or 
maybe Jordan. Now, they cannot come without a visa, and to acquire a visa for 
them is quite difficult. Thus, border policy is not only through the border, but the 
visa policy is another border policy tool. Of course, it has a big impact (Interview 
SRII-Izmir-03). 
 
There are also the ones who come from the African countries. A majority of them 
come in through regular ways, but then they become irregular because of their 
over-stayed visa. During this period, they try to save money. Both Syrians and 
Iraqis. For example, it has been said that the ones who lost their lives during the 
truck accidents had come through regular ways, such as with a visa, etc. (Interview 
SRII-Izmir-03). 
 
In parallel to the second quotation, another fieldwork (Gokalp Aras, 2013, pp.333-337) which 
was previously conducted at meso level in Izmir, also displays that the visa-liberalisation with 
some of the countries (recently mainly with the African countries), results in a high level of “visa 
overstayers” as categorised by Ahmet Icduygu (2003). 
 
5.2.2.2. Advance Passenger Information/ Passenger Name Record Information 
 
Regarding API and PNR, there is no empirical data drawn from the interviews. In addition, 
carrier sanctions as a part of the pre-entry measures were not mentioned by interviewees. 
Rather, for the air and sea border international crossings, carrier sanctions are mentioned as 
a part of the internal migration control mechanism. Regarding the carrier sanctions, the below-
given quotation from an interview with an NGO representative in Ankara provides the 
implication of those sanctions in practice. 
 
Afghans did not start to come to Turkey by 2018. We had been taking their 
registration and we could manage to follow those trends closely. The increase 
[Afghans] started in 2017 and actually, it dates back to the 2015. With the 
statements of Merkel, there was a group who departed. During the state of 
emergency period [in Turkey between July 2016- July 2018], a new decree 
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accepted which was stating that if you sell ticket to someone who has not have a 
registration, the carrier will have to pay fine. As a consequence, the related [travel] 
companies started not to sell tickets to Afghans who come from Van, Agri, Erzurum 
etc. Therefore, people started to come here (Ankara) by walking. There were some 
who could reach here after 28 days and it was reflected to media as “there is an 
Afghan flow and one million people is waiting in Iran to come to Turkey (Interview 
SRII-Ankara-01). 
 
5.2.2.3. The Military-Humanitarian Nexus 
 
Parallel to the increasing numbers of refugees and incidents at the borders since 2015, the 
Turkish state has focused on pre-entry measures to control its border and enhance its border 
security against terrorists’ infiltrations. President Erdogan explained this policy approach in 
August 2018 with the following words: “we believe that Turkey’s border security starts across 
the border. With this belief, we will continue our military operations by expanding them across 
the border” (Gunes, 2018). The pre-entry control measures included the “zero-point delivery", 
the cross-border aid delivery, the establishment of camps inside northern Syria, and the 
reconstruction of some Syrian cities where the Turkish military forces provided military control. 
The most consistent measure is the aid delivery to northern Syria across the border. There are 
a limited number of Turkish national NGOs who have permission for cross-border aid delivery, 
particularly those that have very close relations with the Turkish government. The government 
often selectively works with Islamic oriented NGOs to outsource the humanitarian services and 
to enhance its “humanitarian diplomacy” component of its foreign policy.40 During the Syrian 
interventions, few pro-government Islamic oriented NGOs involved in the establishment of 
camps within the northern Syrian territory that is close to the Turkish border. These NGOs 
support the work of several state institutions such as Kizilay, AFAD, and other relevant 
directorates. The camps are constructed to provide shelters to the internally displaced Syrians 
instead of allowing them to cross the Turkish border. These Turkish NGOs also contribute to 
the reconstruction of Syrian cities, such as Afrin in the North. 
 
One of these permitted pro-Turkish government, Islamic oriented NGO took an active role in 
the management of such cross-border camps and reconstruction as it can be seen below 
 
We have more than 33 camps in Syria, it belongs to us, they are coordinated 
through 10 centres in Turkey and Sanliurfa, we have 800 staff over there, 92 
partner institutions, we have 6 container camp-cities, 27 tent camps, we also have 
one university, 43 schools, thirteen orphanages, and a children centre (Yasam 
Merkezi) community centre. This centre is the largest life centre of the world made 
up of villas, all of which are on the border on the Syrian side, across Reyhanli. 
We also have 35 free clothes stores, 14 health centres, 61 bakeries, and 30 
common kitchens where we serve to Syrian brothers (Interview SRII-Urfa-34).  
 
The representative of this NGO in its Istanbul Headquarters explained the underlying logic of 
these cross-border projects in relation with pre-entry control objectives: 
 
We have developed projects to enable Syrians to either stay in their own country, 
or stay just in the secured places, “buffer zones,” close to the border. We have 
developed projects to build comfortable camp spaces for them to stay. Moreover, 
we build universities and life centres. Our first priority is to make people stay in 
                                                             
40 See N. Celik and E. Iseri. 2016. “Islamically Oriented Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey: AKP Foreign 
Policy Parallelism”, Turkish Studies, 17 (3), pp.429-448; B. Aras & P. Akpinar. 2015. “The Role of 
Humanitarian NGOs in Turkey's Peacebuilding” International Peacekeeping, 22 (3), pp.230-247. 
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their own countries and not to be displaced. They are already displaced inside 
their country (Interview OzU-Istanbul-04). 
 
Similarly, a local aid platform supported by the Metropolitan Municipality reported that 
 
For the cross border, from time to time, we deliver aid to inside Syria, such as to 
the Afrin and Cerablus regions. From Sanliurfa, we delivered more than 1,500 
trucks of aid to Syria. In Afrin, we constructed houses for the stay of Syrians 
(Interview SRII-Urfa-26). 
 
Humanitarian and reconstruction activities inside this region occur under the control of the 
Turkish state. To extend its state authority inside northern Syria, Turkey appoints vice 
governorates of border provinces (Kilis, Gaziantep, Hatay) as the coordinator governorates of 
Syrian cities (Cerablus, Tel-Rifad, Afrin). For example, Hatay’s vice governorate seems 
administratively responsible as “Coordinator of De-escalation of Tension in Idlib” (Idlip 
Gerginligi Azaltma Koordinatorlugu41). Turkish coordinators (vice governorates) deal with the 
coordination of border crossings, the activities of security forces, the delivery of aids, 
education, health, and municipal service provisions (AA, 2018; Yenisafak, 2018; 
Amerikaninsesi, 2019) in the above-mentioned Syrian cities.  
 
In addition to humanitarian concerns, Turkey also has strategic interests regarding the control 
of the border region from a security standpoint. This includes, but is not limited to, preventing 
future irregular border-crossings as a priority for the region. Additionally, since the fall of 2018, 
Turkish policy makers seem determined to deny permission for mass border crossings, and to 
keep displaced Syrians within Syria, with the justification relating to security concerns and 
terrorist filtration. The head of Turkish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Volkan Bozkir, 
made an explanation on the eve of Russian operation targeting Idlib. He said that:  
 
… migration flow can reach to one million, we plan not opening our doors to 
refugees and aim at keeping the migration flow in the camps that would be 
established inside Syrian territory. Previous migration flows from Syria came via 
Idlib and Reyhanli, also militias of terror organisation used to the same route, we 
will not take this risk again. We introduce all measures to create a solution inside 
Syria for a possible case of mass flow (Bozkir, 2018). 
 
5.2.3.  “At the Border” 
 
5.2.3.1 The Conduct of Border Checks  
 
The majority of the interviewees mentioned that due to the increasing securitisation at both 
entry and exit points, there has been an increase in border control. For the entry point, although 
travel documents are not required due to international protection regulations regarding the land 
borders, entry from the land borders has become more difficult and is only possible under 
emergency situations, such as health. On the other hand, exit points have adopted stricter 
controls due to several factors such as the EU-Turkey Statement, and the 15 July coup-d’état 
attempt. The most important common finding for Sanliurfa and Izmir is the shift from the earlier 
flexible border controls (starting form 2011 until 2015), to stricter controls by 2015. 
 
 
                                                             
41 Statement of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey at the 1st Round-table Meeting of RESPOND 
Project/ Border Management and Migration Control Special Session conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras, 
17 December 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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5.2.3.1.1. Relatively Flexible Entry-Exit until 2015 
 
The meso level actors in Sanliurfa provided their first-hand observations about border 
management on the Turkey-Syrian border in the first years of the Syrian crisis, and the 
restrictive changes over time.  
For stakeholders in Sanliurfa, the “permeability” of Turkey-Syria border is an important issue. 
Permeability was high as it intertwined with the psychical, socio-cultural, and economic 
dynamics of border cities of Southeast Turkey (Aras, 2014). The words of the president of an 
NGO, who also took a role in first aid deliveries on the border, summarized the intensity of 
border interactions with the analogy of uncle-nephew-relation. He said: 
 
Sanliurfa has the longest border with Syria. It is also the city in which a mass 
scale interaction happens with Syria because there are Arabs, Turcoman, and 
Kurds living on both sides of the border. People of the city have relatives from 
Syria. We are like uncle-nephew with Syria… When the civil war erupted in Syria, 
particularly they fled through border gates (towns) of Kobani (Syrian)/Suruc 
(Turkish), Rasulayan/Ceylanpinar, Telabyad/Akcakale to seek safety. They just 
came across the border. Many of them have relatives here, they sought safety at 
the houses of their relatives. When the time of their stay extended, the numbers 
became massive (Interview SRII-Urfa-26). 
 
None of the meso-level actors in Sanliurfa mentioned the use of force/violence by Turkish 
security forces to halt entries until 2016. First-hand observers shared that border guards, 
mainly soldiers, allowed individuals and groups from Syria to cross the Turkish border, and 
even helped them to cross. According to the local interviewees in a border town of Sanliurfa: 
 
In the first years, no one (referring state officers) asked who is entering to and/or 
who is leaving Turkey. For two years [referring 2013-2015 when fighting 
intensified on Syrian side] Syrians went back and forth. It was like there was no 
fence. In fact, the fence was broken down, they broke the fence as they massed 
on the border. But right now, there is no crossing, thus the number of Syrians in 
our town decreased (Interview SRII-Urfa-24). 
 
Another local interviewee from Sanliurfa elaborated that: 
 
Before that (a few years ago), we were seeing thousands of people jumping from 
the border fence (Ceylanpinar- place of official border gate), we were seeing it 
with the naked eye, it was happening in front of us. The soldiers at the border 
gate did not order them to stop, they did not tell them not to cross. When we 
asked, the soldiers told us that these people were escaping from the war, from 
the bombing (Interview SRII-Urfa-25). 
 
A local interviewee from Sanliurfa told us about the border crossing/(Syrians) crossing 
into Turkey: 
 
There are many crossings at the border which the state does not know about. 
The state authorities say that they know, but how they can know? Thousands of 
people crossed by breaking the fence including PKK, PYD, normal people, etc. 
They crossed easily; they go to Urfa from here. There are only 100 meters from 
this country to another country, do not expect 1 km distance. There was only a 
fence between two countries, they have just set up this wall (security wall). In the 
past, it was just a fence, if you are 10 people it was really easy to put the fence 
down, they put it down and they crossed, it was just like that. It happened during 
the day time, not even during the night, our state said that “whoever comes, can 
come, we welcome them”. When they see a Syrian in the street, they said, come 
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and register, they asked whether they want to go to a tent camp, if they say no 
and would like to stay in town, they let them to rent a house and stay in the town. 
During crossings, no registration had happened. People thought that the state 
registered all of them, no, it did not happen. I can say that only half of them are 
registered (Interview SRII-Urfa-23). 
 
Organizing the registration of new arrivals was one of the most difficult tasks, which was often 
delayed as a part of the open-door policy. It seemed that the central state authorities tried to 
impose control over registrations due to the security concerns as much as possible, but the 
lack of an adequate readiness and capacity to register all Syrians, considering the volume of 
entrances, proved to be incredibly challenging. Similar points about the easiness of entries and 
the lack of state capacity to register arrivals are also shared by a local NGO representative, 
who has relatives across the border and observed the mass arrivals to the Suruc border gate 
in the fall of 2014. He shared that:  
 
In one night, thousands of people entered from Kobani, and then there was the 
question of what would happen to them after entries. Crossing the border was 
quite easy, the problem was what would happen to them after entering. I think, 
an efficient registration did not happen during entries since Turkey did not keep 
track of who entered, who left, if bad people came, also if some left Turkey to join 
bad people. As a result of this inefficient tracking of who entered, many mistakes 
happened (implying PKK-PYD). Turkey encountered a serious challenge as a 
state. There was no registration centre in Suruc, and although local state 
authorities (kaymakam) worked days and nights, registration did not properly 
proceed since the number of arrivals were huge but capacity and resources were 
not adequate. The state was not prepared, it did not establish tents, no toilets, no 
bathrooms, the infrastructure was not ready, and no hospital while thousands of 
people arrived daily. It was like 50 people were coming to your house as guests, 
even though none of your infrastructure was adequate. Turkey was not ready for 
these arrivals, it happened in such a short time; it was like a flood, it happened 
as an emergency… (Interview SRII-Urfa-15). 
 
From time to time, when there were mass arrivals due to the heavy fighting on the Syrian side 
of the border, provincial governorates and local representatives (Valilik or Kaymakamlik) 
assigned officers to the border towns (sometimes officers from Provincials Migration 
Directorates or AFAD) in order to organize the registration of arrived individuals and groups. 
In the case of Sanliurfa during the mass arrivals, in which a hundred thousand crossed in a 
few days such happened in Suruc and Akcakale in 2014. 
 
Several interviewees reported that Syrians fleeing from the conflict did not encounter any 
problems in their entrance to Turkey, and “no blockades were set up even in mass crossing 
cases, in which over thousands of Syrians entered through the border over a single night” 
(Interview OzU-Istanbul-01).  
 
Many of the interviewees in Izmir said that when the numbers were quite high at the entrance 
cities such as Gaziantep, Urfa, etc., to find lodging or jobs was essentially impossible. 
Therefore, they left those border cities to find better opportunities in other cities in Turkey, or 
to try and reunite with their relatives in Europe. The number of the border crossings from 
Turkey to Greece was quite high until the EU-Turkey Statement. According to the Frontex 2016 
Report, the irregular border crossings from Eastern Mediterranean Route reached up to 
885,386 through this route in 2015 (Frontex, 2016, p.16). Additionally, in the same year the 
daily arrivals to the Greek islands reached up to 6,082 (IOM, 2015).  
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5.2.3.1.2. Shifting from Open-Door to the Restrictive Border Control Policy 
 
The restrictive policy implementation is observable by meso-level actors serving in the five 
cities after 2016. Starting from the entry point, a regional coordinator of an NGO answered the 
question regarding border-crossings from Syria to Turkey as following:  
 
Right now, legal entries are only possible if there is a health emergency, such as if 
a person comes in an ambulance for an emergency. While they are crossing, they 
are obliged to sign a paper, called “voluntary return” accept form. These people 
are sent back immediately after the medical emergency ends (Interview SRII-Urfa-
02). 
 
The president of local NGO in Sanliurfa shared a similar observation, saying:  
 
The number of new-comers are very limited, although in urgent situations, such as 
seriously wounded people, are allowed to enter Turkey. They do not come on a 
daily basis; no mass crossings occur. Only in exceptional situations they will come, 
such as if there is heavy fighting in the border areas; however if there is a push 
from militant groups, crossing attempts do happen… right now, they are not 
allowed to enter, those who are accepted right now are referred to the relevant 
hospitals or institutions (Interview SRII-Urfa-34).  
 
Confirming these observations, a district official (mukhtar) of a neighbourhood where Syrians 
live in high numbers in Sanliurfa reported that “recently few families come to our 
neighbourhood directly from Syria. They came via Kilis, Hatay, and Antep” (Interview SRII-
Urfa-13). 
 
The following quotation is from the high-level officer of the state agency in Ankara who 
describes the change from flexible controls to stricter ones in relation with the changing security 
concerns: 
 
In the early years, the borders were hardly under control. Foreigners could enter 
through the border gate as well as from any part of the border. And in those years, 
there was no PYD (Syria Democratic Union Party) danger. We were struggling with 
immigration in those years. The danger of terror was almost none at that time… 
PKK, part of the terror is active in Turkey, which operates under PYD in Syria. This 
situation forces our country to be cautious. Therefore, from time to time, some 
western countries or NGOs can come with the claims that Turkey has been 
implementing strict border policies. We encounter such reports and articles. But 
Turkey is right regarding its policies. Because Turkey has to fight against terrorism 
for the sake of everyone's safety. Thus, the ones who demand international 
protection also have to enter from the border gates with control (Interview SRII-
Ankara-02).  
 
The majority of the interviewees mentioned that the open-door policy theoretically or officially 
still exists, but in practice it does not have consistency and it has become ad-hoc since 2016. 
The following two quotations state that the open-door policy still exists, but is interrupted from 
time to time due to security or capacity concerns.  
 
The open border policy still exists in Turkey but it is on a day to day basis. It is 
managed by humanitarian criteria. If there are many people coming from Syria 
running from something, they still open the door to them. So, it exists but it doesn’t 
mean that the door is opened to hundred thousand of people to come. Because 
the country has understood after seven years that its capacity is limited. So, in 
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theory it is open door policy, and in practice it is a managed border based on 
security concerns (Interview SRII- Ankara-04).  
 
Right now, the border is under control. It can be said that the open-door policy still 
continues in formal terms, because the density of border-crossings has decreased, 
no such an entry anymore. But closing the borders is out of the question… During 
the festive period, for example, those entry-exits are controlled. Certain gates have 
been used for funerals etc. Now, they say that when we enter to Idlib, since we 
cannot distinguish the ones from PYD, PKK, ISID (Islamic state of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL/ISIS), they should stay at the other side of the border, rather than 
being taken to be Turkey’s side. They will be kept at the areas that will be 
established in Syria; this is the policy (Interview SRII-Ankara-01). 
 
In contrast to the above cited quotes, the subsequent quotation states that the open-door policy 
has been over and the establishment of the “security wall” is the most important evidence about 
this policy change as it follows:  
 
The open-door has been already over. It has been two and a half years or 
something. I went to Hatay around two months ago. There is a giant wall there, we 
saw. It signifies not only the end of the open-door policy, but also the creation of 
boundaries that didn't exist before (Interview OzU-Istanbul-06). 
 
Although legal entries are firmly restricted, some illegal crossings occur across the border. A 
representative from an NGO in Istanbul mentioned that:  
 
What I saw in my own personal experiences is that even though officially, the 
borders are closed, irregular migration is still continuing today, and every day. What 
I found is that in the beginning of that closed-door policy, irregular migration was 
still continuing, and it was still that they were turning a blind eye to it as the days 
passed. However, it has changed. Right now, they open their eyes for any kind of 
irregular migration and they try to stop it (Interview OzU-Istanbul-06). 
 
5.2.3.1.3. Impact of the 15th July Coup D’état Attempt  
 
In the local contexts, the perceptions about Turkey-Syria border are very speculative and 
security oriented. Locals seem to embrace Turkish government perceptions and discourses 
about the “threats” implicitly referring to Kurdish militia coming from Syrian border. Locals even 
reinforce the threat perceptions through further speculations. In Izmir and in Sanliurfa, 
interviewees raised the issue about the situation of border control in relation with the 15th June 
2016 coup attempt. On 15 July 2016, a coup attempt occurred in Turkey against state 
institutions. The government accused the coup leaders of being linked to the Gulen Movement, 
which was declared as the Fethullah Gulen Terrorist Organization (FETO). The attempt 
appears as an independent factor of the securitisation of borders, in particular exit controls. 
Along with its impact of the Turkey-Greece Protocol as was stated earlier, and following the 
coup attempt, interviewees stated that Turkey increased controls at the exit points. An IGO 
representative in Izmir stated also the pressures on the border-related actors as it follows:  
 
Our borders are quite political. So yes, there are international agreements, but all 
the border policy can change. I have seen this a lot after the deal [the Statement]. 
The current decline of the border-crossings is related to the directives from Ankara. 
I know very well that the Coast Guard is doing everything possible. The “let them 
cross period” has been passed, because there is a lot of pressure on them [the 
Coast Guards] because of FETO. For example, if there is one leaving Turkey who 
is a FETO member, Coast Guards can be the subject of an investigation. (Interview 
SRII-Izmir-02).  
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Following the coup- d’état attempt, there is a significant increase of Turkish citizens’ irregular-
border crossing from Turkey to Greece, almost making the “half of the crossings”.42  
 
Interestingly, interviewees in Sanliurfa also referred to the impact of coup attempt over entries 
in a speculative way by claiming that “at the night of Coup (15 July), Turkey-Syria border was 
without any soldier, at that night, everyone, including all terrorists, crossed to Turkey from the 
border” (Interview SRII-Urfa-22). Another interviewee claimed that the border was without 
soldiers for eight days in the week of the coup attempt. To verify this data, researchers checked 
with a local academic expert, who also said that he heard the dissemination of exactly similar 
claims about attempts of mass entries to Turkey from Syria on the entire border region from 
Kilis to Sirnak. However, he didn’t not know whether this border incidence at the night of coup 
was true or not.43  
 
5.2.3.2. Criminalisation of Entry and Exit within the Context of Migrant Smuggling 
 
In Izmir, the sea route is used, while in Sanliurfa smuggling occurs via land routes. It should 
also be noted that due to permeability of the borders on the south-eastern part and as it was 
stated earlier, in Sanliurfa, smuggling has been a commonly observed situation for many years, 
including not only human smuggling but smuggling of everything such as animals and goods 
that have trading value.  
 
Starting from Sanliurfa the following quotations provide insights about smuggling in this city, 
particularly in the border towns and villages. Smugglers, locals, and some bribed security 
officers facilitate illegal crossings. A local interviewee from a border town of Sanliurfa explains 
the process:  
 
There are many illegal crossings along the border, from Kilis. Many Turkish towns 
and villages located at the zero points of the Syrian border. There are villages on 
the border, those who want to cross go to the border of these villages at night and 
see the soldier, say that "I, my wife, my three kids would like to cross", take this 
dollar (2000-5000 Dollars), it is too much money for a soldier. The soldier says OK, 
“just jump from here when no one sees you”, then he puts the money in his pocket. 
There is a wall of 3 meters, but it does not really matter, they have delved 
underneath the wall to open tunnels or they jump from its top (Interview SRII-Urfa-
23). 
 
In the course of time, the border controls for illegal crossings were restricted and became 
costlier for those attempting it. A local interviewee from the border town in Sanliurfa said:  
 
In the beginning, Turkey's border management was terrible; right now, gradually it 
has improved, particularly in the last few years. Now, they cross by paying high 
prices, but going to other side and returning here is costly whereas in the past it 
was free. Today they pay money to soldiers, they pay money to the villagers, 
smugglers, and then they may able to cross. It is too costly (Interview SRII-Urfa-
23). 
 
A Syrian refugee who is working for an INGO in Istanbul noted similar points about illegal 
entries: “even if the border is formally closed, it is possible to cross it somewhere, illegal 
crossings continue, but they have to pay high prices to the guards on the border. It is around 
                                                             
42 Statement of the Delegation of the EU to Turkey at the 1st Round-table Meeting of RESPOND Project/ 
Border Management and Migration Control Special Session conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras, 17 
December 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
43 Personal communication with academician-migration expert from Sanliurfa, 12 December 2018. 
Istanbul, Turkey.  
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2,000 Dollars (Interview OzU-Istanbul-02). In this line, anecdotally researchers were told that 
people seeking border crossings pay smugglers who worked with illegal organisations, such 
as PKK, high prices for its facilitation of crossings from Syria to Turkey even in cases of 
deportation.  
 
As one of the main exit points at the sea borders, in Izmir smuggling has become an issue 
since the end of 1990s, and it reached its highest level in 2015 and 2016. In terms of methods, 
although there are slight changes, due to the physical closeness of the Greek islands, it has 
many crossing points. Therefore, depending on the risk level, prices and the related actors 
have been changing. But briefly, there is always a gathering point such as Basmane of Izmir, 
and there are mediators to inform and collect the migrants from different points. Additionally, 
there are escorts to control the land side until the border-crossing are made from the sea, and 
there are even mediators on the other side to control and facilitate the operation. The quotation 
below provides a picture about smuggling in the region:  
 
So, the general table is the same. There are good smugglers and bad smugglers. 
What happens with a good smuggler; if I give you 1,000 Dollars, and if the 
immigrants are caught at the first exit, a good smuggler says that I won't take 
money from you again, you're my traveller, so I don't need to take money again. I'll 
send you again. Then, there are trickster smugglers, the malicious ones. You do 
the payment and you do not see them again. Or they want money again for the 
second time. (Interview SRII-Izmir-01). 
 
At the most significant border-crossing points law enforcement, IGOs, and NGOs have their 
outreach teams and/or offices. Although law enforcement authorities have been changing their 
strategies in parallel to the changes in smugglers` methods, authorities are not able to take 
action before it turns into a crime as expressed by the law enforcement/ state security (sea) 
agency below in Izmir: 
 
Yes, the local people also have been engaged with smuggling. But the smugglers 
and the local people are different from each other. It is obvious from their 
appearance. The smugglers always have short hair with a beard, always the same 
people. For example, you will be a smuggler and come here (a coffee shop next to 
the sea), seat and drink your tea. I cannot ask you why you are here and what you 
are doing here because there is no element of a crime. I can examine their identity 
documents, but if there is nothing wrong, then I have nothing to do. If immigrants 
have arrived here, they come and sit here at 3 or 4 o’clock in the morning. We 
already know there is something going on (Interview SRII- Canakkale-07).  
 
Finally, it should be stated that the majority of the interviewees- both state and non-state- in 
Izmir emphasized the inefficiency of the penalties regarding human smuggling and the anti-
smuggling policies.  
  
5.2.3.3. Fingerprinting of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants at the Border  
 
Since it is quite technical, and also a security related issue regarding the fingerprints, limited 
responses came from the law enforcement actors in Izmir. Regarding the irregular border-
crossings, since the travel and identity documents are mainly missing, oral statements have 
been the only source regarding their country of origin. Therefore, in terms of the border control 
measures, fingerprints appear as important tools (Interview SRII-Izmir-01). 
 
Significant problems include the lack of required technological infrastructure for properly 
processing fingerprints, the necessity of harmonizing fingerprint databases, and enabling 
coordination with different agencies such as the police, coast guards, and DGMM. A person 
from Law Enforcement explained the latest situation in this regard: 
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A migrant has been caught 3 times, 3 separate names with the same fingerprint. 
The fact that there is no real identity on him creates problem both for us and also 
for the DGMM… The state has bought digital fingerprint devices for this and 
continues to buy them. At this stage there is a need for collecting all the 
fingerprints in one database and identifying them. To overcome this issue 
[repetitions] both our institution and also the state have ongoing studies.... 
(Interview SRII-Izmir-14). 
 
In Izmir, the interviewees stated that the Coast Guard does not have the required technological 
infrastructure regarding the fingerprints, therefore they are taken by the police forces as it was 
sated by an IGO representative at the border-crossing point as follows: 
 
Actually, the coast guard does not transfer, and they do not have the technological 
infrastructure for GBT (criminal record check) for taking fingerprints. Those 
procedures are done by the police. But they (immigrants) are still accompanied by 
coastal security. After the process is completed, the police continue its work 
(Interview SRII-Izmir-14). 
 
The most recent ID-renewal project also has the fingerprint aspect. A representative of an 
NGO shared that “right now, the UNHCR and DGMM are making a project about verification. 
In fact, this is something that should have be done in the beginning where full registration is 
taken, including fingerprints” (Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
It is a fact that irregular transit migrants involve nationals of neighbouring or even distant 
countries such as Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Myanmar, Eritrea (Gokalp 
Aras, 2013, p.228). For example, since Myanmar has no diplomatic representation in Turkey, 
the deportation process has been quite problematic. Therefore, many of the apprehended 
irregular migrants have been stating Myanmar or Burma as their country of origin. It was the 
case for Turkey in 2012 before the fingerprint system as it can be seen from the following 
statement by the law enforcement officer: “There are some methods that [are] used [in order 
to] not to be sent back. For example, even [if a] person came from Tunisia; he says that he 
came from Myanmar. Since they do not have any ID on them, it is difficult to prove” (Gokalp 
Aras, 2013, p.430). 
 
5.2.3.4. Border Surveillance, Sea Rescue and Push Backs 
 
In terms of the border surveillance, both sea and land borders have their own difficulties. For 
example, at the sea borders in Izmir, as it was stated at the macro-level section, there have 
been disputes between Turkey and Greece regarding the Aegean Sea and international waters 
due to their physical closeness. Although this closeness can be seen as an advantage for 
search and rescue, this also creates problems for controls since there are numerous points for 
border-crossing that needs surveillance. In parallel, the following quotation from the 
representatives of one of the most active national NGO at the border in Izmir explained the 
situation: 
 
The Aegean Sea situation is quite problematic. You can cross the border with a 
high-speed boat in 5-10 minutes. Therefore, border operations and the situation at 
the border there are quite critical. Crossing the border is quite easy; however, to 
control those crossings is extremely difficult. It totally depends on the capacity of 
the law enforcement there. And frankly speaking the capacity is still a big problem 
(Interview SRII-Izmir-12).  
 
Border surveillance also has a search and rescue dimension which critically involves the lives 
of migrants. The following quotation is from an interview with a law enforcement officer in Izmir 
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wherein it is revealed that there are challenges in relation to border surveillance, but also that 
stopping the boats during these operations can be quite problematic. It should also be stressed 
that interviewees highlighted the importance of human life. In particular law enforcement actors 
emphasized the importance of saving migrants’ lives as their priority as one of the key 
discourses of the law enforcement agencies. The following quotation is from law enforcement 
officers in Izmir standing for the human safety dimension of the operation, as well as the faced 
difficulties. The meso level interviewees in Izmir also provided important insights regarding the 
difficulties of the operations:  
 
The most challenging thing in operations is that immigrants do not stop at sea. 
They do not listen to your stop order. Because you have to bring them to shore 
safely. The boat could tip over. Smugglers tell them not to stop or throw stones to 
the coast guard’s boats. Sometimes I look at the boat and I see that it is half-filled 
with sea water, I say stop, but they don’t. Smugglers do their operations when the 
coast guard says that the sea is in bad condition [wind etc.]. No matter what the 
sea conditions, if human life is under danger, the coast guard goes to the end no 
matter the conditions at sea. We have search and rescue vessels. They are much 
safer. Since we are out with the boat, we can get maximum 3- or 4-meters waves. 
We have three kinds of boats (Interview SRII-Canakkale-07). 
 
During the interviews in Izmir, all the border-related interviewees were asked about the 
existence of NATO at the Aegean Sea, however, the majority of the interviewees mentioned 
that NATO is not there anymore and it was withdrawn although it showed up with one ship for 
a short time after 2015 (Interview SRII-Izmir-12). Only two interviewees mentioned that NATO 
should still be there with some ships but only for creating the deterrence for the smugglers and 
migrants.  
 
As a part of open-border policy evaluations, in general, the interviewees from five cities 
confirmed the easiness of border crossing and the open-door border management policy of 
Turkey until late 2015. They reported that Syrians fleeing from the conflict did not encounter 
any problem in their entrance to Turkey. None of the meso-level actors mentioned the use of 
force/violence by Turkish security forces to halt entries that occurred till 2016. It was told that 
border guards, mainly soldiers, allowed individuals and groups from Syria to cross Turkish 
border and even helped them in crossing. Thus, during that period, in particular at the 
beginning of the Syrian crisis, we can hardly see border surveillance besides a broken fence. 
This was also the period when the open-door policy was in practice. However, as it was 
mentioned earlier in the report, the main turning point appears to be 2016.  
 
As it was stated as the macro part, regarding the border surveillance the security walls at the 
Turkey-Syrian and Turkey-Iran borders are important. It should also be noticed that there is a 
strong relation between the entry and exit points and land and the sea borders. In this regard, 
the interviewees from Izmir evaluated the impact and the related implication of the security 
walls. The common point is that even though the walls at the southeast are almost completed, 
there are increasing irregular border crossings at the Aegean Sea, and if one border is 
controlled then the alternative ways are adopted by the smugglers and migrants.  
 
Push-backs 
Push-backs are a longstanding policy tool and practice used by Turkish authorities, especially 
at the sea borders, in particular at the Aegean Sea, but also these practices exist in the land 
borders according to the interviewees. Regarding the push-backs at the Aegean Sea, there 
are many civil society groups, platforms, civil initiatives, blogs such as HarekAct44, Aegean 
                                                             
44 For further information: https://harekact.bordermonitoring.eu/ (Accessed 19 January 2019). 
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Boat Report45 and important reports46 or hotlines for the emergency cases at the sea, or in 
case of push-backs47. However due to the size limitations of this report, we would like to provide 
the empirical data that was collected as a part of RESPOND Project. In addition, as will be 
elaborated on below, the increasing push-backs from the land border between Turkey and 
Greece were mentioned by the interviewees. In parallel to their statements, many reports also 
emphasize the increasing push-back cases (Greek Council for Refugee, 2018; HarekAct, 
2018; HRW, 2018b; Multeci-Der, 2018). 
 
The interviewees from Izmir and Canakkale (Kucukkuyu) commonly stated that there are quite 
few cases of push-backs [from Greece], and the number of push-backs in the sea is quite low. 
However, a majority of them stated that there are cases reported in Edirne, in comparison with 
the past, showcasing that the situation is much better in the Aegean region. For example, “for 
a very long time, we have not been faced with a push-back case in here (Aegean region). […] 
But Edirne is different. It is incredible. We have been facing with push-back cases constantly, 
but not from the Aegean Sea” (Interview SRII-Izmir-04).  
 
It should be stated that securitisation and FETO operations have created an impact on the 
border controls, which makes push- and pull-backs by the Turkish law enforcement more 
difficult. Regarding the sea operations, many interviewees in Izmir and the border-crossing 
points mentioned this dimension:  
 
Push-backs [by Turkey or Greece] … We used to hear about those cases but 
right now, not anymore. Because the situation does not reach to that level. Before 
they reach to the shore, the (Turkish) coast guard intervenes. Sometimes, if the 
boats are close to the shore or if they can reach to the Greek waters [pullbacks]. 
But these cases are quite rare. From our side [Turkey] there are no push-backs. 
In particular after the terrorist incidents [refers FETO], if a bird flies over the sea, 
it needs to be reported. If someone crosses the border from the sea, and if they 
do not stop, everybody (refers the coast guards) will face a serious problem. They 
(the state) will ask how could he escape? […] Therefore, in Turkey there is a strict 
control (Interview SRII-Izmir-11).  
 
In addition to Izmir, a local Syrian NGO in Sanliurfa claimed that 100 Syrian families who tried 
to enter Turkey were pushed-back at the border. Moreover, the Amnesty International (AI) and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in 2017 and 2018, Turkish border guards regularly 
intercepted Syrians on the border and deported them immediately back to Syria. The numbers 
of push-backs and deportations range from hundreds to three thousand, in each month. 
Moreover border guards did non-fatal and fatal shootings to stop crossings.48 However, 
Turkey’s DGMM denied allegations of push-backs and shootings, by claiming that “while 
maintaining the security of borders against terrorist organisations, Turkey continues to accept 
Syrians in need coming to the borders, and never opens fire on or uses violence against 
                                                             
45 For further information: https://www.facebook.com/AegeanBoatReport/?__tn__=%2CdkCH-R-
R&eid=ARASvyAIexAzWiHmqLlCLAnCaWxSV9siTPfDOGIABVed2dum7oqZ3p2dLjYvspdOiWTbUoV
cBczjkLla&hc_ref=ARS055BTweJeLL05t5yIq4L4MX_yroCOXLYfk2-
JemXDqxlXHWnHZEov7XdRFiXFnD8&fref=nf&hc_location=group (Accessed 19 January 2019). 
46 For further information: PROASYL (2013). “Pushed Back”, available at https://www.proasyl.de/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/PRO_ASYL_Report_Pushed_Back_english_November_2013.pdf (Accessed 
13 January 2019). 
47 For further information: https://w2eu.info/turkey.en/articles/turkey-seasafety.en.html (Accessed 19 
January 2019). 
48AI, 2017. Amnesty International Report, 2016/17-Turkey, 22 February 2017, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/58b033a3195.html [accessed 13 July 2019].; HRW, 2018a. Turkey: 
Mass Deportations of Syrians, 22 March 2018, available at: 
ttps://www.refworld.org/docid/5b39f227a.html [accessed 13 July 2019]. 
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them.”49 Echoing the official discourse, the push-backs to Syria and shootings are never 
mentioned by national and international NGOs and local government representatives during 
interviews.  
 
5.2.4.  Internal Controls  
 
5.2.4.1. Stay and Residence Permits 
 
5.2.4.1.1. Travel Permit/ Document 
 
The most prominent internal control mechanism is the obligation of travel permits for Syrians 
who are under temporary protection and the regular reporting obligation for non-Syrians 
recipients of international protection. They both impede their freedom of movement, and in 
particular movement inside Turkey. 
 
From the interviewees in Izmir it was unveiled that the travel documents are now issued by the 
district governorships. They highlighted the different implementation of this measure in 
different cities. The DGMM-Izmir representative stated that:  
 
For Syrians, the travel document procedure is transferred to the district 
governorships. Thus, they apply to the district governorships. After we carry out 
the required research, if we find the application is eligible, then the document is 
given by the district governorships. For example, during religious holidays 
[bayrams], if they want to visit Syria, they need to have this travel document. 
Maximum, they can have three months long permission for this. If they travel 
without the travel permission, first they are notified, then we directly write to their 
province (related PGMM). In some provinces they have to pay fine. But in Izmir we 
do not do this. For example, if you are caught in Antep, then you have to pay 1000 
TRY. Therefore, Syrians calculate [whether or not] it is worth it [to violate the rule 
and take the risk to pay the fine or not]. In case of this, we have a special code, it 
means that he/she needs to go to the PGMM. If they are stopped by the police, 
and if it is seen that there is this code, then they are sent to PGMM in that province 
too. There, they are again notified that they need to go to their province, where 
they have been registered and reside. At the end that person needs to go to his/her 
province (Interview SRII-Izmir-13).  
 
A regional coordinator of national NGO in the Southeast Turkey explained the change and 
implementation as follows:  
 
In the past, moving from one province to another was easy, but right now, they 
need to get permission to travel. In the past, such movements were really high, it 
was at the level of uncontrollable, right now it became a level of controllable 
(Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
According to representatives of INGOs, travel permits were introduced as supplementary to 
border closures and internal controls, “because the restriction of border controls speeded up 
the mobility of Syrians inside Turkey. The state directorates and ministries wanted to control 
this mobility” (Interview OzU-Istanbul-02). This obligation led to many problems. One 
interviewee explained it as “people are not given working permits in the provinces where they 
are first registered” (Interview OzU-Istanbul-02). In this line, Syrian NGOs are critical of the 
implementation of travel document requirement. A director of such an NGO, who is also a 
former Professor of Law in Syria, noted that “asking [for] travel documents from Syrians to go 
                                                             
49 Human Rights Watch, 2018. 
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from one province to another is a violation of the human rights, one of the important human 
rights is freedom of travel” (Interview SRII-Urfa-14). 
 
The majority of the interviewees stated that there is no standardized implementation in different 
cities. For example, in one city absence of travel permit can result with fines, while in another 
city they can be ignored. Also, some of the interviewees evaluated the travel expenses as an 
effective measure while some of the others emphasized that it is not working and creating 
heavy workload and financial burden on state. But as the majority of the interviewees stated 
that if there is one restrictive measure, there is always a responsive alternative and strategy 
by the smugglers and migrants. There has not been clarity about the sanctions in case of non-
compliance specifically in crowded provinces where internal controls are difficult. A 
representative of an NGO in Istanbul explained it as the follows: 
 
Some do get stopped and nothing happens, but you do hear of people being 
detained and sent back [to the country of origin]. It’s arbitrary. Legally if you’re 
registered under temporary protection in Istanbul and want to go to another 
province, you have to apply through DGMM. But few people get this and still travel, 
but I don’t know what the reality is. Is a person really being detained just because 
they don’t have that travel document or are there other reasons? (Interview OzU-
Istanbul-06). 
 
The travel restrictions open a space for exploitation and bribery. A district official from a border 
town where there is a refugee camp referred to his experience: 
 
I went to help someone (a resident of the camp) for getting him a travel permission 
to go to Istanbul. We waited for hours in the DGMM’s Office, I got angry at the 
officers [because] they made us [wait] for a long time. Initially they issued him the 
document. In fact, they [did] not bother people leaving the camps. Refugees can 
go from one city to another with private taxis, but not with buses, because 5,000 
TL fine is issued to bus companies. For another one, I had written a paper 
[outlining] his need [for] travel; then stamped it. If I am a bad person, I could ask 
1,000 TL as bribery for stamping it, but I did not do because of my ethics and 
religion. I just tried to solve his difficulty. Syrians do not react, they [are] used to 
bribery. For example, I know some district officers, who take bribery such as 100, 
500, 1,000 TL (Interview SRII-Urfa-22).  
 
5.2.4.1.2. IDs and Registration 
 
As a part of “stay and resident permits”, ID cards and registration cards can be seen as 
important internal control mechanisms. Although registration was a serious problem in the 
early years of mass border crossings, Turkish authorities then put it under control through new 
registrations, issuing identity cards, renewal of previous registrations and updates. Meso-level 
interviewees confirmed the several rounds of registrations and updating regarding ID cards. A 
regional coordinator of NGO which closely work with UNHCR and DGMM told that:  
 
As there are more limited crossings right now, there are no more Syrians without 
identity cards. Last year, there were some lacking identity cards, still from time to 
time, we deal with families without cards, but in the past, it was more, almost 50% 
decrease in the numbers of those lacking identity cards (Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
When the same representative was asked about whether there are differences between 
provinces because he leads activities in eight cities of South-eastern Turkey, he answered by 
referring to the internal control dimension of issuing IDs: 
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Encountering families without identity cards varies across provinces. There are 
differences between Urfa and Antep, because Antep does not take any new 
registration, and does not give IDs as the city is full capacity. Also, the authorities 
do not want to make Antep an attractive place for new arrivals. Therefore, the 
authorities have stopped issuing ID cards. Hatay is also the same. This does not 
mean that they never issue IDs, if there is a vulnerability, or if the family really 
needs to be there, IDs are given (Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
Therefore, the number of refugee families without IDs in general decreased substantially. This 
is also related to the fact that state is seeking to put more control, thus, it takes more cautious 
approach about registrations and issuing of identities. Not only new registrations, but also the 
verification of previous registrations, are important in order to control those staying in Turkey 
and those that leave.  
 
The registration and updating processes require the logistical and technical support /service 
provision of NGOs, since these processes entail language skills and paper work. A local NGO 
representative noted that “the major demands we take from Syrians are about registration with 
DGMM, updating of their registration, and access to services. If they do not do it, they are not 
able to benefit from services” (Interview SRII-Urfa-03). 
 
As noted, registration and renewal of registrations to the central state (through DGMM) are 
placed as prerequisite for access to services. Also, refugees need to register for local 
authorities to prove their residence in a certain city and neighbourhood. Syrians are “asked 
IDs, registration from Population Unit (Nufus Idaresi), and residency forms from district officials 
to make applications for social assistance (Interview SRII-Urfa-13). 
 
However, it is difficult to claim that registrations are fully under control. Particularly border 
towns or transit points face with several registration problems. Local authorities are concerned 
that the lack of proper registration inhibits internal control of Syrians as stated by a local 
interviewee:  
 
Many of them who are settled in, are also unregistered. For example, one of them 
goes to rent the house, then calls for their relatives, and then they settle them into 
the rooms of the same house. They fill the house with as many people as possible, 
sometimes in a single house there are around 20 families. For example, a family 
came to a house, they were around 40-50 people. They had many children, 
women, and relatives. Then we asked this family to be registered into the Muhtarlik 
and Emniyet (Police) but they did not come, then I went to Emniyet [police bureau 
in the town] to ask for monitoring. I asked Emniyet who are they, are they terrorists? 
I was concerned that they might cause a problem in the future. I figured out two-
three days ago that they went away. No one knows where they went. I suspect that 
they have done something illegal, in fact Syrians do many illegal things connected 
with terror, drug, prostitution. Everything you can imagine (Interview SRII-Urfa-22).  
 
Additionally, there are prejudices regarding Syrians who prepare and present fake documents 
in order to access services, and to abuse the aids (Interview SRII-Urfa-22).  
 
The updating of registration data, and renewal of IDs, works as an internal control mechanism. 
However, these procedures have not been conducted smoothly and consistently. 
Misinformation, the mistakes of officers in registrations processes, complexity in procedures, 
and coordination problems among different state institutions have caused serious problems 
and difficulties in accessing services, and losing previously received status. A lawyer from an 
NGO in Istanbul summarized the situation in way to understand complexities in 
implementation: 
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During the IDs updating process, there was a rule imposing that regardless of the 
way Syrians entered in Turkey, they would be given IDs. But afterwards, this rule 
was revoked. For Istanbul, state authorities told that we would not give IDs in 
Istanbul. However, after a while they started to give IDs in Istanbul again, then they 
stopped it again and started to refer applicants to Yalova. In Istanbul, the 
Directorate does not have consistent and sustainable policies. Each policy is 
subject to change overnight. In Istanbul, registrations are open a month, then they 
are closed the following month. Even they do not announce whether the 
registration is open or not. You spontaneously learn it when you go to office for 
getting IDs or renewal. Thus, in many cases, we had to travel to close provinces of 
Istanbul such as Yalova, Kocaeli, Canakkale to help refugees and to be able to 
represent them in judicial cases in which having ID is a prerequisite (Interview 
BilgiU-Istanbul-10). 
 
The cancellation of registration or pausing of new registrations in Istanbul and some border 
provinces such as Hatay, Gaziantep where the numbers of Syrians are very high, do not fully 
work in providing internal controls, but it becomes a serious barrier for protection and access 
to rights. A representative from an NGO told that “registration is not possible neither for 
international protection nor for temporary protection status to avoid accumulation of refugee 
population in Istanbul” (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-02).  
 
Another NGO representative shared her experience:  
 
A transgender refugee had been sent to Gumushane (a remote conservative 
province in Northern Turkey) for residing, but s/he had a risk of life-persecution in 
such a province. Thus, s/he came to Istanbul for personal security, but 
subsequently becomes illegal. S/he can be forcibly sent back to this province. It 
depends on the discretion power of the officers (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-03). 
 
It seems that increasing internal controls in the last years do not prevent irregularity, instead 
cause the problems in accessing the public services. The NGO representative’s example 
explains it 
 
In the past, for such cases in which the refugees change their residence of place, 
there was flexibility. The authorities make a change of residence place, give IDs if 
refugees provide evidence for them, allowing them to have already settled in 
Istanbul and have their children registered and attending a school. But right now, 
there is no possibility of changing the residence place of refugees in line with their 
requests, or provision of proofs. Accordingly, they do not have an access to formal 
rights granted by temporary/international protection status. The implementations 
are currently deadlocked. For example, if a refugee has a chronic disease and he 
is registered in Sanliurfa but he currently lives in Istanbul, he is not able to take his 
drugs from a hospital in Istanbul. His registration should be here for accessing the 
health services. When we consult with the DGMM about such a case, officers tell 
us that “he should go to Urfa to access services”. But we ask “how can he go, if he 
has a chronicle disease and he is an old person” The officers respond us that “if 
he was able to travel from Syria to Turkey, he can travel for Istanbul to Sanliurfa to 
access services (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-03). 
 
Regarding the renewal of the identity card, which were implemented by the DGMM with the 
collaboration of the UNHCR, some problematic aspects were also highlighted in Izmir: 
 
Last week 6-7 Syrians went to the PGMM Izmir. I guess for renewing their identity 
card. While they were there, the PGMM officials took their identity cards, because 
one of them went to Syria as voluntary returnee 4 years ago and came back to 
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Turkey. For the last 4 years, that person [she] had been going to hospitals, even 
had obtained work permit and has been working since then. After 4 years, her 
situation was recognized at the identity card updating centre. This is not acquired 
right, but there is something in the law, if you have not recognized it for 4 years as 
the state, then it is your fault. Then, they took her identity card from her. This means 
that this is forcing someone, they made her open her bag and took her identity card 
and one of a sudden, that person falls to unregistered position. In some cases, 
they take them to the removal centres. For example, finally the woman that I 
mentioned was taken to the removal centre. She and her child were realised at the 
end but, her husband was kept at the removal centre. They only updated her 
identity card, the child’s one. This is out of law as being based on an action from 4 
years before.50  
 
5.2.4.1.3. ID Document Check (Stop and Search, House Checks, Raids) 
 
In the last years, since 2016, ID document checks targeting foreigners in general have 
increased remarkably in line with issuing the obligation for having travel documents. When an 
NGO regional coordinator in Southeast Turkey was asked about ID document checks and 
stop-search, he drew attention to the provincial differences and implementations about control 
through travel documents. He said: 
 
Right now, controls and monitors are more restricted, particularly in the Southeast 
region. At one point, in Gaziantep, police officers were regularly stopping refugees 
on the street to ask their IDs. Officers were controlling the records of refugees’ 
registered province. If refugees were not registered in Gaziantep, they warned the 
refugees to go back to their first registered province, and said "if [you are] checked 
again" you would be deported. Similar checks started to happen in 
Kahramanmaras presently. In Sanliurfa, this has not been yet a case. I heard 
similar controls were happening in Adana and Mersin. This mobility issue has been 
controlled by state security forces (Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
Not only ID-document checks, but also house checks work as an internal control mechanism, 
although in the case of Turkey, house checks are often conducted by civil officers (not by the 
police). These house checks are mainly for controlling the criteria regarding cash 
transfer/financial aid and social assistance (mainly ESSN cards) (Interview SRII-Urfa-09). 
According to interviewees, raids of state authorities to working places of Syrians rarely occur. 
Thus, they are not checked for documents there, even if the places are known by local 
authorities (Interview SRII-Urfa-03). 
 
In the last year, not only security reasons, but also identity card related issues and violations 
of travel regulations which are part of internal control mechanisms, are mentioned by NGO 
representatives, particularly in Istanbul as a reason of apprehensions and deportations. It is 
noted that when authorities find out that refugees’ travel without a valid travel document during 
ID checks, they are treated as illegal migrants (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-03).  
 
5.2.4.2. Apprehensions, Administrative Detention and Removal Centres 
 
Some of the most important issues regarding border control implementation are 
apprehensions, administrative detention, and removal centres. The Turkish central state has 
full authority over the issue, and during our fieldwork we managed to collect substantial data. 
It should also be noted that the researchers did not have access to the removal centres in 
Izmir, Sanliurfa, and Istanbul. However, we conducted interviews with the representatives of 
                                                             
50 The focus group study was conducted on 24 October 2018 with the Izmir Bar Association, Migration 
and Asylum Commission, conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras (SRII). 
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the institutions that are members of the special commission that were established by the state 
initiative. These include some state, but also non-state actors and IGOs, which have been 
visiting the removal centres as well as bar associations that have legal access to those removal 
centres.  
 
Starting from apprehensions, a representative of an NGO in Istanbul shared that “what’s 
happening now, and this is all anecdotal evidence… I’m hearing is that people are 
apprehended at the border, put in detention at military bases and then sent back to the border” 
(Interview OzU-Istanbul-06). 
 
A lawyer who is at one of the removal centres in Istanbul and provides legal-judicial support to 
refugees-irregular migrants also reported the possible apprehension situations, and the 
process of their centre’s involvement: 
 
There are some apprehensions in airports, particularly in transit zones and the 
police centres in the airports. Lawyers have access to the cases. Moreover, as 
Istanbul is a metropolitan city, some apprehensions and detentions occur in police 
stations as a result of ID-security checks in different neighbourhoods of the 
province. After irregular migrants’ apprehension because of their illegal entry or 
stay here, PDMM is informed about the case, and we also get involved, because 
these irregular migrants request for legal support. Our judicial support unit assigns 
a lawyer for taking care of the case. Sometimes detained migrants’ have access to 
lawyers through their own networks. But often, as they do not know their rights and 
have not an opportunity to access lawyers, we do appointments on behalf of them 
to provide legal and judicial support in cases of detention and lack of IDs (Interview 
BilgiU-Istanbul-10). 
 
Regarding the apprehensions, the procedures that followed in Izmir as being located at the 
sea border were given at “the border” heading earlier.” Following their apprehension, and 
before their transfer to the removal centres, irregular migrants are kept up to 48 hours by law 
enforcement authorities in Izmir. As described by one of the laws enforcements officers “All 
their needs including access to health services are provided there and they are taken to the 
PDGMM. We definitely obey the rules for 48 hours.” (Interview SRII-Izmir-14). Because the 
above-mentioned transfer was considered expensive, and also requires human resources for 
accompanying the migrants, they wait maximum 48 hours to see if the newcomers will arrive. 
Syrians are not taken to the removal centres, but rather according to the 24th May regulations, 
they are transferred to the camps in Turkey (and in some cases in Syria), thus for this long 
journey, which is done by busses, they try to get together as many as they can.  
 
The following quotation from the high-level state agency representative in Ankara provides the 
explanation about the different procedures and addresses the “temporary accommodation 
centres (camps)” for Syrians: 
 
We do not accommodate Syrians at the removal centres. Because those at these 
centres are the ones who will be deported. Until their deportations, they are kept 
there in order to prepare for their travel and organize other documents. Therefore, 
according to the Geneva Convention and LFIP, we do not deport Syrians. Thus, 
we do not keep the migrants that we do not report there. We never send Syrians 
to those centres. … (Interview SRII-Ankara-02).  
 
As following the apprehensions, irregular migrants (non-Syrians) are taken to the removal 
centres. The interviews in Izmir provided rich information about the removal centre in terms of 
its physical conditions, the existing procedures, as well as the related problems there. The 
interviewees from Izmir also compared the conditions of previous removal centres: 
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Both Sumerbank and Isikkent were such terrible places in terms of physical 
conditions and personnel. They lacked the capacity, and they were the kind of 
place where no human being should have to be accommodated… We have bad 
memories about Isikkent. I am so happy that it has been closed. It was a place that 
I hated so much. It was incredibly horrible. For example, there were 13 Afghan 
kids, and they were locked into the basement. Nobody knew about them. At the 
end, they cut themselves with razor-blade, and then, we could know about them 
(Interview SRII-Izmir-05).  
 
It should be noted that compared to the previously mentioned removal centres, Harmandali 
was described as having better physical conditions by both state and non-state institutional 
representatives (Interview SRII-Ankara-02). The expression of “five stars” hotel is used by the 
interviewees for Harmandali along with another removal centre in Ayvacik. “The centre is in 
Ayvacik. If you see this place, it is like a palace. It is like a hotel. Five-star hotel” (Interview 
SRII-Canakkale-06). Similarly, a lawyer who has undertaken many cases from Hamandali 
shared that “it is a part of the EU - Turkey protocol regarding the establishment of 7 reception 
and accommodation centres. Harmandali’s form is like a hotel. Rooms, bathroom inside of 
those rooms, sport centre etc… We had 5-star removal centre in Izmir (Interview SRII-Izmir-
05).  
 
However, despite the better physical conditions regarding Harmandali in Izmir, the lack of 
capacity was also emphasized and noted by state and non-state representatives as “the 
capacity is 750 people and the building is really good. But with 15 officers, they were dealing 
with 750 migrants. It is not a normal thing” (Interview SRII-Ankara-01). Not only the numbers, 
but also the competences of the human resources at Harmandali were mentioned. Regarding 
the conditions and treatments, Izmir Bar Association prepared quite a detailed report not only 
for the physical conditions, but also regarding access to asylum and maltreatments (Izmir Bar 
Association, 2017). In addition, Deportation Monitoring Aegean (DMA) provides the most 
recent report about the Harmandali Removal Centre (DMA, 2019b).  
 
Similarly, lack of capacity regarding the removal centres in Istanbul was also reported: 
 
Sometimes it is overcrowded, the capacity is 750 but sometimes you reach 1,100. 
If I have to deal with 100 migrants, I will speak with them individually and 
separately. Why he/she escaped, if he/she wants to apply to international 
protection. But sometimes, I have to deal with 200 migrants. When I was working 
there, we could not deal with those migrants enough, it is related with the 
overcrowded nature of the facility (Interview SRII-Izmir-13).  
 
In terms of monitoring the removal centres, the interviewees in Izmir mentioned about a 
commission, which has been conducting monthly regular visits to the removal centres. In line 
with the Reception and Removal Centres Regulation (2014, Article 16), “a commission shall 
be established at the General Directorate for the supervision of the centres [removal centres]. 
The working procedures and principles of the Commission are determined separately by the 
General Directorate”. The Commission is composed by participants from state and civil society 
organisations, as well as intergovernmental ones. As based on the interviews, it can be said 
that the members of the commission have been changing, and they are dependent on the 
collaboration protocols with the DGMM. Regarding the visit for the purposes of this report, it 
was realized that there is no possibility to have uninformed visits to the removal centres, and 
the actors who have access to the centres are quite limited. 
 
According to the fieldwork and the interviewees’ statements, the decision of detention is 
decided on very loose legal grounds, and access to international protection and appealing 
process are problematic during administrative detention. Bar associations are only able to 
appoint a lawyer if the detained person goes through an investigation stage. However, when 
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the charges are dismissed, the lawyer's responsibility ends. According to lawyer interviewees, 
communication with detained refugees is extremely difficult, but from time to time personal 
networks may work.  
 
Researchers also observed the role of personal networks, which are able to slow down the 
deportation processes, facilitate the intervention of lawyers, and taking a notarized 
representation form. In addition, some specific problems such as to access to the removal 
centres, the problematic “notification” process (give a written notice to somebody) have been 
also criticized by the interviewees in Izmir. It is stated that many dimensions regarding the 
notification responsibility of the state institutions have been overruled. The same problems also 
stated in Istanbul. The following quotation from a local lawyer who has been working in this 
field in Izmir, highlights some of those commonly addressed issues as follows: 
 
As lawyers, we had many difficulties regarding the access, to see our clients, and 
to take deputation. You go there for your interview with your client. Until 17:15, you 
cannot see anyone, then at that time, they give you a lot of documents in a cartoon 
box. There is only 15 minutes left to the end of office hours. They tell you to have 
a look at those documents and speak with your client. Also, irregularities regarding 
notifications… For example, a Farsi speaking person was forced to sign a 
document in Arabic, even though the LFIP is extremely strict about notifications. 
The law says that you will notify the person in his/her own language and you will 
explain his/her situation in that language. Also, the notification is not enough by 
itself. They should be informed that, you were brought here because of this reason, 
we will deport you, you have right for appeal in 15 days, if you do not have legal 
support, we can assign a lawyer from the Bar Association. None of them exist in 
the implementation (Interview SRII-Izmir-05).  
 
From the fieldwork, it is seen that the access of Bar Association lawyers to the removal centres 
to provide legal aid for the detained refugees is not easy due to heavy bureaucracy, lack of 
clarity about procedures, and short time frames between the detention, investigation and 
deportation. An interviewed lawyer in Sanliurfa working on the refugee issues mentioned 
several difficulties in relation to the access of detained refugees: 
 
They (refugees) are imprisoned in Public Order Jail (Assays Nezarathane), 
because there is no separate detention space for them. It is not possible to see 
them during this detention. When, as a lawyer you want to visit, officers do not 
allow you and they ask for vekalet (notarized representation form) of the detained 
person. They do not allow the notary to take his/her signed form for assigning a 
lawyer. We ask officers for what should be done, officers say “we have ordered 
that the detained person should say that X is my lawyer, and I would like to see 
this lawyer”. But the detained person does not have any access to outside, he does 
not know that his family is talking to me, how can he possibly know who is his 
lawyer? He does not even know that his family has visited a lawyer, because they 
are not able to communicate with family (if there is one) (Interview SRII-Urfa-04). 
 
When the migrants are taken to the removal centre, only the Bar Associations have access 
since they are lawyers. There is some accessible information regarding legal counselling and 
the related NGOs or IGOs. While the bar associations have access to detainees? through their 
lawyers, some of the other NGOs provide legal aid and support through the bar associations. 
 
Similarly, the active IGOs provide capacity building (such as financial support, improvements 
of physical conditions, or providing trainings regarding human rights, asylum law etc.) support, 
translation, legal aid and coordination with the bar associations and the related NGOs. The 
IGO representative summarized their support as being essential since “the language barrier is 
important. So, we have a protocol with Turkish bar associations, helping them with telephone 
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consulting. So, we provide translators to lawyers in bar associations for refugee cases. Also, 
the fees for power of attorney or notary” (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-07). 
 
However, it can be said that the possible interventions of non-state actors are very limited and 
follow a complex path as explained by the regional coordinator of a national NGO: 
 
The latest arrival of Afghan refugees (referring to those arrived in 2018) are settled 
in Osmaniye-Duzici. It was previously a temporary accommodation centre (camp) 
but then turned into a removal centre. We do not know the exact numbers, but we 
were told that in the beginning there were around 5,000 Afghans. We do not access 
to camps; we also do not have access to repatriation centres. Only if people can 
access us from camps, are we are able to involve in. They ask for legal support in 
the case of deportation, in these cases, we are calling the Bar Association where 
we refer to lawyer support. Only lawyers are able to enter the removal centres. 
Often persons' family members or relatives come to us to ask for help. Thus, we 
cooperate with the Bar Association and in all provinces, we have offices. However, 
in Gaziantep, Hatay, and Sanliurfa we have closer cooperation with the Bar 
Association (Interview SRII-Urfa-02). 
 
The meso-level interviewee stated that for the non-Syrians, one of the biggest problems is the 
limbo after the administrative detention. Because, after they are released, they are not provided 
with their identity cards such as passport etc. (if they have any) and they are obliged to leave 
the country (ulkeyi terk daveti). Until their deportation, irregular migrants are obliged to report 
weekly or every two weeks. This procedure is problematic both for the migrants and the 
national security institutions according to the interviewees in Izmir. The following quotation 
provides an elaboration regarding the process:  
 
There is one document, which invites them to leave the county between 15-30 
days. If a person leaves the country within this time period, it means that the person 
left the country legally. I think this is the handicap of the DGMM. When it gives this 
document to these people, it has to give this time period to them too. But it cannot 
keep them under detention; because it does not have this capacity to keep them 
in the removal centres. But also, it cannot deport them too. … Those people will 
be taken to the removal centres as soon as they are assigned another 
investigation. This is a complete bunny chase, nothing else. It is to say that you go, 
do whatever you do but be invisible to me… (Interview SRII-Izmir-05). 
 
Another issue regarding the administrative detention, is the different procedures regarding a 
special procedure for foreigner terrorist combatants that is names as “yabanci terrorist savasci/ 
YTS” as it was mentioned by many interviewees. A statement from a lawyer from Izmir 
summarizes that “they did not bring those refugees for legal counselling, or they followed a 
special procedure telling us your security is so important for us [the state]” (Interview SRII-
Izmir-05). Another lawyer stated that “Their [foreigner terrorist combatants] procedure is totally 
different for them at the removal centre. For a long time, the removal centre has not given 
permission to the lawyers for deputation/power of attorney, litigation, or even to communicate 
with their clients. You cannot reach them by phone, for example they are not taken to the 
cafeteria for eating in Izmir. They eat in their rooms.”51  
 
Finally, some INGO representatives working with refugees that after 2016, particularly along 
with the Emergency Law Decrees, stated that the number of deportations have increased. 
Also, the sheltering opportunities in camps declined as some camps are either closed or united 
with others encouraging returns. During the fieldwork, it was also observed that many NGOs 
                                                             
51 The focus group study was conducted on 24 October 2018 with the Izmir Bar Association, Migration 
and Asylum Commission, conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras (SRII) (Respondent II). 
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are trying to disassociate themselves from the deportation cases, and do not want to talk about 
the issue, or in many cases they transfer each case to the related NGOs and IGOs.  
 
5.2.4.3. Deportation  
 
According to the researchers’ observations in the field and the statements of interviewees, no 
civilian state officers (from PDMMs) wants to take responsibility or be engaged about the 
deportation issues as decisions for deportations are often taken on the grounds of alleged 
terrorism suspicions. Also, the legal framework is not fully clear to the civilian officers of the 
DGMM. They (PDMM officers) ask the comments of police officers who have more experience 
regarding the deportation of foreigners. Senior officers try to shift the problem to more senior 
officers (as much as possible) in order not to take sole responsibility. The general approach is 
to deport the person in question (or transfer them to another administrative unit) as soon as 
possible, particularly if there is a suspicion about a terror link.52  
 
The impact of the coup-attempt and the broader concerns regarding terrorism were also 
mentioned in deportation-related interviews in Izmir. The different decisions and lack of 
communication among the different state authorities were underlined by the interviewees in 
Izmir. The following quotation mentions both YTS and a terror dimension, but also the 
problematic and unlawful procedures: 
 
Following the 15th July coup-attempt, with the special security codes, many people 
were deported. Administrative detention was used abusively. As saying that “we 
keep you here for 12 months, then we take you out one day, then we will take you 
again for another 12 months. We will send you to the Nusaybin camp, your 
family…” threating people like that they make people sign the forms automatically 
without even taking their real consent and deport them from Turkey. Okay, and you 
suddenly deport this person, even before the investigation against him/her at the 
prosecution is not finalized. In terms of procedural economics, it is also not 
acceptable. Because you initiated an investigation on the one hand by your judicial 
authorities, but on the other hand another institution deports that person. Following 
your high criminal court search for this person for years. It takes a decision for 
arresting and writes several notifications but this person is not in the country 
anymore. Maybe this person is really a terrorist. If someone threatens your 
country’s security, or the world’s, then you have to judge this person and you have 
to give the required penalty. Or if someone faces such an accusation, that person 
has right to defend him/herself as a constitutional right. How can you deport a 
person without having his/her defence? (Interview SRII-Izmir-05).  
 
One interviewee from an NGO in Istanbul refers to a deportation case: 
 
For example, some of our applicants mentioned deportations from Turkey. 
Although their families had been here, they had been settled here, they were forced 
to sign a document declaring that “I want to voluntarily return”, then they were 
deported. Everything seems in accordance with the legal procedures as the person 
signs a voluntary return document. In fact, the signature was taken under the 
torture in the removal centre. For example, a Kurdish refugee was deported to a 
region which was controlled by ISIS (Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-05).  
 
A regional coordinator of a national NGO operating in the southeast Turkey defended 
deportations arguing for security reasons. He said that 
 
                                                             
52 Participator observation of Z. Sahin Mencutek in the state agencies in Sanliurfa (July 2018). 
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Almost 99% of deportations occur on the security grounds. There are no 
spontaneous deportations, there is no raid or street checks with the aim of 
deportation. If they find you without ID, they send them to the DGMM to get it, if 
there is no security-intelligence link. Turkey is very flexible about these issues, no 
widespread deportations except security reasons (Interview SRII-Urfa-02).  
 
As there is no reliable data (official or unofficial) about the numbers of deportations and the 
legal justifications of each deportation case, it is impossible to validate his statement. 
Considering that he is a representative of nation-wide NGO working with both UNHCR and 
DGMM, his statements may offer some insights, at least regarding the perceptions about 
deportations inside Turkey. The reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
provide additional insights as they are based on interviews with deportees and display the 
unlawful practices.53 
 
A lawyer from Sanliurfa’s Bar Association Refugee Unit mentioned an incident:  
 
One of my customers was alleged to be member of Daesh, he was detained for a 
week. The Court issued the decision of dismissal of charges even though there 
was no investigation stage. The PGMM took the administrative decision of 
deportation. He was then deported. In fact, this is not rational implementation 
because the person was given dismissal of charges decision. It means that he 
does not have any link, and there is no evidence of a link with a terrorist 
organisation. But, at the end such people are deported as there is a suspicion of 
terror. This is very common practice. This means that officers in the DGMM has a 
separate authority (than judges) to decide about deportation. Although the decision 
is presented as an administrative decision, in fact it is a judicial decision, it is a 
basic human rights violation, as it impedes to entering a country without a limitation 
(Interview SRII-Urfa-04).  
 
Finally, a president of a national NGO in Izmir stated that the unlawful deportations “we came 
across with naive official explanations and statements such as ‘we sent 288 Afghans back’. 
The people started to question how they could be sent. We had numerous visitors at that period 
from the European Commissions, from the embassies etc” (Interview SRII-Ankara-01). 
 
24th May Regulation 
As a part of the legal and institutional framework of this report, the new regulation dated 24 
May 2018 was already explained, and the interviewees have also emphasized that rather than 
a regulation it can be seen as an internal implementation measure based on the DGMM’s 
decision. However, in terms of implications the results of the new regulation were quite visible 
in the field. Briefly, it can be stated that the dramatic decrease of border-crossings (Greece-
Turkey) by Syrians was explained as one of the main results. The below given quotation from 
a state officer in Izmir explains the logic behind the regulation and its impact:  
 
In the past, because Syrians used to be released [after they were caught], people 
from Iran, Afghanistan and even Africa were saying that I am a Syrian. When I 
worked at the removal centre it was quite crowded (July, August and September). 
This period was the time of the highest apprehensions. I had never come across a 
false statement. All the statements regarding their nationalities [migrants] were 
correct. I see the impact of the regulation. But I believe that to send Syrians is not 
the solution. Because they are released from the camps, then they come here 
again. And when we take them to camps, for example if we take them to Antep, 
there are 50 officials who accompany them. Think about the expenses from the 
                                                             
53 The reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International provide additional insights as they are 
based on interviews with deportees. See Amnesty International, 2017 and Human Rights Watch, 2018. 
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state, travel expenses etc. It is really harmful for the state (Interview SRII -Izmir-
13). 
 
The following quotation from the interviews with an IGO representative in Izmir also provides 
more details about the dramatic decrease in the numbers of Syrians (in Izmir), and increase in 
various other nationalities. Although Syrians cannot be taken to the removal centres for 
administrative detention, this quotation displays the differing implementation of? Changed? 
after the 24th May 2018 regulation. Before, Syrians were usually released right away, now they 
are taken to the existing/remaining camps with a law enforcement escort. Therefore, it is a kind 
of forced mobility, and in some cases, it is even declared that they are sent to the “safe areas” 
in Syria. Thus, the action seems to go against to the non-refoulment principle. Additionally:  
 
Now, the Syrians are not released from the removal centres anymore but they are 
sent to the camps in the Southeast. From there, their exit is not difficult. Because 
the aim of the regulation is not to keep them in the camps, but to create a 
deterrence. After the new procedure, the number of Syrians has been decreased 
dramatically [regarding irregular border-crossings]. For example, in our records, 
they were 65-70%, but now 33%. Then, it is followed by Afghans with 32% 
(Interview SRII-Izmir-02).  
 
The interviewees in Izmir did not want to share much information about voluntary returns of 
Syrians, but three interviewees shared that some of the Syrians were caught during their 
irregular border crossings, and since they cannot be taken to the removal centres as a result 
of the 24th May 2018 regulation, they were taken to camps. It is stated that some of the camps 
take place within the “so-called” safety areas within Syria, which is against the non-refoulment 
principle, but it should also be noted that Turkey and Syria have a readmission agreement. 
However, to have access to further information about this agreement was not possible for the 
researchers. Thus, they cannot be considered as a part of voluntary return, and they can be 
seen as against the non-refoulment principle of the Geneva convention and also the LFIP. In 
parallel to the above-mentioned situation, the representative of an IGO in Izmir stated that “the 
ones who are single Syrians are also taken to the areas that are called safe areas, where it is 
cleaned from terror. Although those places are inside Syria, the number is low. But in general, 
they are taken to the camps” (Interview SRII-Izmir-11). 
 
5.2.5.  Voluntary Return to Syria   
 
It seems that return is on the agenda of Turkish stakeholders. On 3 December 2018, Ministry 
of Interior Suleyman Soylu declared that 285,424 Syrians returned to their homes after 
Turkey’s military operations in the Northern Syria (Hurriyet, 2018). Recently, on 1 March 2019, 
Turkey’s official news agency reported that “around 315,000 Syrians living in Turkey have so 
far returned voluntarily to their home country after Turkey's anti-terror operations cleared their 
hometowns of terrorists” (Mazi, 2019). 
 
Regarding voluntary returns, NGOs in Istanbul commented on voluntary returns and 
mechanisms. A regional director of an NGO in Istanbul said that: 
 
After the Afrin operation, different authorities from the state started to disseminate 
the information of “there are secure regions in Syria and those who want to return 
may return” via media and other means. Personally, I believe that there is a change 
in the Turkish state’s stance about Syrians towards their return and deportation. 
We see the reflections of this change. The municipalities in Istanbul organize 
campaigns in this end. The municipalities say that “they cover all expenses of 
returning families and provide transportation for them. They do not have any 
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hesitation to run such campaigns and talk about it on media” (Interview, BilgiU-
Istanbul-02). 
 
However, this policy shift has some controversial consequences. The same NGO 
representative considers that “one of the reasons of increasing tension between Syrians and 
locals in this year (2018) is related to this return discourse. The government insistently tells 
that ‘there is a secured place in Syria and Syrians can return if they want’”. This creates an 
expectation among Turkish locals and they say “why these Syrians do not return if there is a 
secured place?” (Interview, BilgiU-Istanbul-02). During our fieldwork in Sanliurfa, the 
researchers observed exactly the same discourse among the locals who expect the immediate 
return of Syrians by referring to the explanation of Turkish Government about the security.  
 
There has been inconsistent information about voluntary returns among refugees (Syrians) 
and stakeholders. A representative of a refugee community centre in Istanbul shared her 
insights:  
 
We cannot mention voluntary returns right now. These are human beings you 
cannot repatriate them. After Turkish soldiers entered in Afrin, we received calls 
from almost two thirds of our beneficiaries. They were saying that “Provincial 
Migration Directorate calls us, they tell us that we establish schools and hospitals 
in Afrin for you, start to collect your stuff, you will return there”. We as an 
organisation have a good relation with the Provincial Migration Directorate, and 
asked about these types of calls. Their explanation made us relax. They told us 
that “there is a misunderstanding due to the translation mistakes.” So, there is no 
policy shift. As the term of voluntary return implies, it has to be voluntary. It can be 
the case that war would end, peace is provided, but these people may not want to 
return (Interview, BilgiU-Istanbul-04).  
 
Similarly, a program assistant interviewed in Istanbul conveyed that:  
 
We encountered some cases that came to us for consultancy. They had been detained, 
but after a while they expressed that they wanted to return voluntarily. Then they were 
allowed to return. At this point, it has opened the discussion as to what extent this is a 
voluntary return (Interview, BilgiU-Istanbul-05). 
 
A lawyer interviewed in Sanliurfa also confirmed about the issue of signing document called 
voluntary return form. He noted that:  
 
Signing of this form (voluntary return document) is problematic, because the 
person is not able to read and understand the form, he does not know what it is. 
Also, receiving this form, a police officer who orders him that "whether you sign this 
form or not we will send you back" they are required to sign this form, considering 
not staying here but go (Interview SRII-Urfa-04).  
 
Many of the interviewees in Izmir also mentioned the problematic character and the procedural 
problems of voluntary returns.  
 
According to the regulation, the UNHCR should take a role as observer along with the other 
civil society institutions, in cases of voluntary returns from the camps. However, many of the 
interviewees who represent different civil society institutions mention that they do not want to 
take part within this process, because they are mainly used for completing a procedure and 
even, they have some hesitations regarding the “voluntary” aspect of the returns. On the other 
hand, if the returns are not from the camps, mainly the semi-state institution Kizilay 
representative signs the forms as the observer, although its neutral observant status in the 
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return are criticized by the IGO, NGO representatives and lawyers (Interview SRII-Izmir-02; 
05). 
 
5.2.5.1. Readmission Agreements and the EU-Turkey Statement  
 
The fieldwork provides information about the impact of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement 
(RA). It should be stated that the majority of the meso level interviewees in Izmir used the RA 
and the Statement interchangeably. It is seen that there is a lot of confusion about these legal 
and political documents as well as the Turkey-Greece Readmission Protocol in practice.  
 
As it was mentioned previously, the RA came into force in 2013 only for the Turkish citizens 
and in 2017, for the third-country nationals as well. However, due to Turkey’s administrative 
measures regarding visa liberalisation process, it could not be applied to third-country 
nationals. For the readmission of the Syrians from the Greek islands, the Statement has been 
used. The complex legal problems and interconnectedness among the Readmission Protocol 
(with Greece), the RA, and the Statement were discussed earlier. As of July 2019, the only 
implemented political instrument (since it is not an international agreement but a political 
statement) seems the EU-Turkey Statement as it was stated at the macro-level analysis of the 
report (p.47). The following statement from the EU Delegation representative elaborates the 
complex statuses of the Agreement-Statement-Protocol triangle and reflects the 
interconnectedness of these three documents: 
 
Now that the protocol (with Greece) has been suspended. There are a lot of 
questions on this because essentially concerning, you know the EU, Turkey and 
Greece make a triangle, the Protocol, the Statement and the Agreement…We have 
the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement, [that] was signed in 2013. However, 
Turkey does not implement the clause that relates to the third country nationals. 
Saying that we are going the implement this clause when you implement the visa 
liberalisation. Basically, the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement is in force, 
however, in practice only for Turkish citizens (Interview SRII-Ankara-03).  
 
As referring to the impact of the Statement, it has generated a significant impact on the irregular 
border crossings from Turkey to Greece. Following the dramatic decrease of crossings in April 
2016 after the Statement, it has also been a constant fluctuation, which was emphasized by 
the interviewees in Izmir. However, it is not possible to attribute these fluctuating figures to a 
sole factor. The interviewees in Izmir mentioned different factors such as the low number of 
readmissions since the RA and the Statement, the 24th May 2018 regulation54, perceptions of 
the interviewees regarding the effectiveness of these policy tools, changes in the perception 
of migrants who intend to try crossing, seasonal differences, family unification attempts due to 
losing the prospects for resettlement and other reasons (Interview SRII-Izmir-10; Interview 
SRII-Izmir-01). For example, the following quotation from one law enforcement officer from 
Izmir focuses on the perceptions of migrants as follows:  
 
So, an immigrant says that if I go to Greece, they will send me back again thus I 
do not want to go. Both the Agreement and Statement are important because they 
create such a perception [among] migrants (Interview SRII-Meso-Izmir-01). 
 
Although it does not necessarily support the ideas around the impact of the Statement on the 
changing figures, the following quotation also emphasizes the importance of other intervening 
                                                             
54 The new internal regulation was launched by DGMM as of 24th May 2018. Before, in case of irregular 
border-crossings Syrians used to be released without taken into the removal centres. However, after 
these internal regulations, Syrians are also taken by the law enforcement actors and companied to the 
existing temporary accommodation centres (camps) in the south-eastern border cities. After registration 
there, they are free to leave the camps.  
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factors such as smugglers and the building of the security wall, implication of different policies 
for different nationalities, and interaction between various border lines: 
 
I do not believe that the decrease in (border-crossings) is because the Statement. 
Even more than its impact, they closed the borders. They made the transition to the 
mainland very difficult; I think, these figures are very much related to this. By the 
way, they [refugees] don't know they will be sent back while they are on their way. 
When our team members ask them if they know about the “readmission statement”, 
they say “no” and when it is explained to them, they say that “I do not think that we 
will be sent back”. Especially Syrians and Iraqis. The closed-doors have a direct 
impact. Smugglers direct them. Thus, migrants do not follow this but they follow what 
smugglers say. By the way they have been diverted to Italy, since it is easier to pass 
the other EU countries rather than Greece (Interview SRII-Izmir-02). 
 
The following quotation from the high-level officer of the state agency also re-confirms the 
recent changes regarding the Readmission Agreement and the Protocol, while emphasising 
that the Statement has been implemented as foreseen. It also displays the impact of the 15 
July coup-attempt in Turkey as visible at the foreign policy level, which will be mentioned later 
in this report.  
 
It was suspended unilaterally with Greece (the Readmission Protocol between 
Greece and Turkey). We signed a protocol with Greece in 2002 on a readmission 
as two countries separate from the EU. In the light of the current developments, as 
you know, there are disputes regarding the Eastern Mediterranean (with Greece) 
... due to some of the political disputes in particular regarding the acceptance of 
the asylum applications of FETO55 related coup-plotters, Turkey suspended the 
Protocol unilaterally. However, this protocol is still valid for Turkish citizens at the 
Greek side. So, it means that Turkish citizens who reside in Europe as irregular 
status can be readmitted to Turkey. I mean, if there is a Turkish citizen in Belgium 
or Holland, we accept them… Now, the readmissions are done as a part of the 18th 
March Statement (Interview SRII-Ankara-02). 
 
Based on the fieldwork, it is seen that the Statement has been applied only through Dikili (a 
coastline town in Izmir) recently. According to the first plan, Gulluk-Bodrum and also Cesme-
Izmir were assigned as the other location for the readmissions, but both the officials and also 
NGO and IGO representatives stated that operations took place only at Dikili-Izmir, which is 
also re-confirmed by the high-level officer of state agency who stated that “We only take them 
from Dikili. At the beginning, we also took from Cesme. Only for 2-3 times, but then that point 
was closed” (Interview SRII-Ankara-02).  
 
In terms of numbers of readmitted migrants, in parallel to the official figures, both the official 
statements as well as the NGOs and IGOs representatives stated that the numbers were quite 
low. The interviewees in Izmir stated that readmissions have been done every two weeks for 
small numbers of about 8-10. The majority of the interviewees said that in the past, the 
numbers were higher for one operation because the time period was longer but now, we more 
often see lower numbers.  
 
The IGO representatives, in particular the UN agencies representatives stated that they are 
not a part of the Statement as well as the Agreement, thus during the readmissions, they do 
not play a role. However, according to the interviewees, based on the good communication 
with the law enforcement institutions and the IGOs and NGOs, in case of any humanitarian 
needs they provide kits as well as the other required support. In parallel, the state 
representative stated that based on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior’s 
                                                             
55 Fettullah Gulen Terrorist Organization 
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central decision, the entire operation is conducted by the provincial representation of the 
migration management state agency in Izmir by cooperating with relevant institutions such as 
law enforcement forces, health unit, and others (Interview SRII-Ankara- 02). 
 
5.3. Cooperation and Coordination Among the Border 
Management and Migration Related Actors  
 
The provinces referred to in this study are quite different from each other in terms of border 
management and migration control. Although there are some similar actors, those cities are 
different from each other in relation to its entrance, exit and transit hub characteristics. Also, 
sea and land borders have significant differences. Therefore, this section will be analysed only 
for Izmir and Sanliurfa. Since Istanbul is not one of the border cities, the findings were not 
enough to evaluate the cooperation and coordination among the border related actors.  
 
5.3.1. Border Governance in Practice- Izmir 
 
In general, Turkey’s western EU borders are also significantly politicized. Western borders are 
the main exit points from Turkey to Europe. Thus, it influences the EU-Turkey relations. In 
addition, since 2015, more IGOs such as IOM started to involve in border management of 
Turkey. All these factors have created a complex policy field of border management. 
 
In terms of border management and migration control, actors are quite limited in Izmir. They 
can be briefly categorised as state and non-state actors. First of all, the state`s law 
enforcement actors appear at the scene. In addition to those actors, at the centre there is the 
DGMM and in the city the PDMM takes a leading role as the state actor. PDMM takes the role 
after apprehensions and by the completion of the legal process, immigrants are taken by 
PDMM to the removal centre. The main role regarding international protection is taken by 
PDMM, including internal controls through registrations, ID renewals, granting travel 
permission, and deportations. On the other hand, GDMM has a specific role regarding 
readmissions from Dikili. District governorships and municipalities also take part, in particular, 
where the intense border-crossings occur. As different from Sanliurfa and all the other south-
eastern provinces at Turkey-Syria border, AFAD has not been an active actor in Izmir but rather 
the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC, Kizilay) also takes part as semi-state organisation  
 
In terms of governance the clear division of labour among the law enforcement forces were 
mentioned in Izmir. Accordingly, all the cases at the sea are the responsibility of the coast 
guard. It is stated by the interviewees in Izmir, at the beginning of the crisis (as referring to 
2015 and 2016) due to the high numbers, lack of capacity, as well as a lack of well-structured 
procedures and regulations, there were some problems among the law enforcement agencies, 
however, still today the situation is not better. After their tasks are completed, the immigrants 
are transferred to the PDMM. In case of readmissions, the DGMM also takes place as 
supporting PDMM. The below given statement from a high-level law enforcement officer 
summarizes the situation and previous problems: 
 
One of the problems we experienced with the PDMM in the past, is how do we 
move immigrants to the PDMM? You have 50 migrants, they have bags, they have 
life jackets. Some people pick up their guitar, some even with their cat. Of course, 
they have different needs at that stage. Hunger, thirst, some of them had even the 
danger of suffocation. At this stage, after cleaning everything, we need a car from 
the PDMM, and sometimes they say they do not have a car. We have to overcome 
the trouble. We are trying to find solutions with every opportunity. There is no 
distinction between them and us. Of course, these are situations no one wants. 
Such a crisis management was something that nobody expected. Since it was 
experienced as a first time, everybody was helping each other. Now, the related 
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institutions can produce a more practical solution because they have all become 
little more professional (Interview SRII-Izmir-01). 
 
The intergovernmental organisations, IOM and UNHCR, appear as the most visible ones in 
the field. More specifically in Izmir, IOM appears as the most active IGO at the important 
border-crossing points that provides support both for the law enforcement and the other state 
actors. For example, IOM has a collaboration protocol with the Coast Guard Aegean Region 
Command. Since border-management and migration control covers mixed flows, the IOM has 
quite an intense role in terms of spatial scope of the operations. IOM not only has offices and 
mobile teams in Izmir, but also in the other cities in the Aegean Region. At the border crossing 
points, it is quite active with its outreach teams, but also as the first contact with the immigrants 
as following their apprehension by the law enforcement actors, IOM also provides information 
regarding international protection. Based on the fieldwork in Izmir and the interviews with the 
IOM representatives, it is seen that IOM provides interpretation and humanitarian aid support 
such as water, food packages, blankets and clothes while law enforcement officers take 
statements of the immigrants. At the same time, they support the law enforcement officers for 
identifying vulnerabilities and for consultancy.  
 
In comparison with IOM, UHNCR does not appear at the border-crossing points directly, but 
they also provide the same kinds of support as IOM to both state and non-state institutions. 
For example, they provide support and funds for one national NGO, ASAM. The interviewees 
from UNHCR stated that they do not take role at the rescue events but they have been funding 
one of the most active national NGO in Izmir and also at the western border crossing points 
(ASAM). Though the collaboration with ASAM, the UNHCR also actively participates to the 
process at the border-crossing points. The close communication and complementary works 
among the UN agencies, as well as the law enforcement and national NGOs were mentioned 
by the interviewees, despite their limited numbers. As different from IOM, UNHCR also takes 
part regarding international protection. Regarding the situation in the removal centres, UNHCR 
has one expert, who is specially assigned for the cases at the removal centre in Izmir to follow 
the cases, to provide support for assignment of a lawyer, and to follow-up the case up to 
appeal.  
 
In summary, IGOs mainly provide humanitarian aid, interpretation, consultancy for international 
protection, identification of vulnerabilities, vehicles and transportation, support, and in some 
cases infrastructure support at the borders (such as shelter, tents, mobile containers, mobile 
toilets, showers, changing rooms etc.) in Izmir. Those services and support are provided both 
to the law enforcement actors and also some national NGOs. As following the dramatic 
increase of the irregular crossings in 2015 and 2016, many of the new IGOs, INGOs and NGOs 
started to open their offices in Izmir. Some of them have also mobile outreach teams, for 
example, UNHCR, IOM, ASAM and Mercy Corps. However, some of the NGOs and INGOs 
have been closed as following the state of emergency and the related decrees. 
 
In terms of NGO representation within border management, ASAM appears as a significant 
actor. As based on the interviews with the representatives in both Izmir and Ankara, it is seen 
that ASAM has specific offices from Edirne to Bodrum. As similar to IOM, they provide 
interpreter, lawyer, social worker services and they have a mobile team like IOM’s outreach 
teams. While IOM has a protocol with the coast guard, ASAM emphasizes the importance of 
the land operations in Turkey.56 Thus, they coordinate and collaborate with the Gendarmerie 
as well as with the security forces. They provide significant services in Izmir such as 
social and legal counselling, psychological support, assisting asylum-seekers and 
refugees through their UNHCR processes, identifying vulnerable cases, reporting push-back 
                                                             
56 It has been emphasized that the changing practices or implemented different operations in different 
borders have impact on the others. For example, the “security wall” in the south eastern borders in terms 
of entrance and the consequences at the exit borders.  
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cases and incidents, food and non-food items (NFI) distribution. They provide interpreters, 
social workers, humanitarian aid kits to security forces and gendarmerie. In addition, ASAM 
has “Mobile Counselling Team (MCT)” based in Izmir. It is stated by the interviewees that 
although based on good manner and bilateral communication, it is possible to work without 
protocols, as the related institutions facilitate cooperation and help to overcome heavy 
bureaucracy (Interview SRII-Izmir-12).  
 
Multeci-Der has only a marginal role in Izmir. They monitor apprehensions and some of the 
special cases regarding international protection, in particular vulnerabilities, which have been 
tackled with the IGOs and NGOs in Izmir through the coordination meetings and the 
established cooperation. As following the apprehensions, like the Izmir Bar Association, 
Multeci-Der also provides intense support to the ones who are under administrative detention 
at the removal centres.  
 
In terms of the EU and the EU-Turkey cooperation regarding border management, the majority 
of the interviewees stated that the EU has not been quite visible as much as the UN 
representative in the field with their representatives from the different agencies, at least at the 
border-crossing points or even in the city. However, many of the projects, including some of 
the UN’s ones, are funded by the EU itself. It is also stated that time to time, the EU Delegations 
have visited the field or the related stakeholders. One of the IGO representatives in Izmir, who 
has been working at the border-crossing point stated that  
 
I have been here for two years. I have seen 7-8 experts from the EU. They come 
here and do an examination in the broadest sense. They try to understand and 
report, how does it work, etc. Since we have been already working here as 
partners, our observations are already taken into account by them” (Interview SRII-
Izmir-08). 
 
In particular regarding irregular migration, almost all the interviewees mentioned that at the 
beginning of 2015, the city was not ready and many of the institutions were not yet established, 
or the ones that had already been in the city had significant problems regarding responding to 
the high numbers of transit migrants in the city centre, as well as the border-crossing points. 
The interviewees mentioned that due to high numbers of arrivals, some problems occurred. 
For example, when the coast guard handed 500 immigrants to the Gendarmerie. Again, almost 
all the interviewees mentioned a relative or significant progress regarding cooperation, division 
of labour, and procedures. In terms of governance, the coordination meetings with the 
participation of all the related stake-holders were mentioned. However, regarding the efficiency 
of the meetings, some of the interviewees mentioned that in terms of producing concrete 
results those meetings remain inadequate.  
 
Concerning governance in Izmir, it can be stated that the number of actors, in particular the 
NGOs, are quite limited. 
 
5.3.2.  Border Governance in Practice- Sanliurfa 
 
In general, the geography affects positioning and implementations of meso level actors. The 
Turkish state has often considered the southeast border with Syria as critical for its national 
security. The same border is also where mass arrivals of Syrians occurred, and they have 
stayed in camps and urban areas in the region. 
In Sanliurfa, the coordination and collaboration among the related actors is different to Izmir. 
Here, the Land Command, particularly border check stations (Hudut Karakolu) and 
Gendarmerie are the main responsible institutions for controlling the crossings.  
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Similar to Izmir, PDMM takes the leading role in the management of the international and 
temporary protection cases. It mainly deals with internal controls such as registrations, ID 
renewals, and granting travel permission within Turkey and to Syria. It is observed that the 
Director of PDMM has a substantial power in the provincial bureaucracy, was in close 
cooperation with the DGMM in Ankara, as well as with the Sanliurfa Governorate. The PDMM 
has two branches in the city centre, in addition to the branches in some big towns and 
temporary accommodation centres. Three temporary accommodation camps in the province 
have been transferred under the governance of PDMM, whereas before they were governed 
by the AFAD since 2011. As the official border gates in Sanliurfa have been closed since 2016, 
PDMM in Sanliurfa cooperates with Kilis Governorate regulating short visits for bayram, trade 
purposes, or funeral purposes and as well as voluntary returns. For deportations, Sanliurfa 
PDMM cooperates with Osmaniye Removal Centre as it does not have its own removal centre, 
but is planned for the near future (Interview SRII-Urfa-01). 
 
There are some coordination problems between local government (municipality and district 
officers), and PDMM in terms of registration and internal controls. An interviewed district officer 
from the city centre conveyed that “we (muhtarlik) do not have direct coordination with the 
governorate and DGMM, and we only contact them for IDs, we are writing a petition for giving 
IDs to Syrians, but we do not have any other contact” (Interview SRII-Urfa-13). In the border 
towns, coordination is a bigger challenge in Sanliurfa than coordination at the city centre, as 
the PDMM does not have offices in all towns (including border towns) where Syrians settle in. 
One part of the coordination problems is related to the lack of adequate capacity to handle 
services.  
 
The PDMM has started to take responsibility in the camps (replacing AFAD), but often camps 
are far from town centres and difficult to access. A district officer from a border town who was 
visiting the camp to help with the paper work of some refugees told us that “If you want to do 
something, make it in a proper way, DGMM should be in the town. If you do registration in a 
tent camp, build a proper waiting lounge, do a good service, even build a proper road to the 
camp. You know the road is terrible, it is terrible” (Interview SRII-Urfa-22). The researcher also 
observed that the road to the camp was not built. 
 
In terms of IGOs, the UNHCR supports the capacity building of PDMM, particularly for training 
of experts and for enhancement of infrastructures where Syrians are given services such as 
setting up mobile toilets and shades on the sites where Syrians are waiting for registration 
(Interview SRII-Urfa-22). The IOM has a presence in the city, but is not involved in border 
related issues. The majority of the interviewees stated that the Turkish state tried to keep 
entries under its full control without hindering or giving limited authority to non-state actors. 
According to the NGO representatives, this stance can be attributed to Turkey’s security 
concerns. It is stated that for example, Turkey avoids asking for the support of the UNHCR 
during border crossings. They did not have access to the border points, except occasionally 
when permission was provided by the central state. During mass border crossings, the IOs and 
INGOs had only been able to support local implementers which delivered humanitarian aids to 
the recently arrived Syrians. 
 
In terms of NGOs, the most visible semi-state and non-state organisations on the borders are 
Kizilay (Turkish Red Crescent) as a semi-state organisation, and the IHH (Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation), which is close to the government and almost turned into an organisation like 
Kizilay according to our interviewees.  
 
ASAM also has a branch in Sanliurfa, however it does not access the border zones but it mainly 
gives legal and logistical support to applicants of international protection and temporary 
protection. It does not involve in the cases of apprehensions and detentions. Also compared 
to Izmir and Istanbul, the Bar Association and its Refugee Support Unit has been still 
underdeveloped and based on voluntary service of few lawyers. For capacity building, lawyers 
 85 
   
from the Association seek to collaborate with their colleagues in Istanbul (Interview SRII-Urfa-
04). It is also observable that NGOs in the province intentionally avoid commenting on the 
border policies or coordination issues in the province, probably with the fear that several NGOs 
in the province were closed after the coup attempt (Interview SRII-Urfa-34). 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This report is based on both macro and meso level analysis. In relation to the macro-level, the 
analysis draws from the post-2011 legal and institutional border management framework. 
Alternatively, for the meso-level, the analysis was based on data collected via first hand 
interviews in five provinces: Izmir, Sanliurfa, Istanbul, Ankara, and Canakkale. The provinces 
were purposively selected on the basis of their importance for the implementation of pre-entry 
controls, border controls, as well as internal controls and returns. The selection also enables 
a comprehensive mapping of both state, non-state, and transnational actors involved in the 
implementation of border management and control policies. 
 
The overview of legislation reveals that Turkey has a highly fragmented legal framework 
regarding border management that has been subject to several amendments. Not only security 
related concerns, but also the relations with external actors such as the EU, have placed the 
goal of strengthening border management of Turkey as a priority. This goal has shaped the 
directions and content of legislations as well as the emergence of new border related actors in 
the last decades.  
 
Although having a more civilian border management structure has been one of the aims 
regarding border management since 2012, particularly in parallel to the EU demands, it took 
until 2015 to transfer border enforcement responsibilities to the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate 
General of Provincial Administration that formed the “Department of Border Management”; 
however in comparison to the existing law enforcement actors, this unit has quite a limited role. 
The fully uniformed and civilian border management unit “National Border Security 
Agency/Organization” which would take authority from Turkish Armed Forces, has not been 
yet established due to the instability in Turkey’s borders in relation to the Syrian Civil War. So, 
still more than 20 different actors are involved in border management, who have to deal and 
act according to the highly fragmented at least 25 different legal regulations that are 
overlapping and contradicting in some extent. Among them, the most prominent institutions for 
land border control include Land Forces Command and Gendarmerie General Command, 
while the sea border control are mainly under the authority of Turkish Coast Guard Command. 
In relation to border management, the DGMM carries out the activities regarding the control of 
regular and irregular migration, including deportations, as well as international protection. Also, 
at the local level, governors are defined as the commander of all the public and private law 
enforcement actors within the provincial borders including those related to border 
management. This commander role become high relevant for the governors of border 
provinces in the cases of irregular entries and exists such as observed in Izmir and Sanliurfa 
as well as for internal controls such as those observed in Istanbul. A number of semi state 
actors, such as the Turkish Red Crescent and Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation, 
started to take increasing roles in responding the mass refugee movements to Turkey as well 
as in supporting internal control mechanisms through household visits etc. Moreover, some 
national non-governmental organisations have carried out substantive roles in supporting the 
registration and protection needs of newly arrivals or those who are subject to deportations. 
Although privatization of border control57 is not a case in Turkey, the border management is 
                                                             
57 As it can be defined as relying on private actors from border control such as private security 
corporations or civilian gatekeepers, to control their borders (Vasanthakumar, 2018).  
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still highly centralized because it is observed that recently few NGOs took part in cross border 
activities. 
 
Not only national institutions, but also international institutions take a supportive role in 
Turkey’s border management. Since the late 1990s, the EU has had a high impact on Turkish 
border management legislations and the designs of national agencies through coordination 
and cooperation. In the last years, the Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey, 
as well as the Statement of 18 March, 2016 turned into a significant pillar of Turkey’s border 
management. Moreover, Frontex cooperated with Turkey through the memorandum of 
understanding for managing mixed flows, particularly those through the Aegean Sea. It has 
become a notable intergovernmental agency involved in border management in Turkey as it 
has served to strengthen technical expertise, infrastructure and cooperation among Turkey’s 
border agencies. The UNHCR also supports Turkish border management institutions with an 
emphasis on compliance with the refoulment principle, access to the registration, and asylum 
procedures for those in need of international protection and assistance.  
 
The major developments and milestones have occurred at different turning-points for each city 
where the fieldwork was conducted. Not only the population in those cities, but also border 
control related developments had an impact on the meso-level actors operating in each city. 
Thus, there are differences among different cities in Turkey. For example, the 2013-2014 
period is widely mentioned with mass arrivals in short time periods in Sanliurfa, while 2016 
was referred as the year that restrictive border controls for entries were observed. On the other 
hand, 2015 and 2016 can be seen as the period of dramatic change for Izmir. In this period, 
the new actors started to take a role in Izmir and the Aegean routes in relation with the dramatic 
increase of the border-crossings, migrants’ deaths and the so-called European Refugee Crisis.  
 has a and flexible policy mainly based on political decisions.  
 
As part of cross-border operations, Turkey has additional pre-entry measures, in particular 
regarding Syria. Parallel to the increasing numbers of refugees and the incidents at the 
borders, since 2015, the Turkish state has focused on pre-entry measures to control its border 
and enhance its border security against terrorist infiltration. Following Turkey’s cross border 
operations, interventions went beyond aid deliveries. Several institutions are involved in the 
establishment of cross-border camps and the reconstruction of Syrian cities. It seems that 
these activities aim at ameliorating conditions in northern Syria, which is the origin region of 
many Syrian refugees in Turkey. In addition to humanitarian concerns, Turkey has strategic 
interests as it approaches the control of the region as a security priority and preventing more 
crossings as vital. As of fall 2018, Turkish policy makers seem more determined about keeping 
the borders closed for mass arrivals and keeping displaced Syrians within Syria in relation to 
security concerns and terrorist infiltration.  
 
Regarding the “at the border” dimension, the change from the open-door policy to more strict 
border controls for both entry and exit points is clearly seen. In addition, the impact of the 15th 
July coup d’état has been significant. This impact can be seen as a new and accelerating factor 
in increasing securitisation. In this section, criminalisation of smuggling as well as increasing 
border surveillance and sea rescue appear as other significant dimensions. While an increase 
is smuggling is the case, new penalties have been introduced but they are evaluated as 
inadequate by the meso-level actors. Another important development in border surveillance, 
the establishment of a “security wall”, can be seen as a concrete reflection of securitisation.  
 
Regarding the entry and exit dimensions, Sanliurfa provides information mainly about mass 
irregular entries from Syria, while Izmir represents one of the exit points for mixed flows. In the 
light of the fieldwork, it is seen that due to the increasing securitisation at both entry and exit 
points, there has been an increase in border control. For entry, although travel documents are 
not required due to the international protection regulation regarding the land borders, entry 
from the land borders has become more difficult, and it is only possible under emergency 
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situations such as health to enter Turkey. On the other hand, existing policy has been the 
subject of stricter controls due to several factors, such as the EU-Turkey Statement and the 
15 July coup-d’état attempt. In relation to travel documents, passports and other border check 
measures at entry and also exit, more flexible implementation was the case at the beginning 
of the Syrian crisis. But with the construction of the “security wall” on the Turkey-Syria as well 
as on the Turkish-Iranian border, then the increasing restrictions have become visible. The 
most important common finding is the earlier flexible border controls starting form 2011 as a 
part of Turkey’s open-door policy but then, in particular by the end of 2015, stricter border 
management.  
 
None of the meso-level actors mentioned the use of force/violence by Turkish security forces 
to halt entries before 2016. First hand observers told that border guards, mainly soldiers, 
allowed individuals and groups from Syria to cross Turkish border and even helped them in 
crossing. In particular, the increasing securitisation along with the increasing number of 
refugees as well as the capacity limits have been emphasized regarding the more controlled 
entries.  
 
Regulations on stay, residency, and secondary movements from Turkey and within Turkey 
determine ways in which internal controls operate. The status granted to the migrants, 
conditions, requirements, and time limits about stays specified in the pertinent regulations 
serve as the techniques of power for providing internal controls. While the LFIP is the main 
legislation setting the stage for internal controls, there has been several supplementary pieces 
of legislations and/or specific legislations such as TPR and relevant circulars referred to during 
implementations. The address-based registration for migrants and asylum seekers (those 
under international and temporary protection) provides one of the main tools of internal controls 
of foreigners. Moreover, residence in the satellite cities (pre-determined cities) and reporting 
obligation of asylum seekers appear as an additional internal control mechanism. Those under 
temporary protection, Syrians, also need registration to legalize their stay and they have to 
stay in the province where they have completed their registration processes to be able to have 
access to the provided rights for them which can be seen as a de-facto residence limitation. 
This requirement for Syrians acts as an additional tool for internal controls, and it limits Syrians 
mobility in Turkey. Moreover, the verification and updating mechanisms have been launched 
to this end to control mobility of Syrians. In the last two years, one more additional control 
mechanism for Syrians is the requirement of a 15-day valid travel permit document, which is 
taken from Governorates when they travel to another city than that in which they register. This 
rule has been widely implemented by travel agencies which are subject to pay fees in the case 
of non-compliance. In addition, Syrians who travel to Syria and other countries need to get an 
exit permit. All these obligations about registration, reporting, updating, and travelling within 
and out of Turkey are critical for foreigners’ stay (protection from apprehension and 
deportation) in the country and their access to public services available to them such as health 
and education. They also raise questions about the refugees’ freedom of movement rights.  
 
In terms of internal controls, it is seen that the number of refugee families without IDs in general 
have decreased substantially. This is also related to the fact that the state is seeking to put 
more control, thus, it takes more cautious approach about registrations and issuing of 
identities. Not only new registrations but also the verification of previous registrations is 
important to control those staying in Turkey. The updating of registration data and renewal of 
IDs for several times work as an internal control mechanism. However, these procedures have 
not been conducted smoothly or consistently. Misinformation, the mistakes of officers in 
registrations processes, complexity in procedures, and coordination problems among different 
state institutions have caused serious problems, difficulties in accessing services, and losing 
previously received status.  
 
Apprehensions and administrative detention are also components of internal migration control. 
According to the LFIP and previous pieces of legislation(s), there are number of grounds for 
 88 
   
detaining foreigners. Among these situations, the vaguest is to pose a threat to public order or 
public security. Similarly, removal decisions are often taken on the grounds of the non-
compliance with obligations about entry-exit, residence and work and security reasons. It also 
tends to the criminalisation of the actions as ranging from being a member of terrorist activities, 
to overstaying a visa or the visa exemption. Although there is a right of appeal against removal 
decisions, it has been a quite complex bureaucratic process that gives difficult time to the 
person of the decision and their legal representatives such as lawyers. Moreover, since mid-
2016, the appeal right of the foreigners was almost eliminated with the legislative amendments 
that are conducted under the banner of measures against “terrorist threats”.  
 
Turkey’s legislation approaches return distinctly as “voluntary returns”; however, many 
interviewees stated the forced returns rather than volunteer ones as violating the non-
refoulment principle. As a part of return policy, the most important and effective factor seems 
to be the existence of the Readmission Agreement (2013) even though has not been 
implemented and the Statement (2016) despite the law number of the readmissions through 
this document in terms of border-crossing from Turkey to Greece. Although, it has been 
expressed that there is much confusions about the Readmission Agreement, the Statement 
and the Readmission Protocol between Turkey-Greece in Izmir, the impact was visible 
regarding the number of border-crossings. As also reflected from Ankara, those documents 
and their implementations are quite political and effected by the foreign policy domain. The 
Statement, while there was a significant impact on irregular border crossings, starting from 
2017 - although there are some fluctuations (due the weather, tourism reason and border 
patrolling etc.) - there has been a consistent increase again. In addition, as it was stated earlier, 
unlawful implementations regarding deportations have been also mentioned. 
 
In general, it has been seen that the Turkish central state has sought to keep its full power 
over the border related issues through its imperative command and devising procedures to 
retain regulative capacity. To this end, state actors needed to create a capacity to fulfil 
management needs such as observed in border controls, registrations, or returns. Non-state 
actors both enlarged their service areas and recently emerged to take some limited 
supplementary roles. The involvement of INGOs in border related issues remained quite 
limited, often in the form of support to capacity building. 
 
Finally, in terms of cooperation and collaboration among the border related actors, it can be 
briefly said that the main problem appears at the low representation of the related NGOs, lack 
of effective communication among the stakeholders, and the sheer lack of capacity. 
7. Policy Recommendations 
  
In formulating policy recommendations, this report concludes that Turkey should develop a 
more civilian border management structure and eliminate vagueness and contradictions in 
its legal framework. Regarding the “at the border” dimension, blocking the migratory flows 
in its neighbourhood by constructing a border wall or conducting unilateral military 
operations may not be an effective border management policy in the long run. In terms of 
“internal controls”, the implementation of travel permit measures should be re-formulated, 
as it significantly limits the exercise of freedom of movement of people who are under 
international or temporary protection in Turkey. In relation to return voluntary returns should 
be closely monitored and the non-refoulment principle should be always respected. In 
addition, the procedures and consequences of readmission agreements should be carefully 
analysed. Moreover, to comply with human right standards, Turkey should act more 
transparently and cooperatively with non-state actors in the apprehension, deportation, and 
voluntary return of asylum seekers. 
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8. Appendices 
 
8.1. List of Legislation 
 
Law-
Regulation 
# 
The title of the 
legislation in 
English 
The title of the 
legislation in 
Turkish 
Year 
 
Online access 
Law #2559 Police Powers 
and Duties Law  
Polis Vazife ve 
Salȃhiyet 
Kanunu 
1934 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.3.2559-20130712.pdf 
Law #5442 Law on Province 
Governance 
İl İdaresi 
Kanunu 
1949 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx
?MevzuatKod=1.3.5442&MevzuatIliski
=0&sourceXmlSearch 
Law #5683 Law on Residence 
and Travel of 
Foreigners in 
Turkey 
Yabancıların 
Türkiye'de 
İkamet ve 
Seyahatleri 
Hakkında 
1950 
Amendment
s: 2010 
Repeal of 
some 
provisions: 
2013  
due the 
LFIP.  
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.3.5683.pdf 
Law #2692 Law on Coast 
Guard  
Sahil Güvenlik 
Komutanlığı 
Kanunu 
1982 https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatM
etin/1.5.2692.pdf 
Regulation 
# 1553 
Regulation on 
Military Property 
Regions and 
Security Zones 
Askeri Yasak 
Bölgeler ve 
Güvenlik 
Bölgeleri 
Yönetmeliği 
 
1983 http://mevzuat.shgm.gov.tr/imevzuat/y
onetmelik/askeri.pdf  
Law #2803 Law on 
Gendarmerie 
Organization, 
Duties and 
Powers  
Jandarma 
Teşkilat, Görev 
ve Yetkileri 
Kanunu 
1983 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.5.2803.pdf 
Regulation 
# 1813 
Regulation on the 
General Role and 
Responsibility of 
Gendarmerie 
Jandarma 
Yönetmeliği  
1983 https://vatandas.jandarma.gov.tr/KYS
OP/uzaktan_egitim/Documents/jandar
mayonetmeligi.pdf 
Law #2929 Turkish Civil 
Aviation  
Türk Sivil 
Havacılık 
Kanunu 
1983 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.5.2920.pdf 
Law #3152 Law on the 
Organization and 
Duties of the 
Ministry of Interior 
İçişleri Bakanlığı 
Teşkilat ve 
Görevleri 
Hakkında 
Kanun 
1984 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.5.3152.pdf 
Law # 3497 
 
 
 
 
Law on the 
Protection and 
Security of Land 
Borders 
Kara Sınırlarının 
Korunması ve 
Güvenliği 
Hakkındaki 
Kanun 
1988 
 
 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin1.Asp
x?MevzuatKod=1.5.3497&MevzuatIlis
ki=0&sourceXmlSearch=&Tur=1&Terti
p=5&No=3497 
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Regulation 
#22127 
Regulation on the 
Procedures and 
the Principles 
Related to Mass 
Influx and 
Foreigners 
Arriving in Turkey 
Either as 
Individuals or in 
Groups Wishing to 
Seek Asylum 
Either from Turkey 
or Requesting 
Residence 
Permits with the 
Intention of 
Seeking Asylum 
from a Third 
Country 
 
 
Türkiye’ye İltica 
Eden veya 
Başka Bir 
Ülkeye İltica 
Etmek Üzere 
Türkiye’den 
İkamet İzni 
Talep Eden 
Münferit 
Yabancılar ile 
Topluca 
Sığınma 
Amacıyla 
Sınırlarımıza 
Gelen 
Yabancılara ve 
Olabilecek 
Nüfus 
Hareketlerine 
Uygulanacak 
Usul ve Esaslar 
Hakkında 
Yönetmelikte 
Değişiklik 
Yapılmasına 
Dair Yönetmelik 
1994 
 
Amendment
s: 2006 
http://www.multeci.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/1994-
Yonetmeligi.pdf. For amendments see 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2006/01/20060127-2.htm 
Law #5237 Turkish Penal 
Code 
Türk Ceza 
Kanunu 
2004 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/1.5.5237.pdf 
Law #5490 Civil Registration 
Services Law 
Nüfus 
Hizmetleri 
Kanunu 
2006 file:///C:/Users/hp/Downloads/Turkish
%20Civil%20Registration%20Service
s%20Law.pdf 
Regulation 
#27185 
Regulation for 
Changes 
Gendarmerie 
Organization’s 
Duties and 
Authorities 
Jandarma 
Teşkilati Görev 
ve Yetkileri 
Yönetmeliğinde 
Değişiklik 
Yapılmasına 
Dair Yönetmelik 
2009 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2009/03/20090330-2.htm 
Regulation 
#28057 
Regulation on 
Health 
Procedures 
Implementing on 
the Border Gates 
Hudut 
Kapilarinda 
Uygulanacak 
Sağlik Işlemleri 
Hakkinda 
Yönetmelik 
2011 
 
Amendment
s: 2006 
http://ttb.org.tr/mevzuat/index.php?opt
ion=com_content&view=article&id=88
8:hudut-kapilarinda-uygulanacak-
salik-lemler-hakkinda-
yoenetmelk&catid=2:ymelik&Itemid=3
3> 
For amendments see 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2006/01/20060127-2.htm 
Decree 
#640 
Decree on the 
Organization and 
Duties of the 
Ministry of 
Customs and 
Trade 
Gümrük ve 
Ticaret 
Bakanlığının 
Teşkilat ve 
Görevleri 
Hakkında 
Kanun 
Hükmünde 
Kararname 
2011 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2011/06/20110608M1-8.pdf  
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Law #6458 Law on 
Foreigners and 
International 
Protection (LFIP) 
Yabancılar ve 
Uluslararası 
Koruma Kanunu 
2014 https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatM
etin/1.5.6458.pdf 
Regulation 
#6883 
Regulation on 
Temporary 
Protection (TPR) 
Geçici Koruma 
Yönetmeliği 
2014 http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman2
8.pdf 
Regulation 
#28980  
Regulation on 
Reception and 
Removal Centres  
Kabul ve 
Barınma 
Merkezleri ile 
Geri Gönderme 
Merkezlerinin 
Kurulması, 
Yönetimi, 
İşlettirilmesi ve 
Denetimi 
Hakkında 
Yönetmelik 
2014 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2014/04/20140422-5.htm 
Regulation 
#29525 
Regulation on the 
Procedures and 
Principles for the 
Obligations of 
Airway Carriers 
Havayolu 
Taşıyıcılarının 
Yükümlülüklerin
e İlişkin Usul ve 
Esaslar 
Hakkında 
Yönetmelik 
2015 http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/
2015/11/20151107-6.htm 
Circular #: 
2016/8, 
55327416-
0000-
:10587 
Temporary 
Protection 
Implementation 
Circular 
Geçici Koruma 
Kapsamındaki 
Yabancılarla 
İlgili Yapılacak 
İş ve İşlemlerin 
Uygulanmasına 
Dair Usul ve 
Esaslar 
2016 http://kizilcahamam.meb.gov.tr/meb_i
ys_dosyalar/2016_03/22094122_gkku
sulveesaslargenelge.pdf  
Law #6698 Law on Protection 
of Personal 
Information 
Kişisel Verilerin 
Korunması 
Kanunu 
2016 https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatM
etin/1.5.6698.pdf 
Decree # 
30474 
Presidential 
Decree on 
Presidential 
Organization 
Cumhurbaşkanlı
ğı Teşkilatı 
Hakkında 
Cumhurbaşkanlı
ğı Kararnamesi 
2018 http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMe
tin/19.5.1.pdf 
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8.2. List of Interviews 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-01. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the high-level officer of the law 
enforcement/ state security agency, 10 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-02. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the regional office 
representative of an IGO, 14 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-03. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the administrative 
coordinator of a national NGO, 15 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-04. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of the 
regional coordinator of a national NGO, 17 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-05. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the lawyer (refugee rights 
advocate), 28 August 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-08. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of an IGO, 
16 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-10. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of an IGO, 
19 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-11. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of an 
IGO, 23 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-12. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with representative of the regional 
coordinator of a national NGO, 24 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Izmir-13. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the officer of the provincial 
state migration management agency, 25 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Izmir-14. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the high-level commander of 
the law enforcement/ state (gendarmerie) agency, 26 October 2018, Izmir, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Canakkale-06. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the local journalist, 
15 October 2018, Canakkale, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Canakkale-07. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the Officer of the law 
enforcement/ state security (sea) agency, 15 October 2018, Canakkale, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Ankara-01. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of a 
national NGO, 12 November 2018, Ankara, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Ankara-02. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the high-level officer of state 
agency,12 November 2018, Ankara, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Ankara-03. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the representative of the EU, 
15 November 2018, Ankara, Turkey. 
Interview SRII- Ankara-04. Conducted by N. Ela Gokalp Aras with the high-level 
representatives of an IGO, 21 November 2018, Ankara, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Urfa-01. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the high-level state officer, 11 July 
2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey.  
 93 
   
Interview SRII-Urfa-02. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the regional coordinator of an NGO, 
12 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-03. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the president of national NGOs, 12 
July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-04. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the lawyer (refugee rights 
advocate), 12 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-09. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the coordinator officer of semi-state 
association, 16 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-13. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the district officer, 18 July 2018, 
Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-14. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the director of Syrian NGO, 18 July 
2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-15. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the president of local ethnic 
solidarity NGO, 18 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-22. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the district officer, 18 July 2018, 
Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Urfa-23. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the representative from town hall, 
22 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Urfa-24. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the representative of national NGO, 
23 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey.  
 
Interview SRII-Urfa-25. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the local person from town hall, 22 
July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
Interview SRII-Urfa-26. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the president of local humanitarian 
aid platform/umbrella organization, 25 July 2018, Sanliurfa, Turkey. 
 
Interview SRII-Urfa-34. Conducted by Z. S. Mencutek with the president of a national NGO, 26 
July 2016, Sanliurfa, Turkey, conducted by Zeynep Sahin Mencutek. 
Interview OzU-Istanbul-01. Conducted by Susan Rottmann with the representative of an NGO, 
1 October 2018, Istanbul, Turkey.  
 
Interview OzU-Istanbul-02. Conducted by Susan Rottmann with the representative of an 
INGOs, 1 November 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
Interview OzU-Istanbul-04. Conducted by Susan Rottmann with the representative of a 
national NGO, 10 November 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Interview OzU-Istanbul-06. Conducted by Susan Rottmann with the representative of an NGO, 
16 November 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Interview, BilgiU-Istanbul-02. Conducted by Ayhan Kaya with the regional coordinator of an 
NGO, 1 October 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Interview BilgiU-Meso-Istanbul-03. Conducted by Ayhan Kaya with the representative of an 
NGO, 9 October 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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Interview BilgiU-Meso-Istanbul-05. Conducted by Ayhan Kaya with the programme assistant 
of an NGO, 1 November 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
Interview BilgiU-Istanbul-07. Conducted by Ayhan Kaya with the Representative of IGOs, 09 
November 2018, Istanbul, Turkey. 
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